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Research conducted on emotion by psychologists has produced numerous understandings of the 
concept and there is currently no consensus as to how it should be defined (Russell, 2012).  Despite 
some general agreement among some theorists as to certain aspects, such as physiological 
response, eliciting events, and related facial expressions, it is a persistent issue and discussions as 
to how a solution may be found have recurred at various points throughout the history of 
psychology.  Some work has been done to address the problem through the meta-analysis of various 
definitions and this has proved to be useful in showing the areas where psychologists might agree 
(e.g. Izard, 2010; Kleinginna & Kleinginna, 1981; Plutchik, 1980).  There is an assumption, 
therefore, that with enough research and debate a solution will be found.  However, this assumption 
neglects to take into account the changing ontological and methodological contexts through which 
emotion has been defined in psychological science.  For this reason the current debates lack a 
broader contextualisation which could reveal what has influenced the production of particular 
definitions and the reasons why the problems of definition have come about.  This thesis aims to 
address this gap in the literature by presenting a historical analysis of the understandings of emotion 
which were produced during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Although there has 
been a great deal of historical work produced which examines psychological theories from this 
time, there is little, apart from Dixon (2012) which is specifically aimed at contextualising this 
particular issue.  In particular, this thesis will examine one respect in which emotion is often 
defined; as that of being a subjective experience.  This understanding, whilst it most often seems 
to be the way in which people, if asked, define emotion (Davitz, 1970) has, historically, proved to 
be contentious in psychological science, perhaps because it is difficult to capture.  The thesis 
describes the method of introspection and its use as a means to examine the subjective experience 
of emotion during the early years of psychology, and looks at what can be learned about the issue 
of definition through an understanding of the work conducted during that period.  It is shown that 
introspective analyses often presented a picture of emotions as complex, idiosyncratic and 
individual experiences and that these characteristics contrasted with the assumptions of the 
emerging scientific psychology that emotion should be defined as structured, predictable and 
universal.  The search for a concept of emotion which embodied the latter rather than the former 
characteristics is described, and it is demonstrated that the result was a variety of different 
conceptualisations.  The thesis concludes that it is important not to view the current problem simply 
as one of academic differences over the veracity of definitions, but to contextualise it in relation to 
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1.1 The problem of defining emotion 
Attempts to define the emotions and elucidate their character have ornamented 
the intellectual landscape for over two thousand years.  Two characteristics of 
the continuing colloquy are particularly noteworthy: first, the presumption of 
palpability and, second, the interminability of debate. (Gergen, 1996, p. 60) 
 
No question arises concerning the intensely personal and private aspect of the 
emotions: there always has been something sacred in the feelings and 
affections of the human individual which stood aghast at any attempt to make 
a scientific probe...If the anecdotal period was something to be combated and 
circumvented in the work of animal psychology because we regarded so many 
animals as pets, how much harder was it to be objective about an experience 
that was so intensely subjective in ourselves. (Ruckmick, 1936, p. 24) 
 
For a topic of rather central importance in the emergence of modern 
psychology, introspection has not been accorded the historical attention it 
deserves. From the global statements and glib generalizations that abound one 
might easily get the impression that introspection always meant the same thing, 
irrespective of time and place. That, of course, is far from true, and if we are to 
avoid historically unjustified generalizations about “paradigms” and so forth, 
we will have to develop a far more differentiated view of the topic than 
presently prevails. (Danziger, 1980, p. 241) 
 
The number and diversity of definitions of emotion and the failure of psychologists to 
come to a consensus on exactly what emotion is are persistent problems in psychology 
and, although several attempts have been made by psychologists to get to grips with 
these issues they are viewed as continuing to hamper the progress of affective science 
(Russell, 2012).  The purpose of this first chapter is to describe these difficulties, the 
attempts to understand and solve them and also to outline the novel approach that will 
be taken in this thesis to examine them.  The first section will outline the extent to 
which they have been reported as a concern by psychologists.  It will further analyse 
the reasons for them and solutions to them which have been proposed by theorists, 
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before presenting an argument for the line which will be taken in the chapters that 
follow.  The second and third sections give some historical background and the final 
section will outline the contents of Chapter Two to Chapter Seven.  
 
1.1.1 Lack of consensus on a definition of emotion  
In psychological science, there is currently a plethora of definitions of emotion and no 
agreement as to how emotion should be defined.  This issue was highlighted most 
recently in a special section of Emotion Review.  In that edition1, Russell (2012), 
describes the unsettled state of current research on emotion: that there is still no 
consensual definition of the concept and that it is still not clear which psychological 
events psychologists should include as being emotions.  Although, as Izard (2010) has 
shown, there may be some convergence as to different elements of emotion such as 
physiological response, eliciting events and cognitive appraisal, he has also stated that 
“Research on emotion flourishes in many disciplines and specialities, yet experts 
cannot agree on its definition.  Theorists and researchers use the term emotion in ways 
that imply different processes and meanings” (Izard, 2007, p. 2).  These problems, 
however, are not novel; they have pervaded the one hundred and fifty year evolution 
of psychology as a scientific discipline and have been highlighted by theorists over 
and over again at particular points of its development.  Not long after the advent of the 
discipline, psychologists were highlighting these issues as a focus for discussion.  In 
1928, Madison Bentley, Professor of Psychology at Cornell University, speaking at 
the first international symposium for feelings and emotions research, stated that he was 
far from certain that psychologists were all talking about the same thing when they 
used the term emotion.  He went on to describe the great variation in definitions that 
had emerged within the early years of the discipline,  
Whatever concerns emotions by way of experience and by way of bodily 
processes is proper material for description.  Its varieties, its history, its 
                                                          
1 The edition includes a range of papers from psychology, philosophy and history to present a number of views of 
the issue.  
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pathology and its subsequent effect upon the organism are all thrilling matters 
for investigation.  But to another psychologist, emotion means glandular 
products and visceral incidents, to a third the action of the autonomic nervous 
system, to still  another, a type of external bodily activity or deportment; or 
again a pleasant or unpleasant reaction upon events or a 'mental state'.  (p. 21) 
 
This statement is illustrative of how the defining of emotion in psychology has often 
been characterised as a conundrum in need of a solution.  Although, during the period 
in the mid-twentieth century when behaviourism dominated psychology, there was not 
a great deal of interest in how the issue might be solved, it reappeared with the return 
of the mind in cognitive psychological accounts in the 1960s.  In 1973, Fantino 
described the effect of the lack of a consensual definition on the field of affective 
psychology.  He stated, “Unfortunately, emotional behaviour has not been 
scientifically studied with the same breadth and depth as many other fields of 
psychology.  One reason for this dearth of knowledge and of agreement about emotion 
is the problem of defining what emotion is” (p. 281).  In the early eighties, the problem 
was most usefully highlighted in a paper summarising the psychological 
understandings of emotion that had been produced by psychologists, throughout 
psychology’s history, up to that year.  Kleinginna and Kleinginna (1981) listed ninety-
two theories and definitions.  The paper presented the enormity of the issue very 
starkly, indicating the diversity and breadth of definitions that psychological theorists 
had produced throughout psychology’s history.  Richards (2010) has claimed, 
however, that Kleinginna and Kleinginna's paper included a mere fraction of the 
number.  He argues that philosopher-psychologists of the nineteenth century had also 
been greatly concerned with defining the concept and had found a variety of ways to 
do so.  Certainly, since 1981, the number and range of definitions of emotions have 
continued to proliferate, particularly in relation to the development of neuroscientific 
understandings, and it would appear that psychologists are no nearer consensus than 
they were at that time. 
Therefore, the more recent focus on the issue has come about because there is a 
concern that, although research into emotion continues apace, researchers are not 
researching the same subject because they are conceptualising the term in different 
ways.  Further, it is felt that the lack of an agreed definition is preventing a focused 
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debate and continues to stand in the way of progress in the field (Mulligan & Scherer, 
2012).  Critics of affective psychology have argued that if theorists are not describing 
emotion in a consistent way they cannot produce a coherent body of knowledge which 
progresses the understanding of the phenomenon.  For example, different 
psychologists have regarded different psychological events as basic emotions – that is 
emotions that are viewed as being the most universal, primitive or important.  They 
have often included different psychological events in this category, simply because 
they differ in terms of how they define emotion.  Tomkins (1984) defining emotion as 
related to density of neural firing, described nine basic emotions: anger, interest, 
contempt, disgust, distress, fear, joy, shame and surprise; Panskepp (1982), who 
understands emotion to be a hardwired biological response, four: expectancy, fear, 
rage and panic; and Ekman, Friesen and Ellsworth (1982), viewing these as having 
universal facial expressions described six.  Indeed, this inability of psychologists to 
decide on what the primary emotions are has led to calls for the abandonment of the 
idea of discrete basic emotions entirely (Ortony & Turner, 1990). 
This is illustrative of just how significant the issues of diversity of definition and lack 
of consensus in affective science are and how, as emotions research continues, whilst 
not always foremost in the minds of researchers, these issues underlie the work that 
they produce.  They even, in the minds of some theorists, both past and current, cause 
a question to hang over the usefulness of the concept of emotion in psychology (e.g. 
Dixon, 2012; Russell, 2012; Scarantino, 2012).  Duffy (1941, p. 292) stated “I can see 
no reason for a psychological study of ‘emotion' as such.  Emotion has no 
distinguishing characteristics.  It merely represents an extreme manifestation of 
characteristics found in some degree in all responses”.  Fantino (1973) concluded that 
it seemed futile retaining the concept in psychology given the seeming impossibility 
of definition.2  Despite this scepticism that has arisen at times from some quarters, 
there does not appear to be a great deal of support in current affective science for the 
                                                          
2 Kleinginna & Kleinginna (1981), cite, what they call, nine ‘skeptical statements’ as to the usefulness of retaining 
the concept in psychology. These statements include those who argue that emotion, as a term, does not point to a 
coherent psychological phenomenon. 
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rejection of the concept entirely.  It is vital, therefore, that psychologists find a way of 
understanding why these problems persist.   
 
1.1.2 Attempts to understand and address the problem 
As well as describing the impediment to the understanding of emotion that the 
difficulties surrounding its definition have produced, some psychologists have also 
been moved to formulate suggestions as to why these problems exist and how they 
might most usefully be tackled.  This section will present a review of a range of these 
proposals and, in doing so, will contextualise the particular approach that this thesis 
will take within the existing literature.  Three approaches to understanding the problem 
will be described: first, the idea that emotion is a naturally complex psychological 
phenomenon and that definitions must necessarily be multifaceted and complex; 
second, the view that the development of different forms of psychological knowledge 
and traditions of research have been instrumental in the production of different 
emotion definitions; and third, the notion that the production of a scientific 
understanding of emotion is a problem because it is contingent on the everyday 
meanings that the term emotion holds.  
The most persistent view in psychology is that there are many understandings of 
emotion because emotion is a complex phenomenon.  Kleinginna & Kleinginna's 
(1981) paper, mentioned above, presented the most comprehensive review of emotions 
definitions and is the best example of a paper that has attempted to analyse the 
problem, although now somewhat out of date.  The complexity of the phenomenon 
was demonstrated by their placing of the definitions into eleven different categories on 
the basis of the particular theoretical issues theorists emphasised.  Drawing on 
definitions from dictionaries, as well as physiological, introductory and well-known 
texts in psychology, the paper highlighted not only the great number of definitions but 
also the range and diversity of components that were discussed by psychologists as 
being aspects of emotion.  The categories highlighted by the authors include the 
experiential categories of affect and cognition; physical categories of external 
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emotional stimuli, physiological mechanisms and expressive behaviour; those that 
emphasise adaptation; those that discuss motivation and those that are multifaceted.  
As the authors describe, most of the ninety-two definitions could be placed in more 
than one category indicating that theorists, in general, consider emotion to be a multi-
aspect phenomenon.  The final category contains some attempts at providing 
definitions that draw together a range of aspects in one definition; most commonly 
affective, cognitive, physiological and behavioural aspects.  However, even within this 
grouping there are differences, both as to what aspects to include, which are most 
salient, and also how these components fit together.  Finally, from the definitions that 
they present, the authors provide a definition of emotion that encompasses a range of 
these understandings and which can describe what they view as the complexity of 
emotion, 
Emotion is a complex set of interactions among subjective and objective 
factors, mediated by neural/hormonal systems, which can (a) give rise to 
affective experiences such as feelings of arousal, pleasure/displeasure; (b) 
generate cognitive processes such as emotionally relevant perceptual effects, 
appraisals, labelling processes; (c) activate widespread physiological 
adjustments to the arising conditions; and (d) lead to behaviour that is often, 
but not always expressive, goal-directed and adaptive.  (p. 355) 
 
The conceptualisation of emotion as a complex hybrid of several different aspects is 
one that is particularly ingrained in affective psychology.  Throughout the twentieth 
century, there has been an ever-growing list of elements that a good definition of 
emotion is expected to encompass.  Lazarus (1991a; 1991b), for example, has 
maintained that a good theory of emotion should address twelve different issues, 
including the role of action tendencies and physiology; distinctions between an 
emotion and a non-emotion; the role of appraisal and consciousness; and the 
relationship between the biological and sociocultural bases of emotion.  Izard (2010), 
similarly, views emotion as a diverse and complex phenomenon.  He examined the 
problem of lack of consensus by consulting current leading theorists in emotion 
research as to the various elements they viewed as being included in the concept.  From 
the responses that he got, although there seemed to be broad agreement on the 
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“structures3 and functions”4 of emotion, there were distinct differences as to which 
were perceived as most salient.  What is clear from this exercise, however, is that 
definitions of emotion commonly combine an assortment of characteristics which are 
subject to change over time and between theorists. 
Even though several multi-aspect definitions have been produced, none as yet have 
proved to be completely satisfactory.  Recently, for example, in another special section 
of Emotion Review, four different approaches to emotion are discussed: basic emotion 
theory, appraisal theory, psychological construction theory and social construction 
theory.  The points of agreement between these were looked at, in order to attempt to 
produce a definition which integrated all the necessary aspects.  The following quote 
from Russell (2014, p.1), indicates both the continued adherence of psychologists to 
multifaceted understandings of emotion, and also the difficulties of producing one with 
which to satisfy all theorists, 
Areas of agreement emerged. The nature–nurture debate is behind us: it’s both. 
All believe in evolution; all believe in culture. In addition, all believe in 
appraisal processes. But then, appraisal theories come in two (or maybe three) 
importantly different flavors. All rejected essentialism (Or have they? 
wondered Zachar, 2014). Some apparent differences among the 
perspectives…seem superficial. Some differences pertain merely to what part 
of the whole is thought more interesting. Some differences pertain to different 
conclusions drawn from existing empirical evidence. Other differences, 
however, run deeper—including defining what an emotion is and determining 
whether these four theories are theories of the same thing. Some differences 
remain elusive. 
 
It seems, largely, as if the more research is conducted on emotion the more difficult it 
is to pin down scientifically.  This leads on to the second point to be covered in this 
section: the idea that the variety of definitions and deficiency of consensus has been 
due to the breadth of the discipline of psychology itself.  It is argued that it is not 
                                                          
3 Structures include: dedicated neural systems, response systems, feeling state, expressive behaviour, antecedent 
cognitive appraisal and cognitive interpretation of feeling state (Izard, 2010, p.365). 
4  Functions include: recruits response systems, motivates cognition and action, organises responses, monitors 
significance of events, provides information or meaning, relational, social, controls responses, motivates behaviour 





simply that emotion is a complex phenomenon, but the problems perisist because 
psychology is a complex and diverse discipline and has taken various approaches to 
the study of emotion at different times in its history (Gergen, 1996).  Most theorists, 
however, would see these as two sides of the same coin: that it is because emotion is 
complex it has necessarily been studied through many different approaches.  This is 
highlighted, above, by the attempts to find common ground between the four different 
approaches covered by Russell (2014).  It is also shown very starkly in the work of 
K.T. Strongman.  Over the last thirty years Strongman has published five editions of 
The Psychology of Emotion.  The book describes the theories of emotion that 
psychologists have produced historically and also includes current theories.  Each 
edition has had to be adapted with regard to the theories included with the changing 
shape of the epistemological and methodological landscape.  In the latest edition, 
Strongman (2003) describes 150 theories of emotion.  He separates them into different 
types, including phenomenological, cognitive, behavioural and physiological, but 
acknowledges that he has not covered everything.  “Emotion”, Strongman (1987) says 
“has sometimes been defined, for example, as a state of the organism which affects 
behaviour and sometimes more directly as a response.  When defined as a state, it is 
sometimes regarded as mentalistic, and sometimes as physiological.  When defined as 
a response, it is sometimes seen as physiological and sometimes as behavioural” (p. 
7).  As amply illustrated above emotion has been studied from many different angles. 
As psychology developed into a diverse discipline, the understanding of emotion, 
arguably more than any other field of psychology, was, and continues to be, affected 
by the variety of approaches.  It could be argued that this diversity results in the 
production of rounder and more complex understandings and in capturing more 
characteristics of the phenomenon.  Alternatively, the result of this diversity could be 
viewed as having produced the situation, first described by Bentley (1928), that it is 
not clear if theorists are really discussing the same psychological entity when they use 
the term emotion. 
Some theorists have put the lack of consensus down to the lack of connection between 
the different strands of research through which emotion has been explored (Mulligan 
& Scherer, 2012).  As described, there have been attempts to tie these different threads 
of research together, to find points of commonality and shared interests.  Despite this, 
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the ontological differences between these approaches continue to present a barrier to 
finding a common definition.  It has been argued that theorists are often unwilling to 
let go of the legacies of the particular tradition that their research follows in order to 
produce agreement.  Hebb argued back in 1949 that, in emotions research in particular, 
tradition carried a great deal of weight.  More recently, Mulligan and Scherer (2012, 
p. 346) stated that “There is little hope that there ever will be agreement on a common 
definition of emotion, given the sacred traditions of the disciplines involved and the 
egos of the scholars working in these disciplines.”  Traditional lines of demarcation in, 
for example, the evolutionary or psycho-physiological traditions, have divided its 
study into separate branches of research each having very different types of scientific 
language, methods and theories.  Gendron and Barrett (2009) and Russell (2014) 
describe three particular types of psychologist working in affective psychology – basic 
theorists, appraisal theorists and psychological constructionists, and highlight the 
historical lines of development of these approaches and the fundamental differences 
that exist between them.  The disagreement between psychological constructionist 
theorists and basic theorists as to the existence of discrete emotions is just one of many 
ontological differences that characterise the field.  Further, even within these broad 
categories there have been numerous ways of understanding emotion throughout 
psychology's history.  For example, Scarantino and Griffiths (2011) describe three 
ways to describe emotion as 'basic' – psychologically, biologically or conceptually.  
Entrenchment of theorists within their traditions can cause emotion definitions to be 
understood only within particular research contexts and to perpetuate communication 
difficulties between psychologists.  So although there may be points of mutual 
agreement, there are also significant epistemological and methodological barriers to 
consensus. 
Although, as has been described, some theorists have attempted to bring together 
different traditions in grand theories of emotion, it seems that theorists are often 
unwilling to let go of the understandings of emotion which exist within their own 
particular paradigms.  Indeed, these comprehensive theories of emotion have not been 
particularly successful, because of the reductive nature of psychological research.  
Kleinginna and Kleinginna’s comprehensive definition, for example, was criticised by 
Strongman (1987) as not useful to research – he views it as overly complex and too 
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inclusive.  Rather, he says, definitions need to include some but not all aspects of 
emotion in order that they can be useful to emotions research.  Young (1973) also 
illustrated this characteristic of psychological research when he stated that “The 
trouble with the psychologist is that emotional processes and states are complex and 
can be analysed from so many different points of view that a complete picture is 
virtually impossible.  It is necessary, therefore, to examine emotional events piecemeal 
and in different systematic contexts” (p. 749).  Although emotion may be understood 
as having many different aspects, different research approaches can only cope with 
fairly narrow definitions of emotion.  
While emotion continues to be conceptualised differently in different research 
contexts, a related issue, and the third point to be raised in this section, has been 
highlighted as causing the problem: that of the use of an everyday concept as a 
scientific concept.  Scarantino, for example,  has argued, that psychologists should 
view scientific uses of the term emotion as separate from everyday applications of the 
term if they are to develop a concept devoid of the baggage of its meaning in the world 
outside the lab (Scarantino, 2012; Scarantino & Griffiths, 2011).  Scarantino and 
Griffiths, as well as Barrett (2006), argue that there has been in psychology a natural 
kind assumption. This is the premise that everyday emotion categories are internally 
homogeneous and can be delineated scientifically.  Griffiths (1997) suggests, it may 
be rather that some emotions, such as  anger, are adequately described by particular 
biological or psychological theories whereas other instances of emotion, such as guilt, 
will require other kinds of explanation, as related to culture and environment for 
example.  It is not possible, therefore, for science to take everyday understandings of 
emotion or particular emotions and to define them in a way that will adequately 
provide a basis for scientific study.  Rather, Scarantino (2012) suggests that the study 
of emotion should be conducted in two separate projects: the Folk Emotion Project, 
which can describe how people use traditional emotion categories and the Scientific 
Emotion Project, which aims to discover natural kind definitions of emotion which 
will be useful for scientific research.  Rather than using everyday emotion terms, the 
latter could rename instances of emotional events using neologisms, such as ‘WS34’ 
for anger (Scarantino, 2012, p. 366).  The problem with this approach, however, is that 
is sets up a dichotomy between an emotion as an everyday occurrence and one as 
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scientific occurrence.  The question is whether the scientific definition will have 
enough in common with the everyday occurrence in order to provide some useful 
understanding of emotion, given the extent to which emotions are subject to people’s 
cultural and linguistic interpretations (Mesquita & Leu, 2007; Wierzbicka, 1995).  It 
also highlights something quite fundamental about the study of emotion in psychology: 
that psychologists are often more concerned about producing understandings which 
reflect particular scientific values, than they are about understanding what emotion 
means in the lives of people.   
Thus, this overview of the issue of the proliferation of definitions of emotion and the 
resulting lack of consensus in psychology has described several concerns.  It has 
outlined the persistence of these problems and the difficulty psychologists have had in 
finding a solution.  It has identified, also, some reasons that have been proposed for 
these concerns:  first, that emotion is a complex phenomenon; second, that there has 
been an increasing range of different approaches to researching emotion in psychology 
and third, that scientific understandings of emotion may be tainted by everyday 
conceptualisations of the term.  In attempting to understand these issues this thesis will 
look at how these reasons may be connected, although not in the ways that have been 
so far suggested.  Although, as described, some theorists would argue that there are 
many different approaches to researching emotion because emotion is a complex 
phenomenon, this thesis will examine the view that it is, rather, that emotion is 
characterised in psychology as being a multifaceted phenomenon because 
psychological science is a broad and fragmented discipline.  It will explore the idea 
that psychologists cannot simply assume that emotion is a complex phenomenon, but 
that the meaning that the term emotion holds in psychology is linked directly to the 
ways in which psychologists have attempted to observe and understand it and that, as 
the number of approaches to studying emotion have increased, so too has the 
complexity of its conceptualisation. This idea will be considered throughout the 
chapters of this thesis, where the early development of the science of psychology is 
described and with it the development of the concept of emotion.  The third point made 
above, however, highlights a particular issue for psychologists and one that will also 
be the focus of what follows: that, in defining emotion scientifically, psychologists are 
attempting to capture an everyday, individual, subjective and, essentially, private 
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experience.  The following section will examine the extent to which this is an issue for 
affective science and will argue that exploring this matter may help us get to the root 
of the problems of the proliferation of definitions of emotion. 
1.1.3 The subjective experience of emotion 
This section describes the idea of emotion as a subjective experience and how it has 
fared in psychological understandings of emotion.  It will illustrate the tendency for 
this characterisation to be neglected in psychological research because experience 
cannot be directly observed in participants, and it is also currently viewed as 
scientifically unacceptable for psychologists to be seen to be using their own 
experiences to understand emotion.  It will suggest, however, that as people who 
experience emotion, psychologists themselves implicitly bring their subjective 
experiences to their research when they study emotion, and will argue for the need to 
examine the role this plays in the production of different understandings of emotion.  
Some evidence points to the fact that while psychologists struggle to define emotion 
scientifically, people, in contrast, seem very much at ease with the concept.  As Young 
(1973) has stated “almost everyone except the psychologist knows what an emotion 
is” (p. 749).  This assertion was illustrated by research done by Davitz (1970), having 
noticed that “a psychologist talking to another psychologist about his emotions is not 
a situation likely to elicit clarity of communication” (p. 251).  Davitz examined how 
ordinary people communicated with each other about emotion.  He found that they 
referred to “experiences – not to behaviours, not to situations, and certainly not to 
measures obtained from an electroencephalogram or a galvonometer” (p. 251).  He 
also noted that although they had no knowledge of behavioural theories or of the 
physiological conditions that accompanied emotion, they were able to discuss emotion 
more coherently than the psychologists with whom he worked.    
Although people tend to describe emotion simply as an experience, psychological 
researchers are apt to be concerned predominantly with other views of emotion.  
Plutchik (1980) found that most definitions do not refer to the subjective aspect of 
emotions.  Further, Izard (2010) has shown that even though some theorists agree that 
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the subjective or phenomenological perspective is important to the understanding of 
emotion, their acceptance of it  is very much dependent on the particular area of the 
discipline they come from.  Sixty-seven of Kleinginna and Kleinginna's (1981) 
definitions mention this aspect, and they state that psychologists included the affective 
aspect5 more frequently than any other characteristic.  However, it is not considered 
by many psychologists to be the only feature of emotion, or even the most important, 
and indeed many psychologists do not include it at all.  Although, some theorists have 
developed explicitly phenomenological theories of emotion, focused particularly on 
experience - Strongman (2003) discusses the work of Stumf, Sartre, Hillman, Fell and 
Denzin, for example - these appear to have had little impact on the ideas of emotion 
espoused by current experimental work.   
The scientific psychology of emotion has therefore often been characterised by the 
uncomfortable position psychologists have with regard to emotional experience. 
Magda Arnold (1960) recognised the problem of the neglect of the subjective 
experience of emotion by most psychologists and, in contrast, advocated that it be 
centre stage in any understanding of emotion.  She described a situation in which the 
more that psychologists described emotion scientifically, the more it appeared to move 
away from the everyday human phenomenon that it sought to understand and this 
movement, she argued, had profound effects on the relevance of the knowledge that 
psychologists were producing.  She stated that “When the connection between any 
system and common experience snaps, that system (and not common sense) is doomed. 
At best, it will maintain itself in a forgotten eddy in the stream of scientific endeavour 
without contributing to scientific advance” (p. 6).  So, although psychologists were 
producing a range of diverse scientific understandings of emotion, it appeared that 
there was something unsatisfactory in the way they reflected emotion as it was 
understood through experience.  This issue is one that some affective theorists have 
begun to explore again more recently.  Barrett (2006)6 presented a meta-analysis of 
recent work that has been conducted to understand emotion through the emotional 
                                                          
5 Kleinginna & Kleinginna use the term ‘affective aspect’ to denote the subjective feeling or experience of emotion. 
6 Barrett’s study focuses on the results of verbal reports on the experience of emotion to show how these have 
failed to reveal differences in experience between different emotions e.g. fear and anger.   
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experiences of participants.  Despite this work, Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner and Gross 
(2007) acknowledge that there is often an assumption in current affective science that 
emotion can and should be explained simply in neurobiological terms.  Both Barrett et 
al.and Costall (2013) argue that, since behaviourism attempted to brand subjective 
knowledge as being unscientific, there continues to be a dualism between the 
subjective and the objective which persists in defining the work that psychologists do.  
They claim that there is a persistent attitude that if psychologists are to produce a truly 
scientific understanding of emotion, the idea of subjective experience should be done 
away with entirely.  This echoes Panskepp’s (1982) discussion of the issue in which 
he stated that “It is difficult to agree how, within the constraints of scientific 
objectivity, we can derive substantive understanding of phenomena that appear 
intimately linked to the internal experiences of organisms” (p. 407).  Indeed, the 
tendency in psychology generally seems to be the presentation of a distinction between 
emotions as human experiences, which are not to be trusted, and scientific 
representations of emotion which are trustworthy.  So, while phenomenologists would 
regard the former as the definition of an emotion, many theorists of emotion tend to 
reject the veracity of human experience and consign it to folk psychology (e.g. 
Scarantino, 2012). 
Although it is certainly true that the experience of emotion has been often neglected 
as an object of study in psychology, even more overlooked is an understanding of the 
effect of psychologists’ own subjective emotional experiences on the study of emotion 
that they conduct.  As Valentine (1982) has argued, 
A particular difficulty is due to reflexivity.  Not only is it the case that the 
observer and the observed are often members of the same species, but also that 
actually doing psychology constitutes part of its subject matter.  This means 
that at the very least psychological theories must be self-referring in the sense 
of explaining the psychologist’s own behavior. (p. 4) 
 
If, as Valentine states, theories must explain psychologists’ own behaviour, is there 
then something about the inadequacy of psychological theories of emotion that they 
are not widely accepted in psychology because they fail, not simply to adequately 
describe emotion scientifically, but to describe emotion in a way that make sense even 
to psychologists themselves, as experiencing, emotional human beings? 
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Costall (2013) argues that when we understand the production of psychological 
knowledge as being a human practice, it is clear that subjective experiences of emotion 
and the objective descriptions of emotion psychologists produce are inextricably 
linked.  Kagan (2007, p. 1) states, that the emergence in psychology of a reliance on 
methods to describe invisible objects “objectified a subjective state”.  This statement 
characterises the position of emotion in psychology where psychologists cannot view 
and measure participants’ experiences, but can view and measure what are seen as the 
accompaniments to the experience such as facial expression and physiological 
responses.  As Danziger (1990) and Lamont (2013) describe, this means that these 
indirect measures must be assumed to represent the phenomenon that is being studied.  
An occurrence of an emotional experience in a participant can only be inferred by 
observing their expression, looking at their heart rate on a monitor or viewing the lit 
up areas on a brain scan or by a verbal report.  It has been argued, therefore, that 
psychologists own experiences of emotion must come into play in the experimental 
process (Strongman, 1987).  These measures described above must necessarily be 
subject to the interpretation of the psychologist who must have some a priori 
experience of the phenomenon in order to understand their significance.  Therefore, 
although Barrett et al. and others, have attempted recently to reinvigorate the inclusion 
of experience in the experimental study of emotion, it could be claimed, rather, that it 
has never really gone away. 
Fell (1977) has argued that a psychologist’s experience of emotion not only feeds into 
the research but is necessary for the research to begin.  In terms of how the elicitation 
of emotions in the lab is conducted, for example, psychologists must have some 
knowledge of emotion in order to understand what is being elicited and the necessary 
stimuli to do so.  As Strongman (1987) states, an emotion can only be accepted as 
occurring in an experiment if a person is having an emotional experience “How can 
we know a stimulus is ‘emotional’ without finding that it leads to…the emotional 
experience?  It is difficult to define the stimulus independently of the response” (p. 8).  
While facial expression, raised heart rate and increased motivation to act may be 
aspects which indicate that an emotion is happening, if an emotional experience does 
not accompany these then an emotion cannot have been said to occur.  Psychologists, 
however, can only know that they have managed to induce fear or anger or happiness 
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in a participant if they know what that experience is like.  Nagel (1986, p. 20) argues 
in The View from Nowhere, “When we conceive of the minds of others, we cannot 
abandon the essential factor of a point of view: instead we must generalise and think 
of ourselves as one point of view among others”.  This would suggest that there is, 
perhaps, something personal about each theory and each definition and that the 
scientific, objective and the everyday, subjective conceptualisations are inextricably 
intertwined.  It would seem that these subjective starting points, are often guiding the 
definition and causing individual theorists to view emotion differently or take a 
particular approach to it.  However, these are rarely explicitly acknowledged or 
examined as emotion becomes defined scientifically.  There is a dichotomy, therefore, 
between the presentation of an explicit objective and scientific understanding of 
emotion and the implicit subjective emotional experiences of psychologists.  It is this 
relationship and what it might mean for the proliferation of a variety of ways to observe 
and understand emotion and the resulting number of emotions definitions and lack of 
consensus that will be examined in this thesis.   
This section has described the issue of the subjective experience of emotion and shown  
that this is a neglected area of research, both in terms of how it has been studied in 
psychology and in terms of how the subjective experiences of psychologists have 
impacted on the way in which emotion is defined in psychology.  The following 
section will describe how the latter aspect in particular will be examined in the thesis 
and will develop its aims and the questions it will answer.  
 
1.1.4 Aims of the thesis and research questions 
As described above, the literature on the problem of definition has tended to address it 
by analysing the definitions that have been produced in psychology and finding 
commonalities between them.  These explorations often make the assumption that it 
will be solved from within psychological science itself and that if the study of emotion 
is conducted ‘correctly’ or if enough research is done, a truthful understanding of the 
phenomenon will emerge.  In examining his findings, Izard (2010), for example, 
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concluded that emotion research will progress if each theorist contextualises the 
definition they use.  What Izard means by contextualise is “giving descriptions of 
factors that are present in the context (e.g. of an experiment) that might influence the 
emotion process under consideration” (p. 369).  This narrow view of what it is to 
contextualise a psychological concept such as emotion, although an important step 
towards clarity in emotions research, does not take into account the way in which the 
concept has been shaped over time and the cultural and historical meanings that it 
carries.  Indeed, in relation to this, Izard’s paper is criticised by Gendron (2010) as not 
adequately addressing the history of the concept of emotion, where it has come from 
and how it has been formed over time with the involvement of many different theorists.  
In short, she argues that the definition of emotion cannot be elucidated in a scientific 
paper, in which the term is removed both from its cultural setting and from its historical 
past.  It is important, therefore, to understand from a historical perspective why the 
different definitions have developed in different contexts during the course of 
psychological exploration.  There is a great deal of historical work that theorists could 
draw on to better understand the current position.  However, the need for the 
application of historical knowledge to the issue can most usefully be shown by 
demonstrating a direct link from past decisions made in psychology to the present 
problem  This is illustrated by Dixon (2012), whose work will be described in more 
detail in the following section.  Dixon sheds some light on one reason why the defining 
of emotion is today problematic.  He argues that it has arisen because of the 
introduction of the term emotions to replace a range of more commonly used terms for 
affect in the early nineteenth century and that it encompasses too vast a range of 
psychological experience to be used coherently in current psychological work.  In 
doing so, Dixon demonstates, that it is by exploring the past usages of the concept that 
we can truly make sense of why this has been a persistent issue in psychology. 
Although this thesis will cover some similar ground to Dixon’s work, it will take the 
exploration in a different direction and cover a different time period because its 
purpose is to look at what has influenced the development of the multi-aspect concept 
that we have today, and why it has come to differ from the everday understanding of 
emotion as a subjective experience as described by Davitz (1970).  The thesis will be 
focused particularly on the assumptions that psychologists have had about what a 
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scientific definition should look like and where their own subjective experiences of 
emotion have fitted in to these assumptions.  It will have a particular focus on 
psychologists’ own accounts of the experience of emotion, as described through 
introspection.  Although there have been few explicit programs of introspective 
psychology for many years, there is still to some degree a dependence of psychologists 
on their experiences of emotion.  Indeed, it has been argued that introspection, as used 
in an informal way, has never gone away (Brock, 2013; Costall, 2006).  The 
relationship between  psychologists’ experiences of emotion and the variety of 
definitions that have been produced has not been explored, perhaps because there is an 
assumption that, because they are objective observers of emotion, psychologists’ 
experiences do not actually feed into the work that they do.  However, as described 
above, it is necessary to understand what this means for the conceptualisations of 
emotion that are produced. 
The focus of this thesis, therefore, will be on a time in which the examination of the 
subjective experiences of psychologists were an explicit part of how emotion was 
observed and understood.  From the mid-nineteenth century, as psychology was 
developing into an academic discipline in its own right, the use of introspection was 
the method by which psychologists studied the mind.  For over eighty years this 
process of self-observation, as will be described, was viewed by many theorists as the 
most valuable means by which the elements of the mind -  for example, the senses, the 
emotions, intellect and consciousness - could be viewed and analysed because it was 
the inner experiences, or mental states, that psychologists sought to understand.  It was 
from the starting point of the understanding of emotion as a subjective human 
experience or feeling that the psychology of emotion developed.  In taking a historical 
approach, the chapters will explore the reasons for the emergence of the various 
understandings of emotion, many of which we still recognise today, that developed 
alongside that of subjective experience, by looking at the ways in which these were 
formed and the reasons for their development. The thesis will also describe the 
assumptions of an emerging psychological science in order to look at what led 
psychologists to define emotion in ways other than as a mental state or experience.   
Therefore, there will be four particular aims that distinguish this thesis from previous 
explorations of the topic.  First, it will examine the impact of the early strivings of 
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psychologists to study the mind on the direction that understandings of emotion were 
to take in psychology.  Second, it will not make assumptions as to the efficacy and 
usefulness of the range of understandings of emotion in emotions research but will, 
rather, seek to understand why a number of traditions, approaches and methods have 
been applied to emotion.  Third, it will cover a period, 1850-1930, in which the 
subjective experiences of psychologists were very much an explicit part of the 
understandings of emotion that they produced.  Analysing psychological work 
conducted during this period allows for an exploration of how psychologists described 
emotion when they observed themselves.  Fourth, the effect of the production of a 
subjective, experiential understanding of emotion in interaction with the drive to 
conduct psychological work in a scientific and objective manner on the emergence  of 
understandings of emotion can be examined.  The research questions, therefore, will 
be:  What was the effect of the drive to conduct psychological research scientifically 
on the way in which subjective experiences of emotion were viewed?  How did this 
drive contribute to the proliferation of understandings of emotion? 
Having outlined the direction that the thesis will take, the rest of this chapter will set 
the background for the work and go on to describe the contents of the chapters.  It will 
provide a brief historical outline of how emotion was viewed in early nineteenth 
century British philosophy in order to explain where the concept had come from and 
how it had been understood prior to 1850.  Section 1.4. will, similarly, show how 
introspection was an explicit part of particularly British philosophical thinking and its 
importance to the work of philosophers prior to the development of psychology as a 
distinct academic discipline. 
 
1.2 Emotion in the early nineteenth century 
This section will set the background for the thesis by describing briefly how emotion 
was understood prior to the mid-nineteenth century.  It will highlight first, how, in the 
early nineteenth century, emotion emerged as a term to be used to denote affect in 
philosophy; second, it will discuss the kind of concept the term was assumed to 
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represent; third, it will describe how precise attempts to define emotion became a 
priority when emotions began to be studied scientifically. 
Although the scientific study of emotion emerged in psychology in the nineteenth 
century, people’s affective lives had been of interest in philosophy for millennia.  
Aristotle had stated, for example, “Now all the soul’s modifications do seem to involve 
the body – anger, meekness, fear, compassion, and joy and love and hate.  For along 
these the body also is to some degree affected” (Arnold, 1960).  Descartes 
(1649/1989), also, had described the six primitive passions as wonder, love, hatred, 
desire, joy and sadness.  The term passion was, also, used by Hobbes, Hume, and 
Locke.  As both Danziger (1997a) and Dixon (2003; 2012) describe, in the English 
language at least, the words sentiments, passions and affections were, prior to the 
nineteenth century, the common ways to express the idea of feeling. 
However, according to Dixon, a profound change happened in the early 1800s when 
the term emotion began to be used to represent this aspect of the human condition.  In 
describing the radical change that took place during the early nineteenth century, 
Dixon states that, 
It is an immensely striking fact of the history of English-speaking 
psychological thought that during the period between c.1800 and c. 1850 a 
wholesale change in established vocabulary occurred such that those engaged 
in theoretical discussions about phenomena including hope, fear, love, hate, 
joy, sorrow, anger and the like no longer primarily discussed the passions or 
affections of the soul, nor the sentiments, but almost invariably referred to ‘the 
emotions’.  This transition is as striking as if established conceptual terms such 
as ‘reason’ or ‘memory’ or ‘imagination’ or ‘will’ had been quite suddenly 
replaced by a wholly new category.  (2003, p. 4)  
 
The terms that had been used previously were much more nuanced in their meaning 
than the all-encompassing term emotion.  Sentiments denoted higher or more refined 
feelings; passions, the strong or compelling feelings that drive people; and the 
affections, a term to describe a feeling of devotion or being drawn to someone of 
something.  As Dixon goes on to argue because the meanings of these words had 
theological connotations, emotion was the term deliberately used by philosophers at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century to secularize feeling or affect for scientific 
study.  In particular he discusses the work of Thomas Brown (1822).  Brown discusses 
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emotions in the following way:  “if any definition of them be possible, they may be 
defined to be vivid feelings, arising immediately from the considerations of objects 
perceived or remembered, or imagined, or from other prior emotions” (p. 252).  While 
there were still discussions of the sentiments in psychology even into the early 
twentieth century (e.g. Shand, 1914), gradually emotion, became almost exclusive in 
both academic and everyday usages to refer to affective experiences.  In describing 
this change, Dixon shows the particular influence of academia in how people come to 
understand themselves and their own psychology and argues that the term emotion at 
that time, in contrast to previous cultural understandings of affect, as disconnected 
from a theological or moral framework, came to denote “morally disengaged, bodily 
non-cognitive and involuntary feelings” (p. 3). 
Dixon (2012) states, however, that Brown himself acknowledged that the term emotion 
was almost impossible to encapsulate in a definition.  Prior to the development of 
scientific forms of knowledge about the mind and human behaviour there had been no 
real need to develop a precise definition of emotion or any other affective concept for 
that matter.  It was not thought that abstract psychological phenomena could be easily 
pinned down.  However, as the work of anatomists, physiologists and psychologists 
progressed throughout the nineteenth century, attempts were made by theorists whose 
scientific interest in the subject meant that they in some way had to describe what they 
intended by it in their writings.  The work of Charles Bell (1774-1842), the Scottish 
anatomist, acknowledged by Darwin (1872) as being influential on his own thinking 
on emotional expression, is illustrative of this.  His book, The Anatomy and Philosophy 
of Expression as connected with the Fine Arts, provided descriptions of expressions of 
emotion.  These descriptions relating to particular emotions were however qualified 
by Bell's statement as to the scientifically imprecise definition of the term.  He stated 
“Were we not to limit our inquiry to the agitations of the body, we should be 
embarrassed with the ambiguity with such words as passion, emotion, desire, 
inclination, appetite” (Bell, 1844, p. 145).  Although he may have been 'embarrassed' 
at the inability of scientists to produce only vague definitions of their objects of 
inquiry, Bell had made such an attempt, defining emotions as “certain changes or 
affections of the mind, as grief, joy, or astonishment” (1824, p. 18).  So although 
emotion had been and continued to be, described by philosophers, the real driving 
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force behind the production of definitions was the development of the  production of 
scientific knowledge about people, their bodies and their minds.   
What will be explored in the following chapters is the extent to which emotion from 
the mid nineteenth century to the early twentieth century was understood to be 
predominantly a subjective feeling or experience or mental state in scientific 
psychology.  The English psychologist James Sully, for example, stated in 1892, “The 
word emotion is…beginning to receive general adoption as the name of the higher 
group of feelings” (1892a, p. 56, my italics).  However, because a precise definition of 
emotion had never really been established from the outset, there was also a fluidity 
about its meaning as a term as scientific psychology developed.   
The primary method viewed as suitable for the study of emotion in the early period of 
psychological research was the introspective analysis of the psychologist's experience 
as a means of describing and explaining what emotion was.  The following section will 
present a brief description of introspection as it was used in the early part of the 
nineteenth century and will describe some of the disagreements as to its efficacy as a 
scientific method. 
 
1.3 Introspection in the early nineteenth century 
Introspection as used in every-day language, means literally an inward vision:  
a paying attention to, or observing of the process of the organism itself: the 
feelings, emotion, and organic processes of other kinds – organic sensations, if 
you want to cling to that term; and in scientific psychology we can most 
usefully employ the term in practically the same way; to signify awareness of 
things inside the body; of feelings, emotions, organic changes, and muscular 
activities.  (Dunlap, 1926, p. 319) 
 
Introspection was used in early psychological work and epitomised the work of most 
psychological theorists of the nineteenth century (e.g. Bain, 1855; James, 1890a, Ladd, 
1894).  In the simplest terms, it is the observation of one’s mental state (Lyons, 1986).  
In philosophy and psychology it has, however, been understood in many more nuanced 
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ways.  Indeed, Alexander Bain identified thirteen different kinds of introspection 
(Bain, 1899).  Later, Knight Dunlap (1912), the US psychologist, when writing on the 
usages of the introspection in psychology at that time, described these as being 
‘technical’ and as having developed more recently.  He stated, however, that, “the 
signification is very old.  We need not pursue it back farther than Reid, Hamilton, Bain 
and James Mill, to get a definite understanding of the extent to which 'self-
consciousness' is involved in British theories” (p. 405).  This section will describe 
introspection in the early part of the nineteenth century and the controversy 
surrounding its use as a scientific method.   
Although we now take for granted that we can examine our minds, as Lyons (1986) 
discusses, this may not always have been the case.  Lyons presents evidence to show 
that introspection was described both in the work of Augustine and Descartes.  He 
argues that it was not until the seventeenth century that self-observation became part 
of the philosopher’s repertoire as a product of the rise of empiricism in British 
philosophy (Brock, 2013; Lyons, 1986).  Locke argued that knowledge is based on 
experience of which we have both an inner mental kind and an external physical kind.  
He stated that “the mind comes to reflect on its own operations about the ideas got by 
sensation and thereby stores itself with a new set of ideas, which I call ideas of 
reflection.  Introspection could, therefore, be used as a means to study inner experience 
and through it to better understand human nature” (Locke as cited in Lyons, 1986, p. 
3).  Introspection, therefore, began to be viewed at this time as being a particularly 
useful tool in the description of the mental states.   
The method was taken up by Scottish schools of philosophy, as well as the 
associationists in England.  Although it was the process by which much British 
philosophical thought was conducted, it was rejected by German philosophers who 
regarded rational enquiry as the means to understand the human mind, rather than the 
examination of consciousness.  This rejection was because they, unlike their British 
counterparts did not accept that consciousness was equated with mind.  For this reason,  
these philosophers argued that the study of the former had little to say about the latter 
(Danziger, 1980).  Kant argued that this form of introspection was not useful.  
However, he did accept that the reflection on the phenomenal self - that is on the bodily 
feelings and experiences - was an acceptable form of introspection in philosophy.  In 
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Britain, while it was more accepted, there was a great deal of discussion about the 
efficacy of introspection and what it entailed.  As Dunlap (1912) discusses, there were 
some fundamental disagreements between different philosophers as to the nature of 
introspection and its efficacy as a method.  Thomas Reid, for example, disagreed with 
James Mill in terms of the involvement of consciousness in the act of self-reflection. 
The question was if consciousness was part of the self-reflection or what was being 
reflected on.  Consciousness, Reid believed, was a part of every mental act.  He stated, 
“Can I feel without knowing that I feel?  This is impossible.  Now this…common 
condition of self-knowledge, is precisely what is denominated consciousness” (1880, 
as cited in Dunlap, 1912, p. 405).  James Mill, in contrast, argued that feeling and 
consciousness were practically interchangeable, and consciousness was the awareness 
of oneself in a phenomenological, rather than mental, sense. 
In the early nineteenth century also the nature of introspection continued to be 
contested in philosophy.  This time the disagreement was between James Mill’s son, 
J. S. Mill and William Hamilton.  Danziger (1980) describes how Hamilton introduced 
explicitly Leibnizian notions of unconscious mental activity, and Mill the younger took 
up the mantle of defender of introspection’s status from his father.  Mill, however, was 
to defend the method from a far more potent attack from Auguste Comte in the 1830s.  
The argument put forward by the French philosopher in his Cours de Philosophie 
Positive,  was that it was not possible for a mind to observe a mind.  He argued, further, 
that the results of such an endeavour had never been consistent.  In defending, J.S. Mill 
mocked Comte’s premise for rejecting introspection, 
But it is clear to him that we can learn very little about the feelings and nothing 
at all about the intellect, by self-observation.  Our intelligence can observe all 
other things, but not itself: we cannot observe ourselves observing, or observe 
ourselves reasoning: and if we could, attention to this reflex operation would 
annihilate its object, by stopping the process observed. (Mill, 1891, p. 63) 
 
In refutation of Comte’s argument, Mill referred him to both his experience and to the 
work of Hamilton, who had, he said, “described several impressions at once” (p. 64).  
Secondly, he discussed the idea of retrospection where an experience is held in 
memory to be analysed at a later time.  In any case, he stated that introspection was 
the study of the workings of the mind by direct observation, rather than by their results, 
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and as such was a necessary part of psychological theorising.  As Danziger (1980) 
states, Comte’s criticisms were not widely accepted in psychology. As will be 
described in the following chapters, introspection continued to be drawn on by most 
early psychologists as the means of obtaining direct access to the mind.  It seemed, 
however, that those who advocated the method, of whom there were many, were in a 
continual position of defending it.  This was, perhaps, because of the positions that had 
been taken up against it as described in this section. 
This section has described how introspection might be defined as well as the arguments 
that arose as to its nature and efficacy in the early nineteenth century.  It presents the 
background to the examination of the discussion on the use of introspection in 
psychology in Chapters Three to Six.  The following section will give a brief summary 
of each chapter of the thesis.  
 
1.4 Outline of the chapters 
Chapter Two will describe the usefulness of conducting a historical study and what it 
can bring to the understanding of current research.  It will also show the importance of 
this method of gathering data about psychological concepts and allow their emergence 
over time to be traced.  It will argue, using the work of Foucault, Danziger, Hacking, 
Smith, Gergen and Richards, that historical, psychological work has much to 
contribute to the psychological debates about the nature, structure and 
conceptualisation of emotion and of the use of introspection in its study. Further, this 
chapter will describe and justify the sources that will be examined in the thesis.   
Chapters Three, Four, Five and Six will describe the observation and description of 
emotion in psychology, predominantly in Britain and the US between 1850 and 1930, 
focusing mainly on the use of introspection as used to illuminate the nature of emotion.  
The chapters are roughly chronological, and they follow the process of the 
development of scientific psychology throughout this period from its roots in British 
associationist philosophy to the beginning of the behaviourist movement.  Each 
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focuses on the work of the most prominent emotion theorists of the time as well as 
drawing on the work of some less well known theorists as a means to present a more 
complete picture of the way in which emotion was studied at this time.  Each describes 
the place that introspection had as a method in psychology but also examines the extent 
to which other methods were used as a means to observe and describe emotion.  The 
reasons for the use of particular methods will be elucidated and the ways in which 
emotion was understood described.  
Chapter Three will cover the period of the mid to late nineteenth century when, 
following British philosophical tradition, introspection was the predominant method 
by which psychologists understood the mind and emotion in Britain and the US.  It 
focuses on  the work of three of the leading theorists of the time in those countries: 
Alexander Bain, Herbert Spencer and William James, but also describes that of those 
who are now less well known but were influential at the time, such as G.T. Ladd and 
James Sully.  It will examine why each advocated the use of introspection as a means 
to develop an understanding of the mind and will look at how each used it in different 
ways to present different understandings of emotion.  In doing so, it will show the 
perceived importance of the subjective experience of emotion at this time, as well as 
what were seen as the limitations of introspection.  It will conclude by presenting an 
overview of the main findings of the introspective analyses of psychologists’ 
subjective experiences of emotion.  
Chapter Four will identify the use of objective methods of observation of emotion, and 
contrast these with the subjective method of observation of introspection.  It will  
describe the way in which psychologists looked to physiology to provide more 
scientific descriptions of emotion in  relation to its conceptualisation and measurement, 
and in order to demonstrate its universality and to discover patterns and laws which 
regulated the production of emotion.  It will show how these were used as a means to 
make up for the perceived scientific deficiencies of understandings produced by the 
introspective method.  It will then go on to describe the effect of the acceptance in 
psychology of evolutionary understandings both on the perceived value of 
introspection and on how the subjective experience of emotion was regarded.  In doing 
so, it will examine the work of Herbert Spencer as well as Charles Darwin’s work on 
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the expressions of emotion and, at the end of the nineteenth century, the US 
functionalist psychologists.   
Chapter Five covers the work of the US psychologist, E.B.Titchener, and his 
‘systematic experimental introspection’ which came towards the end of the nineteenth 
century and into the early twentieth century.  It will describe how Titchener attempted 
to present introspection as an objective method through controlling the way in which 
it was conducted.  It will analyse why and how he did so by examining the rules that 
he put in place to regulate the subjective experiences that psychologists produced.  It 
will outline the dearth of experimental papers which were published about emotion 
using Titchener’s method during this period and will examine the reasons why it was 
problematic to study emotion using this method.  It will, however, go on to describe 
the attempts that were made by psychologists to investigate emotion in this way and 
what sorts of subjective understandings of emotion that resulted.  
Chapter Six describes the ways in which introspection altered in the early part of the 
twentieth century in response to criticism as to its reliability.  It will show how the turn 
to behaviour and the arguments against introspection were an attempt to rid 
psychology of a method that was deemed unreliable and of experience which was 
regarded as an epiphenomenon.  It will describe the arguments aimed at the method 
and how it was stoutly defended by many psychologists who could not see a future for 
psychology without some kind of examination of the subjective experience of emotion.  
It will show that, despite the criticisms, the method survived in an altered form and 
that it continued to be used to study the subjective experience of emotion, albeit in a 
different form from Titchener’s.  The understandings of emotion that were produced 
using this form will be described by examining the papers presented at the first 
symposium on feelings and emotions at Wittenberg, USA  
Chapter Seven will return to the research questions and present some conclusions as 
to how these can be answered, given the findings in the preceding chapters.  I will then 
discuss the implications of the findings for the lack of consensus of the understanding 





A HISTORICAL APPROACH 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a case for a historical examination of the 
concept of emotion in order to better understand the problem of the lack of consensus 
of the definition.  It will describe the use of what Danziger (2003) calls “historical 
psychology” as a means to understand present concepts or issues in psychology 
through the light of past developments, and will also explain the reasons why this 
approach is useful in contextualising the current situation.  It will briefly outline the 
sources that will be analysed and justify the selections made.  
 
2.1 Introduction 
Only when we understand something of this historical embeddedness of 
specific psychological objects and practices are we in a position to formulate 
intelligent questions about their possible historical transcendence. (Danziger, 
1993, p. 43) 
 
As described, the problem of the definition of emotion has been dealt with through the 
examination of definitions of emotion in order to find commonalities between the 
various understandings that have been produced so that a consensual definition can be 
presented.  Although this seems like a useful exercise in that it does seem reasonable 
to assume that if different aspects of emotion repeatedly recur in the work of 
psychologists, then these are likely to be the most salient, it is an approach which has, 
so far, proved fruitless in achieving the aim of consensus.  The question then must be 
asked as to why this might be.  One of the reasons for its lack of success is that 
attempting to address the current problem simply within the context of current 
psychological discourse places too narrow a focus on the issue and tends to ignore the 
broader issue of the reasons why emotion definitions have tended to proliferate 
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historically.  The following quote from Solomon (2002) about the definition of basic 
emotions highlights the sense that it is not enough simply to understand emotion within 
current psychological contexts and discourses,  
I would argue that the notion of “basic emotions” is neither meaningless nor so 
straightforward as its critics and defenders respectively argue, but it is 
historical and culturally situated and serves very different purposes in different 
contexts, including different research contexts…It is a subject with a rich 
history, and it is not one that can be readily understood within the confines of 
a technical debate in the Psychological Review. (Solomon, 2002, p. 124) 
 
This statement could equally be applied, more broadly, to the issue of the definition of 
emotion itself.  While it may be useful for psychologists to gather information about 
psychological definitions in order to compare them, the exercise does not provide an 
understanding of the context in which definitions and theories of emotion are 
constructed, not does it examine why this problem has emerged in the first place.  It 
makes the assumption that there is something about the nature of emotion itself that 
has caused the issue to arise.  In order to deal with the matter in a way which gets to 
its root, it is necessary to put to one side the prevalent assumption that it has occurred 
as a result of the complex nature of emotion.  In doing so, the focus is taken off asking 
questions regarding the character of emotion and placed, rather, on the means through 
which, and the contexts in which, emotion has been conceptualised.  This allows for 
an understanding of the different ways in which emotion is constructed differently in 
different circumstances, and under different conditions, to arise and provides a broader 
basis on which to understand the reasons for the variety of definitions.  It examines the 
meanings that the term holds in psychology and why it has been assigned these 
meanings.  
The importance of history to the contextualisation of current psychological knowledge, 
although largely neglected in psychology today, was recognised early in psychology’s 
history - “The historian of psychology must tell us what psychology is, in its largest 
aspects, by telling us whence its methods and concepts have come and what these mean 
for its further development” (Griffith, 1921, p. 17).  By using history to look at how 
the concept of emotion has been defined in psychology at various points of time, it is 
possible to understand the reasons why the problem has arisen.  This can be done by 
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examining the various conceptualisations of emotion and considering the contexts in 
which they emerged.  By placing the problem of definition of emotion within a 
historical context we will be in a better position to understand the effects of the 
production of psychological knowledge on the concept.  A historical examination 
allows for the influences, the constraints and the demands of the discipline to be 
highlighted and their effects on its concepts described.   
It is important, however, to contrast the historical psychological approach with the way 
in which history is traditionally used in psychology.  The history of psychology, or of 
emotion, is not ignored in psychological theorising but it is often used in quite careful 
and specific ways to justify particular theoretical positions, what Danziger (2010, p. 4) 
calls “justificationism”.  So, although it is recognised in psychology that emotion is 
understood differently than it was in the past, that recognition is often set in a narrative 
of progression and advancement in its understanding (Gergen, 1996).  For example, 
historical overviews of emotions research (e.g. Arnold, 1960; Gendron & Barrett, 
2009; Kagan, 2007; Plutchik, 1980; Ruckmik, 1936) are produced with the particular 
purpose of justifying the particular theory or definition a theorist is attempting to 
promote.  Further, literature reviews in scientific papers, where the past is presented in 
a framework of justification, are written in terms of a progression from study to study 
in order to identify issues to be addressed and to promote the presented hypothesis, 
method and results as valid and useful.  The intention is to show how current theories 
or experiments progress the understanding of emotion by building on the work of 
previous psychologists.  These justifications rework psychology's past to provide a 
basis for current research.  As such, this type of history in psychology is an integral 
component to the construction of psychological knowledge.  It perpetuates the 
assumptions that lie at the heart of psychological research, rather than addressing how 
these assumptions may influence current research and the present concepts.  This 
contrasts with the use of history to describe, rather than to justify. 
Kleinginna and Kleinginna's (1981) paper goes some way to attending to the issue 
addressed in this thesis historically.  They use a historical approach, presenting an 
overview of 100 years of definitions of emotion in psychology.  It is indeed useful in 
drawing together a range of definitions of emotion.  However, their paper is inadequate 
in addressing not only the ontological or methodological context under which these 
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definitions were produced but also any sense that the definitions that they include have 
been influenced by particular views as to what a scientific theory or definition should 
achieve.  As described in Izard’s (2010) paper, in conceptualising emotion, 
psychologists may have different aims.  Sometimes they are interested in the structures 
of emotion and sometimes the functions, for example.  This is ignored by Kleinginna 
and Kleinginna's overview, and,  further,  the various movements that have happened 
in psychological science that may have culminated in the present situation are 
disregarded and there is an assumption that they are comparing like with like.  
Therefore, their use of history as a tool in which to understand the current problem is 
incomplete and inadequate.   
Historical psychology, in contrast, allows for a much broader understanding of 
psychological concepts to emerge.  It describes the purposes with which these are 
produced, presents the social and cultural context within which they have developed 
and seeks to understand the present through the light of past conceptualisations. 
Foucault (1969/2010, p. 5) stated in The Archaeology of Knowledge, that “The history 
of a concept is not wholly and entirely that of its progressive refinement, its 
continuously increasing rationality, its abstraction gradient...but successive rules of 
use and the theoretical contexts in which it developed and matured”.  The present 
situation, rather than being justified by the past must be described by the past.  
Examining the past can, therefore, be of use in understanding why current issues have 
arisen in the light of historical developments in psychology.  As Danziger (2013, p. 
829) stated recently, history “plays a more useful role within the discipline when it 
takes the current multiplicity of psychological objects as its point of departure and 
explores the social context of their emergence.  This entails a historical analysis of the 
language used to define, describe, categorize, and modify psychological objects”.  
The following section will describe the ways in which historical enquiry will be used 
in this thesis to aid the understanding of the current issues of the continued 
proliferation of emotion definitions and lack of consensus.  It will do so in relation to 
two particular concerns.  First, a historical examination allows the various current 
conceptualisations of emotion to be understood in relation to the past contexts in which 
they have developed.  Second, that it allows the effect of psychology as a human 
activity on the concepts of emotion that are produced to be considered. 
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2.2 The need for a historical examination of concepts  
The first point to be discussed here is that exploring past contexts in which emotion 
was studied can aid in understanding the present problem.  There are several 
advantages to this kind of historical exploration.  First, it means that different 
conceptualisations of emotion can be compared and the reasons why these are different 
examined; second, the present situation can be understood in terms of the assumptions 
inherent in the methodological and epistemological legacies of past contexts; third, the 
particular reflexive effects of the production of psychological knowledge on the 
phenomenon that psychologists explore can be illuminated.  In this section, these three 
distinct but connected points will be developed first and will be followed by a 
discussion of the view that history is also useful in understanding the effect of 
psychology as a human activity on the concepts it produces.  
First, history allows for the current understandings of emotion to be compared with 
the past understandings of emotion that have been produced in psychology and it can 
show how and why the concept has altered over time.  Although Kleinginna and 
Kleinginna (1981) present a range of different definitions, they choose to present these 
in terms of commonalities, rather than in chronological order.  History can aid in the 
comparison between different conceptualisations of emotion because it allows for a 
wider context to be revealed.  For example, Kleinginna and Kleinginna present the 
following two definitions: “Emotion...the association between certain widespread 
changes in ongoing operant behaviours and the presentation and removal of enforcers” 
(Millenson, 1967 as cited in Kleinginna & Kleinginna, 1981, p. 364 ); and “Emotions 
have in common the fact they involve appraisals elicited by external conditions which 
are of concern to us or which we have brought about or suffered” (Peters, 1970, as 
cited in Kleinginna & Kleinginna, 1981, p. 363).  While these are both presented as 
scientific conceptualisations of emotion, these should not be taken at face value as 
comparable representations of the same concept, although both attempt to represent 
emotion and both try to get at something in relation to how emotion works.  Without 
understanding, however, the broader historical and epistemological contexts within 
which they were produced, they are essentially meaningless.  Each is bound up in a 
particular psychological tradition, which include particular approaches to study and 
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which use particular types of metaphors to define the concepts that are seen to come 
under the research remit of psychological science (Gergen, 1996).  These two 
definitions are not far apart in terms of when they were stated but they are far apart in 
terms of the forms of knowledge they represent, the language that is used, and the 
methods each theorist would employ to research emotion.  It is necessary to understand 
how and why these different forms of knowledge emerged in psychology to understand 
why these understandings of emotion have been formed.  In conducting a historical 
study it is not simply the passage of time that is of relevance but rather that during the 
passage of time, different contexts have emerged through which emotion is viewed 
and studied.   
To appreciate why psychological concepts are defined in different ways in different 
contexts we cannot simply treat them as good or bad representations of 'natural kinds' 
but rather they must be understood as being a production of the contexts in which they 
were formed.  Although Griffiths (1997) and Scarantino (2012) go some way to 
addressing this, in that they recognise that emotions are often not ‘natural kinds’, they 
need to go further. They fail to recognise that, by the very act of studying emotion 
using particular scientific paradigms, something which may be a “natural kind”, using 
particular “psychological” forms of language to describe it, alters it into a 
psychological kind (Hacking, 2002).  Psychological kinds have, what Hacking calls, a 
historical ontology, existing only in relation to human history.  In order to understand 
emotion, we cannot simply treat it as something biological which exists in the 
population, the facts of which can be discovered.  We must acknowledge that its form 
owes much to the ways in which it has been viewed and understood at various points 
of time.  It cannot be free of the language that has been used to understand it and it is 
the language and the metaphors that have been applied to it that need to be examined 
if we are to be in a position to understand why particular definitions have been 
produced.  A historical understanding highlights more readily the changes in forms of 
psychological knowledge that the concept has been subject to at various points in 
history.  This allows for an understanding of current psychologists as being the 
inheritors of these past understandings.  For the concept of emotion this is particularly 
pertinent.  As described, Dixon (2003) has shown how the scientific concept of 
emotion emerged most prominently in academic discourse in the early nineteenth 
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century.  It is necessary, therefore, to understand what happened to the concept in 
academia from that point as emotion was studied within psychology if we are to 
understand the way in which it has come to be conceptualised and why the difficulties 
with its definition have arisen. 
Secondly, the historical examination of the past contexts in which emotion was studied 
allows for an understanding of the epistemological and methodological legacies of 
scientific psychology to be revealed.  It can provide an understanding of how these 
continue to affect the conceptualisations of emotion that are produced.  The legacy that 
current psychologists have inherited from psychology’s nineteenth century roots has 
been well documented (e.g. Bevan, 1991; Danziger, 2007; Gendron & Barrett, 2009; 
Richards, 2010; Smith, Harré & van Langenhove, 1995).  To understand why the 
defining of emotion continues to be an issue for psychology it is necessary to 
understand this inheritance and what this means for the concept.  Danziger (1997b, p. 
8), for example, has argued,  
The relevance of historical studies for the discipline of psychology seems to 
me to lie primarily in their potential for contributing to an understanding of the 
context of construction. As members of the discipline we have all been 
socialized to adopt certain prescribed practices and to communicate about our 
subject in terms of a specific received vocabulary. The nature and meaning of 
what we achieve depends on these practices and this vocabulary. We can 
certainly go on producing effects without ever reflecting on the context of 
construction that enables us to do so. But our understanding of what we are 
doing will be profoundly defective. For that to be remedied an appreciation of 
the historicity of our practices and our language seems to be indispensable.  
 
The concept of emotion has undergone a process of construction over the course of 
time and attempts to define it in the present are not free from the constraining effects 
of previous usages, but rather these received ways of understanding exert a “tyranny” 
over current theorising (Gergen, 1996, p. 1).  As Danziger (1982, p. 142) says, 
regarding the present, “scientific development cannot take place in a theoretical 
vacuum but must make use of the conceptual equipment bequeathed to it”.  This 
“conceptual equipment” has been shaped over time by the positions that have been 
taken up as to what valuable scientific knowledge is.  It is important, therefore, in 
attempting to understand the present position of emotion definitions, to produce a 
history of the concept which shows, not only how it has changed but why it has 
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changed, to understand why particular definitions were produced at particular times, 
and to understand why some views of emotion became accepted and others didn't.  In 
order to do so it is necessary to look at the ways in which these were justified by 
psychologists within particular paradigms of psychological knowledge and to examine 
the assumptions of psychological science. 
It is necessary, also, to understand the development of the concept of emotion within 
the context of a developing psychological science and to examine the continuities and 
discontinuities that show how and why it has been shaped in the ways that it has. 
Returning to the early days of scientific psychology allows for the understanding of 
the premises on which it was founded to be revealed.  It is not enough to take for 
granted that because current psychologists have formed a complex model of emotion 
that that is simply because emotion is a complex psychological phenomenon.  It is 
necessary to understand something about the nature of psychological science in order 
to understand why the concepts of emotion that it has produced have been shaped in 
the way that they have.  This tends to go unexamined by psychologists.  As Slife and 
Williams (1995, p. 3) state, “The difficulty is that in the behavioral sciences, relatively 
little attention is paid to assumptions and implications.  Students are often taught the 
various theories for understanding behavioral science phenomena, but rarely is their 
teaching enriched by directly examining the assumptions and implications hidden 
within these theories”.  Further, as Smith, Harré and van Langenhove (1995) describe, 
psychologists are often reluctant to step outside of their understandings of what valid 
scientific knowledge is in order to examine the conventions inherent within these 
understandings.  History allows us to take a broader view of psychology and the 
concepts that it produces.  It allows for the examination of its values to be examined.  
We can see where they have come from, how they are perpetuated, why they are 
valued, how they shape psychological knowledge and what the alternatives might be.   
Further, as Richards (2010) argues, history maintains access to psychology’s long-
term memory.  It can ensure that past problems are not repeated by examining why 
these have arisen before.  A historical examination will also allow for a better 
understanding of the current problems to emerge because the current situation can be 
compared with the same problem of definition that was described as being an issue at 
the beginning of the twentieth century (Bentley, 1928).  Rather than simply accepting 
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that this is how emotion or psychological science is, it is important to examine what it 
is about psychological science that such widely differing views of the same concept 
were, and continue to be, produced within the discipline.  A history which reflects on 
the nature of psychological science, and what it is at different times and contexts, can 
provide a perspective from which to see the effect of the discipline on its concepts and 
to study both continuities and discontinuities over time and across traditions, providing 
a more considered understanding of the issue and increased awareness by 
psychologists of the common and repetitive issues that they face in dealing with the 
definition of emotion. 
The third point is with regard to the issue of reflexivity.  In taking a historical 
psychological approach to the concept of emotion, the purpose is not simply to produce 
a history which tells a story about the ways in which emotion has been viewed and 
studied at different times and contexts.  It is to provide a historical examination of not 
only a scientific concept but also an everyday psychological concept on the basis that 
the work done by psychologists has the potential to affect how people understand and 
therefore experience their own emotions.  For example, as Richards (2010) argues, it 
is clear from the changing language used, that emotions experienced today differ in 
substantial ways from those experienced in the nineteenth century.  He says, that “we 
may see this in the shifts as the change from ‘worrying’ and ‘fretting’ to suffering from 
‘anxiety’ and ‘stress’” (p.160).  The former are active verbs, the latter passive, so in 
essence the feelings which these words describe have altered from something we do 
to something which happens to us.  These changes reflect the “psychologisation” of 
emotion, changes which have taken place as a result of the dissemination of 
psychological discourse.  The paradox for psychologists seeking to find a truthful 
definition of emotion is that, in using particular terms to define emotion they alter what 
they observe because the way that these are played out in everyday life is through the 
lens of the surrounding culture, including, in the West, the lens of psychological 
science.  Smith (2007, p. 244) has argued, therefore, that history can teach us “what 
man has done and therefore what man is”.  Although it will not be the focus of this 
thesis, it is important to bear in mind the constructive effects of the defining of emotion 
in psychology and that it matters how and why psychologists seek to understand 
emotion, because as they do so they are in the process of adding meaning to the 
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concept.  A historical examination of the psychological concept of emotion, therefore, 
is also a study in the psychological phenomena of emotion, because the latter is shaped 
by the production of the former.   
Finally, historical examinations of the production of understandings of emotion in 
psychology can highlight this as being a human activity.  As Bevan (1991, p. 477) 
describes, “to insist on the objectivity of a science in terms of its separateness from the 
life experiences, intentions, values and world views of the persons who create that 
science is to deny its fundamental character as a human activity”.  This characterisation 
of psychology is less pronounced today because psychologists present themselves as 
detached observers but was more obvious in the period of time which will be covered 
in this thesis where introspection was used to understand emotion.  Studying how 
psychologists understood emotion through introspection is a means by which to 
understand how psychology and the development of understandings of emotion have 
been shaped by the experiences of theorists themselves.  History can be used as a way 
of looking at what psychologists do, how they behave and the choices they make, 
putting the theories that they produce in context.  Richards (1987, p. 203) states 
“Psychology claims to be the science of behaviour; being scientific is a form of 
behaviour of the most potent kind, its history involves such psychological matters as 
the nature of concept-formation, concept-change, communication, motivation and 
even perception”.  This sort of history is not mere biography, but an acknowledgement 
that psychologists cannot be naïve, detached, objective observers of the phenomena 
that they seek to address. They are rather intimately bound up in their work in a way 
that shapes their findings in particular ways.  As described in the previous chapter, it 
is difficult for psychologists to get away from the fact that, as human beings 
themselves, their experiences and viewpoints shape the way in which they conduct 
research, 
Psychological knowledge continues to be the product of psychologists 
thinking, acting and interacting with others, and in particular ways that cannot 
be isolated from the wider social context that shapes the way people think and 




It could be said the idea of the psychologist as an objective, detached observer has 
been constructed in order for psychology to be accepted as a science.  Certainly, the 
way in which psychology papers are written in the third person demonstrates attempts 
to eliminate the taint of subjectivity from the research.  If we are to understand why 
emotion has been defined as it has, we must understand the forms of behaviour under 
which it has been researched and why some forms of behaviour were acceptable at 
some times and not others.  Examining a time in which the experience of the 
psychologist was very much accepted as part of the understanding of emotion allows 
for a different kind of psychological science to be described and compared with the 
role that psychologists take up today.  It can demonstrate the effect of the inclusion of 
psychologists’ experiences on the concepts they produce.  Further, the historical 
examination of a time in which subjective knowledge was valued allows for the 
relationship between subject and object to be understood.  As Smith (2007, p. 76) has 
argued, “in the human sciences at least, it simply is not possible at root to separate 
subject and object.  The very act of acquiring knowledge, even in the most rigorously 
controlled situation, is a change in the life of both subject and object”.  In going back 
to a time in which the subjective experience of psychologists was an acknowledged 
aspect of the development of understandings of emotion, we can better understand how 
these contributed, and continue to contribute, to the concepts of emotion that are 
produced.  In order to understand the assumptions inherent in the conceptualisations 
of emotion which were produced at the time it is important to analyse the ways in 
which both psychological science, its methods and its subject matter were discussed 
and debated by psychologists.  This allows for the reasoning behind the 
epistemological and methodological choices that were made at the time to be 
elucidated and will aid in revealing the issues that have caused the defining of emotion 





The data for this study will be, largely, drawn from books and articles produced by 
psychologists between 1850 and 1930 which discuss the use of introspection and 
present understandings of emotion.  There will be a particular emphasis on the way in 
which both scientific psychology, its methods and emotion are discussed and debated 
in the psychological literature of the time, in order to draw out the issues and 
assumptions that were important to the theorists of the period.  Some of the sources 
presented in this thesis will, therefore, be analysed in some depth in order to illuminate 
some of the most influential ideas that were prevalent during the period.  As Lamont 
(2007; 2015) describes, there is a benefit in understanding current issues from 
analysing the discourse used in historical sources because from these the arguments, 
expectations and agreements as to what is seen as valuable knowledge can be 
ascertained.  It is through the discourse of the time that ideas about introspection and 
emotion were constructed.  Therefore, these sources are the data of this study and 
segments of the original texts are presented, rather than being paraphrased, as the latter 
can have the effect of altering the intended meaning.   
Prior to the late nineteenth century much of this work was in book form but from that 
period onwards the production of scientific journals meant that many papers on 
emotion and on introspection were published.  Journals such as Mind (18767), The 
American Journal of Psychology (1887), The Psychological Review (1894), The 
Psychological Bulletin (1904), and The British Journal of Psychology (1904), were 
issued as a means for dissemination of research conducted in psychology and these 
will also provide the source of data for the study.  Given the vast amount of literature 
that has been produced by psychological science over time, it is, of course necessary 
to be selective for the purposes of both manageability and to maintain focus on the 
most relevant material.  There needs, therefore, to be some criteria for the selections 
that have been made.  With this in mind, the sources for this study have been selected 
using three main criteria.  First, the period of time to be covered; second, the academic 
                                                          
7 The titles have been followed by the date of publication. 
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disciplines the sources are to be drawn from; third, geographical and linguistic 
boundaries.  
The time period 1850 to 1930 has been selected for various reasons.  Although many 
histories of psychology place psychology’s origins with the advent of German 
experimental psychology, for the purposes of this thesis, the period prior to that is vital 
in understanding the development of the concept of emotion.  As mentioned, the term 
‘emotion’ began to be used in academia from the mid nineteenth century onwards.  It 
was taken up by theorists such as Alexander Bain, Herbert Spencer and Charles 
Darwin who each incorporated it into their work.  In seeking to understand how and 
why the concept developed as it did, and how introspection was used, examination of 
their work is vital.  The period covered will end at 1930.  This represents a point by 
which psychology had begun to display many of the characteristics which it does 
today.  Several different schools of psychology had developed by this period and there 
was an acknowledged proliferation of understandings of emotion and confusion as to 
how to define the term.  Secondly, in 1928, the APA Wittenberg Symposium of 
Feeling and Emotion was held.  This drew the most prominent psychologists of the 
time and presents a snapshot of the state of the field in the early twentieth century.  It 
represents a point of time in which psychologists were looking back and looking 
forward and presents reflections on the past developments and hopes for the future. 
Particular criteria have been used in taking a sample of all the sources, books and 
journal articles on emotion available over this period of time.  Apart from the early 
part of the study where the work of philosophers who have been referred to as 'pioneer 
psychologists' (Richards, 2010) has been examined, the work produced by scientific 
psychologists has been used.  So although there was a wide breadth of cross-
disciplinary work on emotion, except where these touch on the work of psychological 
science, through collaboration, criticism or comment, they are not considered.  
Obviously, the lines are not always so clearly drawn between disciplines, but this study 
aims to focus on the work of those theorists who would describe themselves or have 
been described as psychologists.  In attempting to understand the interaction between 
definition, theory and method, the focus of the study is particularly on the effects of 
experimental psychology on psychological knowledge.  As psychology was 
developing over this period it drew on other disciplines such as anatomy and 
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physiology so these too will be discussed, as will Darwin’s work because it too was 
influential on the way in which the discipline of psychology was to develop.  The work 
of some philosophers throughout this period was important in reflecting on the 
direction that psychology was taking and will also be drawn on. 
Thirdly,  given that versions of  scientific psychology have, since the inception of the 
discipline in the nineteenth century,  had a presence in academia in a number of 
countries, a decision has to be made about which and why particular psychological 
cultures and societies will  be included in this study.  The first criterion under this 
heading is that the sources studied will be written in the English language.  The 
majority of the research discussed, therefore, will be drawn from work conducted in 
Britain and the USA.  Although a large amount of work has been done in psychological 
communities throughout Europe, the focus of this study will be on theorists drawn 
from these countries.  A coda must be applied to this criterion, however, in that it may 
be necessary to discuss in contrast, criticism or support, of particular views, work 
conducted by theorists from without these countries.  So for example, where William 
James' theory of emotion is examined it will be necessary to discuss its relation to the 
theory of Carl Lange as these have been bound together in Psychology.  The work that 
will be covered relates to some of the major movements in psychology over the period 
and will often be covered in some depth. 
The chapter has described how and why a historical approach is appropriate for the 
presentation of an understanding of the current problem of the definition of emotion.  
It shows that there is a need to understand the contexts in which emotions definitions 
have been produced and the legacy of psychology’s past.  Analysing the ways in which 
the study of emotion developed through the examination of the sources from the period 
between 1850 and 1930 will allow for a better understanding of why this issue 




THE INTROSPECTIVE OBSERVATION OF EMOTION 
FROM 1850 TO 1900 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is, first, to show that introspection was regarded as the 
method of psychology by psychologists during the latter half of the nineteenth 
century and second, to examine how it was used to study emotion and to illustrate the 
sorts of descriptions of emotion that it produced.  It will highlight the view that was 
prevalent at the time that emotion was a subjective experience or mental state which 
could only be observed through the use of introspection.  It will describe, however, 




How we come to know mind:  (a) the Subjective Observation…the direct, 
internal or subjective way. In following this we direct attention to a process in 
our own mind at the time of its occurrence or immediately afterwards.  All of 
us have some power of turning the attention inwards on the successive 
movements or changes of our mental life.  Thus we can attend to our emotions 
of joy and sorrow, love and hate, to our desires and motives and so on with a 
view to observe their nature, composition…and so forth.  And this internal 
observation of mind can be indefinitely improved by exercise, and rendered 
exact and scientific. (Sully, 1892b, p. 3) 
 
The mid to late nineteenth century was a time in which the credentials of psychology 
as a scientific discipline were being established (Danziger, 1990; Gergen, 1996; 
Richards, 2010).  It was an era in which the subject matter of psychology and what 
methods psychologists should use to study psychological phenomena were a matter 
for much debate.  Indeed even the question as to whether psychology could ever be 
classed as a science hung in the air.  Much of the rhetoric of the work of early 
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psychologists involved arguments that the discipline could, indeed, rank alongside 
biology, physics and chemistry, in a claim to be scientific, particularly in terms of the 
methods that were used.  As described in the section on introspection in Chapter One, 
Comte’s arguments as to the unfeasibility of a mind studying a mind had left 
psychology out in the cold in terms of its claim to be a scientific discipline.  Despite 
this, many psychologists, in utilising the method of introspection, followed Mill by 
resisting Comte’s narrow view of science.  They did, however, attempt to engage with 
his arguments by presenting a counter-argument:  that psychology was indeed a 
science in the positivist sense of the term because it did involve scientific observation 
– the observation of the mental states or consciousness (e.g. James, 1890a; Titchener, 
1898).  
While introspection, as a method by which scientific evidence could be produced, was 
given a dominant role in the study of the mind, it was not as clearly defined by 
psychologists in the mid nineteenth century as it was to be later on in the century.  
Although the term was understood by most psychologists as the means by which to 
study the mental states, they did not go into detail as to what they were doing when 
they introspected.  Until the end of the nineteenth century the method - later to be 
referred to, disparagingly, as “armchair psychology” by W.S. Scripture (Klein, 1942, 
p. 226) - was used fairly loosely.  For associationists such as Alexander Bain (1818-
1903) and Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), whose work will be described below, it was 
a vital way of delineating the mind but often it was not only the mental states that were 
being analysed through introspection, but bodily experiences and feelings also, 
especially when it came to understanding the emotions. 
The study of emotion in the late nineteenth century seemed to go through something 
of a renaissance.  Indeed, it has been claimed that these were “the Golden Years” of 
emotions research (Gendron & Barrett, 2009, p. 316 ), and a time that was to have a 
profound influence on subsequent understandings of emotion in psychology.  The 
nineteenth century, according to US psychologist Madison Bentley (1928), was 
characterised by “its romanticisms, its naturalisms, and its humanisms” and “seems 
easily to have turned the reflective attention of men toward the feelings” (p. 17).  It 
was an era in which there was, in literature, philosophy, anatomy and physiology for 
example, a profound interest in the emotions and their place in the lives of people 
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(Bentley, 1928; Brett, 1928).  Indeed, almost every textbook on psychology contained 
a chapter which attempted to describe what emotion was and how the emotions could 
be classified (e.g. Bain, 1875; Baldwin, 1893; James, 1890b; Ladd, 1893; McCosh, 
1880).  Scholars in the German schools of physiological psychology were presenting 
descriptions of individual emotions in precise detail (James, 1890b) and it was during 
this period that William James (1842-1910) produced one of the most widely discussed 
and enduring emotion theories in psychology.   
This interest meant that the questions of not only what emotion was but also where 
and how, it could be observed were important for psychologists at the time.  For many 
of them the main source of understanding lay not simply in newly emerging sources 
of knowledge such as physiology and evolution8 but still, as it had done for centuries 
through self-observation, by the examination of their own bodies and minds.  It was 
argued that the purpose of psychology was to study mental states or consciousness, 
and the only method by which to do so was through introspection, whatever the 
positivists might argue (e.g. Bain, 1855; James, 1890a).  The nature of emotion as an 
internal, subjective state could not be revealed purely by examining its outward 
characteristics.  As this chapter will describe introspection was, as a result, understood 
as being the method by which psychological phenomena could be understood.  It was 
discussed as being so in all the chapters on method of the major psychological texts 
between 1850 and the early twentieth century.  The following quote from Shadworth 
Hodgson (1832-1912), the English metaphysician, writing in the journal Mind, was 
typical of the argument for introspection in psychology that was put forward,  
Psychology, then, differs from physiology in this, that it brings in subjective 
states as part of the general object...For its method it depends partly on 
Reflection...the subjective aspect must first be distinguished, before it can be 
separated, from the objective.  But psychology is not the first science to make 
this use of Reflection, to adopt and employ the distinction of subjective and 
objective aspects.  All the other sciences require it in the same way; the 
difference is, that they bring into their object-matter portions of the objective 
aspect only, i.e., Things, the external world; whereas psychology brings into 
its object-matter subjective states as such. (Hodgson, 1876, p. 226) 
 
                                                          
8 The effect of these on understandings of emotion and on the use of introspection to study emotion will be dealt 
with in Chapter Four. 
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As Hodgson’s quote describes, introspection was seen as what made psychology 
distinctive from other sciences in a positive sense – it ensured that the subjective states, 
through which science was conducted were not neglected.  Psychology needed to be 
engaged with both the internal as well as the external, the subjective as well as the 
objective, in order to present a complete understanding of the mind.  
In order to explore what this approach to the study of psychological phenomena meant 
for the understanding of emotion during this period, the work of three of the most 
prominent emotion theorists of the time, Alexander Bain, Herbert  Spencer and 
William James will be discussed in the following three sections.  Further, the extent of 
the introspective study of emotion in the work of their contemporaries will be 
described.  It will be shown, as the quotes from Hodgson and Sully above suggest, that 
in order to recognise, evaluate and understand outward displays of psychological 
phenomena, it was seen as vital that the inner, subjective experience of those 
phenomena must first be examined.  It will be argued, also, that the method placed the 
psychologist and their experience very firmly within the process of the development 
of knowledge about emotion, rather than being a detached observer.  The subjective 
understandings of emotion that were produced by these theorists through the use of 
introspection will be described, and a general picture of descriptions of emotion during 
this period shown.  
The first section of this chapter will describe the work of the Scottish philosopher and 
psychologist, Alexander Bain, and will show how he used introspection to delineate 
the mind and to classify the emotions.  Bain and his contemporary, Herbert Spencer9, 
have been said to be instrumental in setting the foundation for the discipline of 
psychology (Dixon, 2003; Richards, 2010; Robinson, 1995).  These theorists, were not 
only the first to use the term “psychology” about their work (Dixon, 2003) but, it has 
been claimed, “did all but found experimental psychology” (Robinson, 1995, p. 279).  
They also attempted to observe and discern the nature of emotion using introspection.  
The second section of the chapter will, therefore, look at the work of Spencer in order 
                                                          
9 Dixon (2003) describes that, despite their influence on the future direction of psychological 
knowledge, Bain and Spencer’s works have been given little attention by historians in relation to the 
studies of their contemporary, Darwin. 
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to evaluate the effect of his separation of psychology into objective and subjective 
analyses, and his use of self-reflection to produce the latter, on his descriptions of 
emotion.  In the third section, the most famous nineteenth century psychological theory 
of emotion will be discussed: William James’s (1884) so-called ‘feeling’ theory will 
be evaluated in the light of his arguments for, and use of, the introspective method and 
the extent to which his own experience of emotion underpinned the theory that he 
produced will be shown.  In the final section of the chapter a brief but more general 
analysis of the work of a range of British and US psychologists will be examined.  It 
will present an overview of the role of introspection in psychology in the late 
nineteenth century and the issues regarding the conceptualisation of emotion that these 
theorists described. 
 
3.2 Alexander Bain: emotion as an element of the mind 
Alexander Bain was a Scottish philosopher of the associationist school whose 
approach to the study of the mind was to classify it systematically and describe its 
composition.  In an attempt to understand how mental states arose through the physical 
workings of the body, he did so by allying what physiological descriptions of the 
internal organs and the nervous system were available at the time with the doctrines of 
associationist philosophy.  The purpose of the latter was to present the mind as a set 
of related 'ideas' and to understand how elements of thought might be related10.  In 
writing The Senses and the Intellect 11  (1855)12  and The Emotions and the Will13 
(1859)14 Bain’s goal was to present as full an account as possible of the human mind, 
the elements of which it was composed, and how these elements worked together to 
                                                          
10 For more on associationism see, for example, A History of the Association Psychology (Warren, 1921). 
11 The Senses and the Intellect will be referred to as The Senses for the rest of the chapter.  
12 Four editions of The Senses and the Intellect were published in 1855, 1864, 1872 and 1894. 
13 The Emotions and the Will will be referred to as The Emotions for the rest of the chapter. 
14 Four editions of The Emotions and the Will were published in 1859, 1865,1875 and 1899. 
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produce particular behaviours.  This “systematic exposition” in which Bain argued for 
a particular separation of the mind into three main elements, defined these elements 
and their sub-elements by the use of a mixture of personal reflection, associationist 
laws, and physiological descriptions.  In his work, emotion, as one of the main 
elements, was not only defined, but a comprehensive classification of the emotions 
was also presented.   
Bain, following the work of Thomas Brown, therefore, brought into focus what could 
be expected of a scientific psychology: that the mind should be systematically 
examined piece by piece, in order that a complete account of it was provided.  In doing 
so, he was attempting to describe the mechanisms by which intangible phenomena 
such as sensations, emotions and volition were connected to the visceral and 
anatomical workings of the body.  However, although he used physiological 
descriptions of the nervous system, the muscles and the anatomical structures of 
separate parts of the body, the books were very much focused on understanding how 
these explained the mental states and subjective experiences.  He made it clear that the 
only way in which theorists could understand the minds and experiences of other 
human beings was through self-examination.   They would then be in a position to 
infer from the result of that analysis what other people's experiences were.15  For 
example, in the introduction to The Senses he stated, 
True, it is each in ourselves that we have the direct evidence of the conscious 
state, no one person's consciousness being open to another person. But finding 
all the outward appearances that accompany consciousness in ourselves to be 
present in other human beings...we naturally conclude their internal state to be 
the same with our own.  (Bain, 1855, p. 2) 
 
This approach, it was argued, was particularly required for the study of emotion 
because emotion was felt and, as such, was experienced in the body 
phenomenologically in a way that perception or memory, for example, was not.  No 
one had access to another’s feelings, so for a scientific understanding of emotion to 
                                                          
15 This is, in part, because Bain (1855) regarded other methods as not having produced a great deal of reliable 
evidence in relation to emotion – he felt that over time it may be possible to increasingly use more physiological and 




emerge there had to be some way of observing emotion from within, and, therefore it 
was argued by Bain and, as we will see, many other theorists in the late nineteenth 
century, that a true understanding of emotion was only really available to psychologists 
from within their own minds and  bodies.   
As an examination of the ways in which Bain portrayed the experience of emotion 
through the use of introspection, the first part of this section will describe how he 
delineated the mind into different elements and the second part will discuss the way in 
which he classified the emotions.  It will show that, although he sought to produce a 
delineation and description of the mind which was to some degree based on the 
physical, he viewed experience as being a more important source of knowledge 
because he believed that without it a physical description of emotion would have no 
meaning.  Further, although Bain believed both should be studied in psychology, he 
viewed emotion, at first at least, as simply the subjective experience of emotion and 
the physiological and behavioural signs as mere “accompaniments” to the emotion 
itself.  Physiological changes in the body might give rise to a psychological state of 
fear, for example, but these were not part of the emotion itself.  The only place, 
therefore, to truly observe an emotion proper was for each person to examine their 
consciousness.  
 
3.2.1  Bain's delineation of the mind using introspection 
 As has been stated, in the nineteenth century there was an increasing interest in the 
study of the emotions.  In philosophy, Thomas Brown's (1822) lectures had provided 
a platform for emotion, as a concept, to be raised to an eminent position in comparison 
to other terms for affect (Dixon, 2003).  Emotion was a psychological concept which 
was developed in relation to Brown's argument for psychology as being a kind of 
‘mental chemistry’, in which, the mind could be divided into separate elements, each 
being defined and studied independently.  Therefore, one of the main questions for the 
emerging psychologists of the mid nineteenth century, as it had been for philosophers 
for hundreds of years, continued to be in regard to how the mind should be divided up.  
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Given all the different human experiences and behaviours, as well as the various terms 
that had developed over time to denote particular psychological concepts, for example,  
consciousness, the will, memory intellect and perception, if psychology was to be a 
scientific endeavour, psychologists must decide which of these were to be used, firstly, 
to denote the main elements of which the mind consisted and second, what sub-
elements were required to present a complete delineation.  
The past centuries had already provided some suggestions as to how the mind should 
be divided.  Plato, for example, had suggested three basic components:  the reasoning, 
the desiring, and the emotive.  At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Brown 
(1822) rejected the traditional two-fold division of Thomas Reid into Understanding 
and Will in favour of one that comprised three elements - sensations, thoughts and 
emotions.  Bain (1859), similarly, adopted a threefold division of the mind.  For him 
the sensations and the emotions appeared to be too close together, or similar in nature, 
to be separated.  Although he accepted that the Will was certainly a main element of 
mind, he viewed Reid to be incorrect in subsuming emotion within that heading.  
Rather than leaving the emotions under the head of the Will, he therefore separated 
these out, and made use of the work of several philosophers in defending this three-
part model by citing the, similarly tripartite, divisions of Brown, William Hamilton 
and Dugald Stewart. 
The analysis of his own mental states, as it had been for these philosophers, was the 
key to his understanding.  Indeed he quotes Hamilton, as having achieved his division 
through introspective analysis. 
Sir William Hamilton, in remarking on the arrangement followed in the 
writings of Professor Dugald Stewart, states his own view as follows: — 'If we 
take the Mental to the exclusion of Material phoenomena, that is, the 
phoenomena manifested through the medium of Self-consciousness or 
Reflection, they naturally divide themselves into three categories or primary 
genera; — the phoenomena of Knowledge or Cognition, — the phoenomena 
of Feeling or of Pleasure and Pain, — and the phoenomena of Conation or of 
Will and Desire.’ Intelligence, Feeling, and Will are thus distinctively set forth. 
(Bain, 1855, p. 7) 
 
Although Bain used supporting evidence in the form of physiological observations he 
did not rely on these as being the main evidence for the classification.  In The Senses, 
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he discussed the work of a Dr Sharkey, whose own understanding of the brain and 
nervous system had caused him to propose a quadruple division, of intellect, will, 
sensation and emotion.  Bain rejected this division and chose, rather, to mould his own, 
placing the sensations in the same division as the emotions.  He thus disregarded the 
physiological evidence in favour of his introspective analysis of emotion.  This is not 
surprising given that he argued in a later edition that,  
The study of the mind, as a science, must contain an element of introspection. 
There is a difference of opinion as to what ratio this should bear to the objective 
study of the physical concomitants of the mind. Some psychologists define the 
science of mind, as the science of the facts of Consciousness, meaning Self-
consciousness or subjectivity.  The only tenable position is the combination of 
both.  (Bain, 1872, p. 689) 
 
At the start of his treatise he stated, “Mind, according to my conception of it, possesses 
three attributes, or capacities. 1. It has Feeling16, in which term I include what is 
commonly called Sensation and Emotion. 2. It can Act according to Feeling. 3. It can 
Think” (Bain, 1855, p. 1). However, at the beginning of The Emotions, he claimed, 
“Mind is comprised under three heads, - Emotion, Volition and Intellect” (Bain, 1859, 
p. 2).  Using introspection, Bain had broadly delineated the elements that he 
understood as being the ones which mainly define a mind.  He struggled, however, to 
settle on a word for the affective element, equating emotion with both feeling and 
consciousness.  Sentience was a necessary aspect of being human; indeed, Bain gave 
emotion or feeling, or consciousness, the most prominent place in the mind.  He stated 
that, emotion was the “foremost and unmistakeable mark of a mind” (1855, p. 2).  His 
difficulty in explaining what it was, however, is apparent in that he directed the reader 
to their experience for a definition, 
A Definition should itself be intelligible, and composed of terms not standing 
in need of further definition.  Thus, for a notion of what feeling is, I must refer 
each person to their own experience. The warmth felt in sunshine, the fragrance 
of flowers, the sweetness of honey, the bleating of cattle, the beauty of a 
landscape, are so many known states of consciousness, feeling, or emotion. 
(1855, p. 2) 
                                                          
16Although he says the feeling is both sensation and emotion here, Bain tended often to use the terms feeling and 




The difficulty of defining emotion scientifically was clear in Bain's work.  Emotion, 
as an abstract ephemeral and intangible psychological phenomenon, was best 
understood within each person's experience.  In order for psychologists to study 
emotion, it was necessary, however, that they were able to provide clear and adequate 
definitions of the phenomena that they were investigating.  According to Bain's 
introspective analysis, the term emotion encompassed all sorts of different 
psychological states, “Emotion is the name here used to comprehend all that is 
understood by feelings, states of feeling, pleasures, pains, passions, sentiments, 
affections.  Consciousness, and conscious states also for the most part denote modes 
of emotion” (1859, p. 3).  Emotion was a broad, complex and multifarious 
phenomenon.  Emotion as a feeling, however that feeling may be defined, was what 
most informed Bain's definition of emotion.  Investigations into the potential 
underlying biological or neurological mechanisms were in their infancy, and it was not 
possible to connect the elements of the mind to the physiology of the body in anything 
but the most rudimentary manner.  Introspection, on the other hand, gave theorists 
direct access to emotion in a way in which no other method could. 
Bain's tripartite conception of the mind, based on his own, and others, introspective 
analysis, continued to be used throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
as a template by which the elements of the mind could be studied (e.g. Sully, 1893).  
It influenced where the investigations of psychologists were directed and what they 
saw as being of value in understanding the mind and human behaviour and, in 
presenting people as being predominantly feeling creatures, led the way for the 
scientific study of emotion.  It also helped to heighten the profile of the emotions as a 
subject worthy of study in psychology.  Further, as will be discussed in the following 
section, Bain's scientific classification of the emotions was the first attempt at a 
taxonomy of emotion which, although grounded in his own experiences, was 






3.2.2 The classification of the emotions 
In attempting to classify the varieties of emotion, Bain (1855) resorted to the use of 
two main scientific methods, the Natural History method and the method of 
introspection.  First, he used the Natural History Method as a template on which he 
intended to develop a scientific and precise classification of the emotions.  Bain 
admired the work of the theorists that had used the method to produce taxonomies for 
the sciences of mineralogy, botany and zoology which classified minerals, plants and 
animals into genera and species.  He, therefore, set out to do likewise in relation to the 
emotions, through discriminating between them on the basis of particular 
characteristics,  
Such is my model for the Natural History of the Feelings.  In the present 
chapter, entitled "Emotion in General," I enumerate all the facts, attributes or 
properties that in various degrees attach to the special emotions, and in the 
order most natural for exhibiting those properties intelligibly; choosing 
instances to illustrate the meaning of the generalities. In the chapter subsequent 
to the second, I give the families and species of emotions in detail, and state 
for each species to what extent these properties attach to, and constitute the 
specific characters of, that species.  (Bain, 1855, p. 24) 
 
It was clear, however, that this method was only as accurate as the observation of the 
characteristics of the phenomena that were to be classified.  While the scientists who 
studied minerals, for example, classified these in relation to physical attributes such as 
“hardness, tenacity, optical peculiarities, phosphorescence and composition”(p. 23), 
the question that Bain had to answer if he was to achieve a similar classification was, 
‘What are the defining characteristics of the emotions?’.  It might be expected that 
Bain, like the mineralogists and botanists, would simply look to physical properties; 
movements of the body accompanying emotion such as facial expressions and visceral 
changes are described in much of The Emotions.  However, although these were used 
in the classification, they were not sufficient, in Bain's eyes, to describe or define the 
emotions themselves.   
In order to observe the emotions for classification the second scientific method that 
Bain advocated was self-examination as a means to look at and examine what he called 
“the Feeling, proper”.  He stated, “Our own consciousness, formerly reckoned the only 
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medium of knowledge to the mental philosopher, must, therefore, be still referred to 
as a principal means of discriminating the varieties of human feeling” (Bain, 1859, p. 
57).  Because emotion, as he saw it, resided only in the consciousness of individuals, 
it was only with recourse to the consciousness of an individual that these could be 
viewed.  After having set out the physical characteristics which he saw as 
accompanying an emotion, for example, the muscular expressions, “the diffusive 
action” in the nerves, and the actions of the secreting glands, he then went on to set 
out the mental and experiential aspects of emotion on which the classification 
depended.  
Using a mixture of metaphor, anecdote, parallels in the sciences, and personal 
reflections, Bain demonstrated how the emotions might be distinguished and classified 
using introspection.  The intangibility of emotional experience was to be given some 
shape and formed into something that resembled a scientific enumeration.  The aspects 
of emotion he identified as being the main means of delineation were recognisable 
characteristics of everyday emotional experience.  In producing the classification he 
started by making “the first broad distinction that of Pleasure or pain” (p. 29).  Next, 
he divided the emotions into groups depending on the magnitude of pain or pleasure 
they exhibit, “and the next is the difference of degree...quantity and intensity as 
rendering the statement of degree more specific” (p. 29).  A further distinction was 
made in terms of the quality of the emotion,  
It is not by virtue of mere amount or intensity that some pleasurable impulses 
give a satisfaction only for the moment and others continue to live in idea, or 
to vibrate long after the stroke has ceased. This is a distinction of quality. A 
piece of good news, received in the morning, enlivens the mind for the entire 
day; the sweetest taste, when withdrawn, ceases to touch any chord of delight. 
(Bain, 1859, p. 29)  
 
Further, on the aspect of quality, Bain went on to show how different emotions alter 
depending on the environmental stimulus that has caused them.  “The feeling produced 
by a great work of art is quite different from the pleasure of gain, or from an outburst 
of affection — all have something in common, but yet in each there is a quality peculiar 
and characteristic” (p. 30).   
61 
 
Finally, before he proceeded to describe each emotion in detail, he described a 
particular technique by which emotions can be scientifically distinguished by 
introspection. “When different emotions occur together, or in close succession, there 
is an opportunity of comparing them, and the mind then recognises similarity or 
diversity of quality or degree” (p. 30).  He also describes how amounts of pleasure or 
pain can be measured by using a practice more often found in chemistry, 
Just as acids are pronounced equivalent when in amount sufficient to neutralize 
the same portion of alkali, and as heat is estimated by the quantity of snow 
melted by it, so pleasures are fairly compared as to their total efficacy on the 
mind, by the amount of pain that they are capable of submerging. In this sense 
there may be an effective estimate of degree which shall include all the three 
characters above distinguished, under the heads of mass, acuteness, and 
quality. (p. 30) 
 
Thus, Bain (1859) produced what he viewed as a scientific classification of emotion 
based on an examination of his subjective experience and mental processes.  He 
described nine special emotions: the law of harmony and conflict; the law of relativity, 
e.g. wonder and curiosity; terror; tender affections; emotions of self; power; the 
irascible emotion or anger; emotions of action and the exercise of the intellect.  
Examples of each were given, and their natures described in relation to the 
characteristics above.  Emotions, he argued, could be classified in relation to particular 
characteristics and described as individual elements of the mind because “We 
recognise such generalities as pleasure, pain, love, anger, through the property of 
mental or intellectual discrimination that accompanies in our mind the fact of emotion. 
A certain degree of precision is attainable by this mode of mental comparison and 
analysis” (p. 57).    
However, if this was to be a scientifically useful enumeration of the relevant aspects 
of emotion, it must be applicable not only to himself but must also be generalisable to 
other people.  The classification could not simply be the description of Bain's mind 
alone, as interesting as that might be, but must be a template on which to base an 
understanding of other people's mental states.  The problem, of course, as Bain pointed 
out several times in his work, is that scientists do not have access to other people's 
experiences and feelings.  The question then arises as to how psychologists can know 
what people are experiencing.  Bain addressed this question as follows, 
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The expressive gestures growing out of the diffusive stimulus, the volitional 
energies stimulated, the influences upon the intellectual trains, and all the 
appearances that result from various combinations of these, are our means of 
judging of what is passing in the interior of the mind. When to all these we 
apply our own consciousness as a medium of interpretation, we have done all 
that the case admits of. Having lain on the watch for all the significant acts of 
another man's mind, we refer to our own feelings, and endeavour to arrive at 
some one mode of consciousness in ourselves that would have exactly the same 
accompaniments. This is to us what the other man feels. (1859, p. 50) 
 
Self-examination was, therefore, for Bain, a vital element in the process of evaluating 
the emotions of other people.  Emotion, if it was to be defined as a mental state, could 
only be observed from within.  Although the physical accompaniments may be viewed, 
the emotions themselves remained hidden and the only way for the psychologist to 
understand them was to view the expressional aspects and connect them to his own 
particular experiences. 
There was still an issue, however, with the representativeness of each theorist’s 
introspective view of emotion as Spencer (1868) pointed out in his essay on The 
Emotions.  He said of Bain's classification, “Mr Bain in confining himself to an account 
of the emotions as they exist in an adult civilised man has neglected those classes of 
facts out of which the science of the matter must chiefly be built” (p. 257).  Spencer 
argued that the Natural History Method was rather a method that was intended to 
record evolutionary adaptations and developments in the classes of phenomena it 
described.  Bain’s method did not do so because he could not examine the emotions 
internally as they existed in less evolved organisms such as animals or ‘savages’,  as 
theorists of the time tended to call the indigenous people of other, less ‘civilized’ 
countries.  In response, Bain, in the second edition of The Emotions dropped any 
mention of the Natural History Method but continued to resort to his own 
consciousness as a means of classification, arguing a little less strongly than 
previously, that theorists should not, “supersede a reference to our own direct 






This section has shown that Bain, far from viewing introspection as being unscientific 
as Comte had suggested it was, saw it rather as a vital method by which to observe the 
mind and discern its elements and felt that without it, a psychological science would 
be impossible.  His use of introspection to delineate the mind and describe its elements 
and to classify the emotions was based on a view that it was from the subjective 
perspective that the mind and emotion could be understood.  His conceptualisation of 
emotion was based on what it was like to experience emotion and although he 
embraced other understandings, these were to be used as a means to understand that 
experience, for example, to describe what actions or physiological responses might 
accompany the emotion as it occurred.  As will be described in the following section, 
Spencer too argued for the need for the introspective method, despite differences 
between himself and Bain in terms of the broader frameworks of psychological 
knowledge in which they each developed their views of emotion.   
 
3.3 Herbert Spencer’s subjective psychology 
This section of the chapter will discuss the work of Herbert Spencer, his 
conceptualisation of psychology and of emotion.  In 1855, Spencer published The 
Principles of Psychology17 a treatise on the subject matter of psychology and the 
methods by which the mind should be examined.  Spencer's advocacy of evolution 
figured quietly in the first edition, due to its general lack of acceptance in academic 
circles, and more strongly in the second edition which was published in 1870, after 
Darwin's Origin of Species.  Following the second edition of The Principles, Spencer's 
evolutionary associationism18 and advocacy of comparative psychology emerged as a 
                                                          
17The Principles of Psychology will be referred to as The Principles in the rest of the chapter. 
18This encompassed the idea that associations are hereditary and when repeated in successive generations 
become cumulative so that there is a compounding of simple states into those that are increasingly more complex.  
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profound influence on the way in which psychology was to develop, particularly in 
relation to the later development of behaviourism (Boring, 1929).  Spencer’s 
psychology relied on the idea that the associations between mental states as developed 
through evolution, could be discovered in part through introspection, so that, although 
Bain and Spencer fundamentally disagreed  with each other on the efficacy of 
evolution as a useful framework with which to understand the human mind (Bain, 
1865), they were agreed on the efficacy of introspective analysis as a means by which 
the theorist could explore the mind and discover from what it was formed.  Both, 
although they would have claimed themselves to be positivists (Dixon, 2003), held out 
against the Comtean position that introspection was mere metaphysical speculation 
and had no place in a discipline purporting to be scientific.  They also both followed 
J. S. Mill in his defence of the use of introspection from attacks from those such as 
German philosophers Kant and Leibniz, who, as was discussed in Chapter One, argued 
that introspection as a method of philosophical analysis was not tenable because mind 
was not the equivalent of consciousness and, therefore, to examine the latter would not 
produce an accurate account of the former (Danziger, 1980).   
For Spencer, as will be described below, psychology had two sides, the subjective and 
the objective.  The following sections will, first, describe how he conceptualised the 
different roles that these played in the development of psychological knowledge and 
second, will show how he developed a subjective understanding of emotion through 
the use of introspection.  The third part of the section will go on to demonstrate his 
views on the uses and limitations of introspection for the study of emotion. 
 
3.3.1 Psychology as subjective and objective 
For Spencer, the fact that psychologists were looking not only at the objects in the 
world but the internal workings of the mind was something that distinguished 
psychology from other sciences in a positive sense.  In the first edition of The 
Principles, he stated that, 
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The claims of Psychology to rank as a distinct science, are thus not smaller but 
greater than those of any other science. If its phenomena are contemplated 
objectively, merely as nervo-muscular adjustments by which the higher 
organisms from moment to moment adapt their actions to environing co-
existences and sequences, its degree of speciality, even then, entitles it to a 
separate place. The moment the element of feeling, or consciousness, is used 
to interpret nervo-muscular adjustments as thus exhibited in the living beings 
around, objective Psychology acquires an additional, and quite exceptional, 
distinction. (1855, p.141) 
 
This distinctive science could achieve something that no other science did.  While all 
other sciences produced descriptions of the objective world, psychology studied both 
the objective and the subjective.  Further, as Spencer pointed out, without the 
subjective aspect the objects that psychology studied would be mere descriptions of 
the physical correlates of the subjective phenomena, which was, after all, the true 
subject matter of even an objective psychology. 
To those who see that the essential conceptions on which Psychology in general 
proceeds, are furnished by subjective Psychology — to those who see that such 
words as feelings, ideas, memories, volitions, have acquired their several 
meanings through self-analysis, and that the distinctions we make between 
sensations and emotions, or between automatic acts and voluntary acts, can be 
established only by comparisons among, and classifications of, our mental 
states; it will be manifest that objective Psychology can have no existence as 
such, without borrowing its data from subjective Psychology.  And thus 
perceiving that, until it acknowledges its indebtedness to subjective 
Psychology, objective Psychology cannot legitimately use any terms that imply 
consciousness. (Spencer, 1880/1896, p. 141) 
 
Spencer's psychology, therefore, was a dual-aspect discipline.  Objective psychology 
dealt with the physical workings of the body, the observable data of a positivistic 
science.  Essentially, objective psychology was everything except for consciousness; 
for example, physiological psychology which was “limited to such data as can be 
reached by observations made on sensible objects” (1870, p. 48).  Subjective 
psychology, therefore, covered what was left:  the “data wholly inaccessible to external 
observations” (p. 48) - data, which according to positivist doctrines, had no place in 
the building up of a scientific body of knowledge.  While, as has been described there 
was little explicit discussion as to how introspection was used or what it was used to 
examine, in Spencer's work it was used in two ways;  to examine his experience as a 
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means of producing descriptions of the elements of the mind and to produce a 
theoretical analysis of the mental states.  These will each be described below in relation 
to his study of emotion. 
 
3.3.2 Spencer's subjective descriptions of emotion 
In the first and second editions of The Principles Spencer presented a chapter on 
emotion19, its nature and its relation to other aspects of the mind.  In it he demonstrated 
that the mental states, as examined through reflection on experience, were not always 
in line with what his intellectual and philosophical leanings told him about how the 
mind was constructed.  He was particularly concerned with the contrast between 
emotion and cognition as subjective experiences when examined introspectively and 
the way in which he thought they should present themselves according to the doctrines 
of evolutionary associationism.  At the beginning of the chapter he stated, “Habitually 
contemplating the contrast between the cognitive and emotive faculties from a 
subjective point of view, we conclude that it is a strongly marked contrast; and to say 
that there is really no line of demarcation between reason, and sentiment or passion, 
will, by most, be thought a contradiction of direct internal perceptions” (1855, p. 584).  
Spencer's experiential analysis of emotion demonstrated a separation between emotion 
and reason.  However, in contrast, his intellectual analysis affirmed a quite different 
position, that, “if all mental phenomena are incidents of the correspondence between 
the organism and its environment; and if this correspondence is a thing of degree, 
which passes insensibly from its lowest to its highest forms; then, we may be certain, 
à priori, that the Feelings are not, scientifically considered, divisible from other 
phenomena of consciousness” (p. 584).    
Further, Spencer went on to describe the way in which the emotions must have evolved 
at the same time as memory and reason because these three were all higher processes 
                                                          
19The chapter is called 'The Feelings'. Spencer uses the terms feelings, emotions, passions and sentiments 
interchangeably as terms for affect that are not sensations. 
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which could be distinguished from lower psychological states such as reflex action and 
instinct.  Thus, he argued, these had all evolved as conscious rather than subconscious 
states but had differentiated separately according to particular characteristics so that 
they had become internally distinguishable, even though their evolutionary beginnings 
meant that they were fundamentally related.  These may be clearly discerned he said 
if, for example, we compare “an inference and a fit of anger” (1855, p. 584).  However, 
if we contemplate a beautiful statue or listen to music, the impressions that we receive 
are a mixture of both intellectual and felt.  There is a connection in the mind between 
the perception and the meaning and the emotion that is produced and these are 
inseparable.  At times, then, in subjective experience emotion can appear as being a 
very different kind of mental element from reason, at other times the two are so bound 
up in experience that they are indistinguishable.   
However accurate his assertions about the origins of mental processes were, Spencer's 
analyses of experience in the light of evolutionary associationism enabled him to 
present a complex view of emotion.  He showed how it could be viewed as both as 
being an individual mental state, which when subjectively contemplated could be 
understood as being distinct and isolated, and that it could also be seen as part of a 
more complex whole, that of consciousness.  The implication, therefore, that to simply 
contemplate emotion in isolation neglects its relationship with the other processes to 
which it gives meaning and which in turn give it meaning.  He showed that there was 
a need to contextualise emotion both in terms of other processes and in terms of the 
situations in which emotions arose.  For example, he showed the relation of memory 
to emotion and the way in which current emotions are generated through past 
experiences of the connection of emotion with particular circumstances, such as a 
beautiful scene.  However, the intangibility of emotion as an experience meant that 
Spencer's combination of inner reflection and evolutionary associationism were not as 







3.3.3 The uses and limitations of introspection 
In the final edition of The Principles Spencer (1880/1920) presented the need for, and 
the limitations of, introspection when it came to the analysis of emotion in psychology.  
First, he argued that for the feelings, which he separated into sensations and emotions, 
the only reason for the objective study of the nerves by physiological psychologists 
should be to contribute to the understanding of the subjective states.  Examinations of 
the nerves alone could not provide the data on which to base a psychology of emotion.  
Further, because the proofs for the existence of feeling that physiologists and 
pathologists accumulated were based purely on a physiology of animals, their 
understanding of the production of human feelings was an indirect one and limited in 
what it could reveal.  The only means by which psychologists could understand the 
connection between the nerve centres and the feelings that these produced was through 
the method of introspection and it was only when the relationship between these had 
been established, that emotions could be properly understood.  Therefore, Spencer 
argued, it was only through self-reports of the human experience of emotion that the 
two could be connected, where “the reader imagines a nervous system contained in his 
own body, and concludes that his sensations and emotions are due to the disturbances 
which the outer world sets up at its periphery, and arouses by indirect processes in its 
centres” (p. 100).  There was, he argued, both in science and in everyday life, a useful 
assumption that the experience of the observed is the same as the observer.  Although 
there may be individual differences in terms of emotional response, we can rely on this 
assumption to provide a general picture of the subjective experience of emotion based 
on our own.  The subjective experience of the theorist was sufficient evidence on 
which to base a psychology of emotion. 
Secondly, in contrast, Spencer (1880/1920) considered that there were limits to the use 
of introspection in the analysis of the emotions.  Although it could be used to examine 
the experiences that emotions produced, it could not be used in the way in which Bain 
has done so, to classify the emotions.  His rhetoric against Bain's use of introspection 
in producing a classification of emotion by means of self-analysis was developed 
theoretically in the second volume of the final edition of The Principles.  In it he moved 
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from the objective part of the treatise to the subjective where he intended to discuss 
and analyse the elements of consciousness.  Anticipating that the reader would expect 
to find the emotions in this section, he explained why the emotions were not to be 
considered there: “a sentiment is altogether vague in its outlines, and has a structure 
which continues indistinct even under the most patient introspection.  Dim traces of 
components may be discerned; but the limitations of the whole and of its parts are so 
faintly marked, and at the same time so entangled, that none but very general results 
can be reached” (p. 4).  Spencer did not appear to mean that emotions themselves are 
entirely indistinguishable in consciousness because, in sections of the previous 
volume, he discussed how different emotions such as fear and anger might arise.  
Rather, what he was suggesting was that these cannot be analysed in a structured way 
and that in terms of his own experience and of the laws of association, the intangible 
and ephemeral emotions did not fall neatly into a clear arrangement.  This was not an 
unusual conclusion for the introspectionist psychologists of the nineteenth century, as 
will be described later.  Spencer accounted for this difficulty in a particular way, by 
interpreting this experience in terms of the associative and evolutionary development 
of emotion:  that the emotions had evolved from compounds of “clusters upon clusters” 
of heterogeneous simple feelings into larger heterogeneous clusters meant that these 
could not be easily separated (p. 4).  
 
3.3.4 Conclusion 
Spencer's contention that psychology be both subjective and objective provided an 
argument for the preservation of the method of introspection for psychological science.  
For Spencer, however, there were two understandings of introspection:  an experiential 
introspection which was used to comprehend the phenomenology of emotion, and an 
intellectual introspection which enabled him more particularly to apply the laws of 
association and evolution.  While Spencer found that his experience of emotion was 
not always in line with his belief as to how emotion should present itself, this did not 
cause him to mistrust experience, but, rather, to attempt to examine why this might be.  
This section has shown, therefore, that the experience of the psychologist was viewed 
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as a valuable and reliable source of evidence about emotion for psychologists at the 
time.  
This was certainly the case in the work of William James.  In the following section, 
James’s theory of emotion will be examined in the light of his arguments for the use 
of introspection.  James’s argument that, rather than being a subjective method, 
introspection was an objective method, even if it did examine subjective states, will be 
described, and his understanding of emotion analysed in light of his use of 
introspection.  
 
3.4 William James: the experience of emotion 
The work of William James needs very little introduction.  James left a lasting legacy 
on the development of the discipline in the US and on the field of emotions research.  
Whether or not his theory has helped or hindered the understanding of emotion has 
been a matter of debate for the last century (Ellsworth, 1994; Lang, 1994; Dixon, 
2003), however, there is no doubt of the impact that it has had in psychology.  At the 
time it was written it produced an enormous level of debate (Gurney, 1884; Irons, 
1894; Marshall, 1884a; Titchener, 1915); almost fifty years after it was first published 
it was still being critically evaluated by the major theorists (Bentley, 1928); and no 
chapter on emotion in any modern psychology textbook is complete without a 
rendering of James's 'feeling theory’.  
At the time he wrote it James had seen the need for a theory which could supplement 
the vast array of detailed physiological descriptions of individual emotions which were 
coming out of the German schools of physiological psychology at the time.  Once 
psychologists had a coherent understanding of emotion, a theory, or what James 
termed, “the goose that lays the golden egg” they would not, he argued, need to keep 
producing these tedious accounts (1892, p. 449).  Like Bain and Spencer, James was 
far from opposed to other methods of inquiry in psychology, however, as will be 
discussed, he defended the supremacy of introspective accounts above all other 
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methods in psychology against the attacks that had been made by Comte and, although 
James described the three methods of psychology as being introspection, comparison 
and experimentation, the only one of these which James himself practiced was the first. 
As Boring (1950) describes, although James encouraged experimentalism in the US as 
a means by which to practice psychology, he did not carry out any experiments 
himself.  As a result, his work was strictly theoretical and, although informed to some 
extent by the other two methods he described, like Spencer's and Bain's, his work was 
first and foremost developed through inner reflection.  In contrast to many current 
discussions of James’s theory in the literature which try to present re-evaluations of it 
and its explanatory power, here it will be discussed, not in terms of how well it explains 
emotion, but in terms of how it was developed in relation to James’s belief in the 
efficacy of introspection and the understanding of emotion as a subjective experience.  
The first part of this section will show that James argued strongly for the requirement 
for introspection in psychology and that this was done in relation to both the purpose 
and subject-matter of psychology.  In the second part of this section, James's theory 
will be evaluated in light of his use of introspection and it will be shown that his own 
subjective experience of emotion was important both in the development of the theory 
and in its defence. 
 
3.4.1 The importance of introspection in James's work 
William James was in no doubt about the need for the method of introspection in 
psychology:  
Introspective Observation is what we have to rely on first and foremost and 
always. The word introspection need hardly be defined - it means, of course, 
the looking into our own minds and reporting what we there discover.  
Everyone agrees that we there discover states of consciousness. So far as I 
know, the existence of such states has never been doubted by any critic, 
however skeptical in other respects he may have been...I regard this belief as 
the most fundamental of all the postulates of Psychology, and shall discard all 
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curious inquiries about its certainty as too metaphysical for the scope of this 
book.20 (James, 1890a, p. 185) 
 
As has been shown in the work of Bain and Spencer, these theorists’ advocacy of 
introspection as a method of observation in psychology, and their holding out against 
the arguments against it, existed in relation to their views on the purpose of psychology 
and its subject-matter.  James's defence of introspection against the arguments of those 
such as Comte (1830 cited in James, 1890a, p. 188), who believed that introspection 
was “a pretended psychological method” which was “radically null and void”, was 
similarly set against the background of his views of the attributes of a body of 
psychological knowledge which would be meaningful and useful as is described 
below.  This section will describe James’s advocacy of introspection in relation to what 
he believed psychology was and what psychologists should study. 
Psychology was, James (1890a) claimed, a “natural science”.  It was “the Science of 
Mental Life, both of its phenomena and of their conditions.  The phenomena are such 
things as we call feelings, desires, cognitions, reasonings, decisions, and the like” (p. 
1).  Although it was the science of consciousness, it was important, he believed, to 
allow psychology to be “as vague as its subject” (p. 6), and to also examine the bodily 
experiences, particularly as these related to the physiology of the brain and nerves from 
where the mental processes were initiated.  These other kinds of evidence were useful 
in order that the mechanisms by which the mental states arose could be described, 
although they were not, for James, the main subject-matter of psychology.  That he set 












(James, 1890a, p. 184) 
                                                          
20Dixon (2003) states that James gave a limited role to introspection.  This is true to some degree because, as will 
be shown, he believed that the method was vital for psychology, he did not believe that it was the role of 
psychologists to use introspection to produce statements as to the metaphysical basis of psychology, what he called 
the “ultimate puzzles”(James, 1890a, p. 184). These should not be examined by psychologists any more than they 
were by botanists, zoologists and chemists.  
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These four squares, he stated, contain “the irreducible data of psychology” (p. 184).  
“The psychologist believes No's 2, 3, and 4, which together form his total object, to be 
realities, and reports them and their mutual relations as truly as he can” (p. 184).  The 
psychologist was to examine his own experience or understanding of, for example, the 
emotion of fear, and present his own analysis; his “reality”.  Unlike Spencer, James 
did not divide psychology into objective and subjective endeavours.  The end product 
- the “psychologist’s reality”- as James saw it, was an objective account from reflection 
on the objects of consciousness, “To the psychologist, then, the minds he studies are 
objects, in a world of other objects.  Even when he introspectively analyses his own 
mind, and tells what he finds there, he talks about it in an objective way” (p. 183).  The 
purpose of the psychologist was to turn his own experience into the objective 
knowledge of scientific enquiry.  Given that James believed psychology to be a 
science, and psychology's data to be thought and the content of thought, it is no wonder 
then that he also believed that introspection was the best scientific method by which 
psychologists could conduct their investigations. 
Although there was to be no metaphysical inquiry in psychology, the use of 
introspection by philosophers for that very purpose was called up by James to support 
his argument for its requirement as a psychological method.  Citing Locke, Hume, 
Reid, Hartley, the Mills, Stewart, Brown and Bain to show just how established the 
method was in “English empirical psychology” (James, 1890a, p. 188) he further 
added the more recent work of Brentano, Ueberweg and Mohr as examples of its 
efficacy.  To further back up his argument Mohr is quoted as follows, “The illusions 
of our senses, have undermined our belief in the reality of the outer world; but in the 
sphere of inner observation our confidence is intact, for we have never found ourselves 
to be in error about the reality of an act of thought or feeling. We have never been 
misled into thinking we were not in doubt or in anger when these conditions were 
really states of our consciousness” (Mohr, 1882, as cited in James, 1890a, p. 191).  
Although James agreed with this statement to a certain extent he, nevertheless, 
qualified it by stating how hard it is to discern some emotions through introspection.  
He understood, he said, that introspection was “difficult and fallible” (p. 191) but it 
was only difficult and fallible in the way that observation of any kind in psychology 
was difficult and fallible.  
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In particular, for introspection to be used correctly, he argued, like Spencer, that a 
distinction needed to be made between experiential and intellectual 'modes of 
consciousness'.  Referring to JS Mill and Brentano, James contrasted the difference 
between the immediate “feltness” of a feeling and of the reflection on that feeling a 
moment later which is dependent on perception and memory.  The first, the feeling, is 
the abstract phenomenological experience, the latter, an intellectual working out of 
what that experience is and what it means.  For James it was only the second “mode 
of consciousness” (p. 189) that was of use to the psychologist.  The first, available 
even to a baby, he said, was not the means by which psychological knowledge was 
going to progress.  The psychologist, 
must not only have his mental states in their absolute veritableness, he must 
report them and write about them, name them, classify and compare them and 
trace their relations to other things. Whilst alive they are their own property; it 
is only post-mortem that they become his prey.  And as in the naming, classing 
and knowing of things in general we are notoriously fallible, why not also here? 
(p. 189)   
 
He goes on to say that the rest of The Principles of Psychology, which includes his 
theory of emotion, is an illustration of the difficulty of using the method and “of 
discovering by direct introspection exactly what our feelings and their relations are” 
(p. 191).  The following section will look at the way in which James was dependent 
on the reflection on experience in the production of a theory of emotion which was his 
own “psychologist’s reality”. 
 
3.4.2 James’s theory of emotion as “psychologist's reality” 
My theory...is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the 
exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the 
emotion. Common-sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we 
meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry and 
strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is 
incorrect, that the one mental state is not immediately induced by the other, 
that the bodily manifestations must first be interposed between, and that the 
more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we 
strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, 
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because we are sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case may be. Without the bodily 
states following on the perception, the latter would be purely cognitive in form, 
pale, colorless, destitute of emotional warmth. We might then see the bear, and 
judge it best to run, receive the insult and deem it right to strike, but we should 
not actually feel afraid or angry. (James, 1892, p. 449) 
 
As the most debated and revisited emotion theory of all time, James's theory of 
emotion has made an enormous contribution to the literature on emotion in psychology 
(e.g.  Arnold, 1960; Ellsworth, 1994; Lang, 1994; Plutchick, 1980; Strongman, 2003; 
Wassmann, 2014).  Its fame is not, of course, because it has been universally accepted 
in psychology as the definition of emotion, but because it very quickly became a point 
of reference for theorists to use in their own work.  As Wassmann argues, “James is 
cited today as if “James’s theory of emotion” were a contemporary scientific text that 
correctly explained the emotions.  “James” has become a landmark that stands for 
“emotion” like “Darwin” stands for “evolution.”” (p. 180).  As Titchener (1914a) 
argued at the time, and others have done subsequently (e.g. Richardson, 2006; 
Wassmann, 2014), its fame was in large part due to James's extraordinary ability to 
communicate in writing and to present his work in an accessible style.  Titchener 
argued that similar theories had been presented by many theorists before James and, 
more recently, Dixon (2003) that similar theories had been proposed by some of his 
contemporaries but were largely ignored.  It was, however, James's formulation, 
coupled with Lange's version and sometimes, later, also with that of Sergi21, that 
received an immense amount of attention in psychology.  
It was also, however, at James's theory that a great deal of criticism was directed from 
his contemporaries.  As Dixon (2003) describes, most of the dissatisfaction was 
directed towards the logic of the theory, although some, like Gurney (1884), Worcester 
(1893), and Irons (1894), argued that the theory did not really describe the experience 
of emotion.  This latter point is important.  As has been mentioned, James himself did 
not study the brain or the body experimentally.  Although he cited experiments by 
                                                          
21 Although the theory is more often referred to as the James-Lange Theory, several theorists refer to it as the 
James-Lange-Sergi theory (e.g. Ruckmick, 1936; Panskepp, 1986).  Giuseppe Sergi (1841-1936) was an Italian 
anthropologist who published details of a theory of emotion in the nineteenth century similar to that of James and 
Lange (Sergi, 1854; Sergi 1894). 
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physiological psychologists and the observations of psychiatrists in order to back up 
his claims, the only method by which he directly observed emotion was by that of 
introspection.  Therefore, his theory was not produced through simply weighing up the 
evidence from observations of the outward accompaniments to emotion as evidenced 
in animals and other people; it was mainly the product of inner reflection on his own 
experience of emotion.  As has been shown,  James did not differentiate between the 
objective and subjective, as Spencer did, but rather, argued that introspection was an 
objective method, a reflection on the object of the psychologist's own experiences, 
producing the “psychologist's reality”.  This section will argue that although James's 
theory was presented, and treated, by psychologists, at the time, and still is today, as 
one which could explain how emotion functioned, underlying James's argument was 
the idea of emotion as it was experienced.  The extent to which introspection shaped 
James’s theory will be examined by looking at how he argued for the veracity of the 
theory by appealing both to his own experience and to the experience of others.   
Introspection, as has been described, was James's method; the way in which he 
observed the data of psychology which he understood as being consciousness and the 
mental states.  As far as the emotions were concerned, however, he concluded that 
there were special difficulties in producing an accurate introspective account,  
However, it may be with such strong feelings as doubt or anger, about weaker 
feelings, and about the relations to each other of all feelings, we find ourselves 
in continual error and uncertainty so soon as we are called on to name and class, 
and not merely to feel.  Who can be sure of the exact order of his feelings when 
they are excessively rapid?...Who can compare with precision the quantities of 
disparate feelings even where the feelings are very much alike?...Who can 
enumerate all the distinct ingredients of such a complicated feeling as anger? 
(James, 1892, p. 191)  
 
These phenomenological peculiarities - the variability in strength and number and the 
indistinctiveness - were particular to the feelings.  Further, when these were reflected 
upon they would disappear or lose their strength.  To capture enough of a sense of 
what feelings felt like to produce a theory of emotion was never going to be easy.  
However, James (1884) was clear as to the source of his theory in the article in Mind 
in which it was first presented.  He claimed that his theory grew out of “fragmentary 
introspective observations” (p. 189).  These difficulties of discrimination were not a 
77 
 
barrier to his analysis because he believed that it was necessary for the inner experience 
of emotion to be the place where a truthful account of emotion could be discovered.  
Certainly, Titchener's take on the popularity of James's theory is that it appealed first 
and foremost to experience.  He says, “The accounts of emotion in psychological text-
books had become too academic, too conventionalised, and James brought us back to 
the crude and the raw of actual experience” (1915, p. 478).  In arguing for the need for 
a theory of emotion, James had described the tediousness of the accounts of the 
emotions by the physiological psychologists.  Comparing the dryness of these accounts 
with those produced in literature and philosophy he described the way in which these 
latter sources show how emotion feels, rather than simply detachedly enumerate its 
characteristics,    
But unfortunately there is little psychological writing about the emotions which 
is not merely descriptive.  As emotions are described in novels, they interest 
us, for we are made to share them. We have grown acquainted with the concrete 
objects and emergencies which call them forth, and any knowing touch of 
introspection which may grace the page meets with a quick and feeling 
response. Confessedly literary works of aphoristic philosophy also flash lights 
into our emotional life, and give us a fitful delight. But as far as "scientific 
psychology" of the emotions goes, I may have been surfeited by too much 
reading of classic works on the subject, but I should as lief read verbal 
descriptions of the shapes of the rocks on a New Hampshire farm as toil 
through them again. (1892, p. 448) 
 
It was vital to James that psychological accounts of emotion did not become too 
detached from the experience they were attempting to explain and so he appealed to 
the experience of emotion of his readers in arguing for his theory.   He appealed to 
experience first, in providing evidence for his theory and he did so secondly, in defence 
of the theory.  
First, in attempting to show that his theory was an accurate representation of emotion 
James asked that people reflect on their own experience of emotion.  He appealed to 
the way in which physiological changes felt, “every one of the bodily changes, 
whatsoever it be, is felt, acutely or obscurely, the moment it occurs.  If the reader has 
never paid attention to this matter, he will be both interested and astonished to learn 
how many different local bodily feelings he can detect in himself as characteristic of 
his various emotional moods” (1892, p. 450).  He also presented what one of his 
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contemporaries described as an “introspective experiment” as evidence for the theory.  
If people examined their own consciousness, James argued, they might see that his 
theory provided an account of emotion which described how it was really felt, 
If we fancy some strong emotion and try to subtract from our consciousness of 
it all the feelings of its characteristic bodily symptoms, we find we have 
nothing left behind, no “mind-stuff” 22  out of which the emotion can be 
constituted and that a cold and intellectual perception is all that remains.  It is 
true that although most people, when asked, say that their perception verifies 
this statement, some persist in saying theirs does not. (1884, p. 193) 
 
This thought experiment shows that James did not simply intend the theory to appeal 
to logic or to present an academic theory which went against the usual way of 
understanding emotion.  He was also looking to show that this too was the way in 
which emotion was experienced.  In doing so he, rather ironically, acknowledged the 
difficulty of disproving the theory experimentally, saying, 
But to detect with certainty such purely spiritual qualities of feeling would 
obviously be a task beyond human power. We have, as Professor Lange says, 
absolutely no immediate criterion by which to distinguish between spiritual 
and corporeal feelings; and, I may add, the more we sharpen our introspection, 
the more localized all our qualities of feeling become...and the more difficult 
the discrimination consequently grows. (1892, p. 455) 
 
Really what James is pointing out in this statement is that introspection does not 
discriminate between the feelings produced by the body, the “corporeal feelings”, and 
the “spiritual feelings”, those related to the hypothetical “mind-stuff”; that the physical 
and mental experiences of emotion  were the same and not distinct.    
Introspection was not capable of detecting the differences that some theorists claimed 
existed.  But for James, the method could not be at fault.  If an argument was not 
evidenced by introspection, then it was an indication that it was incorrect.   In his paper, 
The Physical Basis of Emotion, written to defend the theory, he argued that, if 
introspective and physiological evidence contradicted each other, it should be the 
physiological evidence that should be rejected as incorrect.  He stated, “Of course one 
                                                          
22James (1890a) devoted a whole chapter in the first volume of The Principles of Psychology to showing that “mind-
stuff” (the elements of which consciousness was made up) did not exist. (pp. 145-182) 
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must admit that any account of the physiology of emotion that should be inconsistent 
with the possibility of this strong contrast within consciousness would thereby stand 
condemned” (1894, p. 521).   
Secondly, he appealed to experience as he defended the theory against its critics. For 
example, in replying to Irons's (1894) arguments against the theory, he stated that,  
Irons, for example, says that it belongs to a psychology in which feeling can 
have no place...In my own mind the theory has no philosophic implications 
whatever of a general sort.  It assumes...that there must be a process of some 
sort in the nerve-centres for emotion, and it simply defines that process to 
consist of afferent currents.  It does this on no general theoretic grounds, but 
because of the introspective appearances exclusively.' (1894, p. 522)   
 
Similarly, he claimed that the theory was based on his own experience of emotion 
which he understood as being purely a mixture of bodily sensations and judgments of 
these.   “Such organic sensations being also presumably due to incoming currents, the 
result is that the whole of my consciousness (whatever its inner contrasts be) seems to 
me to be outwardly mediated by these.  This is the length and breadth of my 'theory'” 
(p. 524).   
Further, he argued that differences in understanding of emotion between theorists may 
come about because of the way in which emotions are experienced differently by them.  
There can be, James claimed, a difference between people in their ability to locate 
different elements of “organic excitement” when in an emotional state: “I for one shall 
never deny that individuals may greatly differ in their ability to localize the various 
elements of their organic excitement when under emotion. I am even willing to admit 
that the primary Gefühlston23 may vary enormously in distinctness in different men” 
(p. 524).  As far as he was concerned, his own feelings were “very mild and...platonic 
affairs.  I allow them to hypothetically exist, however, in the form of the 'subtler' 
emotions” (p. 524).  His argument as to differences between his own experience of 
emotion and that of other theorists is illustrated by an interesting exchange between 
James and W.L. Worcester, who had written against James’s theory in The Monist.  
                                                          
23 ‘Gefühlston’ refers to the ‘feeling tone’, or experience, of an emotion (Chang, 2009) 
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Worcester (1893) had argued that according to his own introspection, James’s 
formulation was not correct.  He stated,  
I should have no hesitation in saying that such a statement of the case is 
contradicted by my own consciousness, but as that would merely be setting up 
my consciousness against his, without the possibility of an umpire, I will call 
attention to some other considerations which seem to me to render it 
impossible. (p. 288)  
 
James (1894) wondered, therefore, given the differences in experience, if the 
introspection of critics such as Worcester “acquaints them with a part of the emotional 
excitement which is psycho-physically impossible that incoming currents could cause” 
(p. 524).  It also appeared to James that much of the disagreement surrounding the 
theory is simply a case of theorists having idiosyncratic conceptualisations of the term 
emotion; so that theoretical differences between psychologists are rather differences 
as to which phenomenological experience they understand the term as referring  to,   
For which sort of feeling is the word ' emotion' the more proper name—for the 
organic feeling which gives the rank character of commotion to the excitement, 
or for that more primary pleasure or displeasure in the object, or in the thought 
of it, to which commotion and excitement do not belong? (p. 525) 
 
Thus, for James the most important means by which to understand emotion was 
through the psychologist’s own experience.  As Margaret Washburn (1922, p. 106) 
was later to remark in defence of the method of introspection when it was coming 
under attack in the early twentieth century by the behaviorists, “that bulwark of 
behaviorism, the James-Lange theory of emotions, makes its most convincing appeals 
always to introspective evidence”.  This statement is an indication of how vital the 
method had been to this most enduring of psychological theories.  For James, that 
experiences differed between theorists was not a barrier to understanding emotion but 
showed the rich diversity between people in terms of how emotion was experienced 






This section has shown that James’s theory was his own “psychologist's reality” and 
that it was based on his own self-reflection.  James’s theory was a theory of emotion 
which, as a product of his own introspection on his emotions, was designed to capture 
an experience of emotion.  If it did not have universal appeal, this was not only due to 
the explanatory efficacy of the theory but also due to the idiosyncrasies of emotional 
experience.  This section has also shown how the use of the introspective method 
placed the psychologist and his own experience at the centre of the production of 
understandings of emotion, rather than being a detached bystander.  This had a 
particular effect on how emotion was described.  In order to discuss this aspect of 
introspective psychology in more detail, the following section will show the 
prevalence of the use of introspection by theorists in psychology at this time and will 
present an overview of its effect on understandings of emotion. 
 
3.5 Introspection and emotion in late nineteenth 
century psychology 
Having described how introspection was regarded in the work of three of the major 
theorists of the late nineteenth century and how its use both reflected and influenced 
their understandings of emotion, it is necessary to set these descriptions in a broader 
context.  It is important also to note, before we move on to the next chapter in which 
the development of other psychological methods to observe emotion will be described, 
that introspection underpinned most of the work that was being carried out in 
psychology in Britain and the US24 at this time.  It is important, also, to examine more 
generally what kinds of understandings of emotion that the method produced.  This 
section will, therefore, take a brief look at the prevalence of the use of introspection in 
                                                          
24 This chapter has not covered the work of the structural psychologists whose experimental form of introspection 
began in the mid to late 1890s. This will be dealt with separately in Chapter Five. 
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psychology in the late nineteenth century and at how emotion was understood as a 
result. 
 
3.5.1 Introspection as the method of psychology 
Introspection during this period was a widely accepted method in psychology.  The 
criticisms of James's theory are indicative of this.  These were not based, as might be 
expected, on the positivist argument that introspection produced idiosyncratic 
accounts of psychological phenomena and that his theory related simply to his own 
experience and had no objective validity.  The reason that this argument was not 
produced by psychologists was because the method of introspection was 
unquestionable at the time in the minds of most theorists in the US and Great Britain.  
In the textbooks on psychology produced during the late nineteenth century the 
introspective method predominated.  The best way of understanding the mental states 
was, according to most theorists, to view them through inner reflection.  Emotion, 
defined as a mental state and experience, could not be observed if psychologists did 
not reflect inwardly and it was unthinkable to suggest otherwise.  There were several 
arguments for this. 
First, introspection gave psychologists the advantage of presenting themselves at the 
centre of the knowledge that they produced, and this gave their science a distinctive 
advantage over other sciences.  As G.T. Ladd (1842-1921), Professor at Yale 
University and author of Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, stated, “In 
psychology the individual point of view and the particular method of investigation and 
of treatment chosen, as well as the mental characteristics of the investigator, determine 
the character of the results as in no other one of the sciences” (Ladd, 1894, p. vii).  This 
relationship that the psychologist had to the material that he studied was not viewed as 
being too subjective.  Indeed a subjective psychology as gleaned from the experience 
of the scientist was an important part of psychological theorising, as was described in 
the section on Spencer, and is described also in Bain's later editions of The Senses and 
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The Emotions and in the work of James Sully (1842-1923), another prominent British 
psychologist.    
Further, theorists such as Stout (1860-1944), the English author of A Manual of 
Psychology, argued that all sciences relied on the experience of the scientist as the 
medium by which observations were processed (Stout, 1898).  The beauty of scientific 
psychology was that, not only could it explain what an object looked like to the human 
eye, but it could also explain how the scientist observed and experienced the object.  
Psychology could examine the mental processes by which the world was perceived 
and understood.  Therefore, it was, in the US psychologist, E.B. Titchener’s words, 
introspection that was at the heart of truly scientific accounts, because it was the only 
method by which experience, which was inherent to all scientific theorising, could be 
observed.   It was, according to Stout, also the only method that gave direct access to 
the inner world.  “What introspection does is to supply us with a direct instead of a 
hypothetical knowledge of mental process.  It thus forms a source of psychological 
material which is invaluable and unattainable by any other means” (p. 16).  It was, 
therefore, seen as an absolutely necessary method by which to produce psychological 
knowledge.  Sully (1892b, p. 5) stated that “To try to discover mental phenomena and 
their laws merely by watching the outward manifestations of others, 'thoughts, feelings 
and volitions would plainly be futile”.  And although Stout (1898), like James, 
admitted, that there were “alleged fallacies, obscurities and difficulties with the 
method”, these, he argued, could be overcome if the questions it answered were broad 
enough. “There is”, he said, ‘no...obscurity...in the statement that when I have 
toothache I do not like it very much” (p. 16).   
The need for introspection in psychology was, therefore, endorsed by the leading 
psychologists.  If it had its inherent problems, that was not an indication that it could 
not be a path which could lead to some theoretical developments.  Indeed, it could be 
argued that the existence of the wealth of understandings produced during these 
“Golden Years” of theorising about emotion was due in part to the breadth of 
individual understandings that were acquired through a method which was based on 
the explicit reflection on individual experience.  To show the effect of the use of 
introspection on understandings of emotion that were produced at the time, the 
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following section will describe some of the general characteristics of emotion which 
were described by late nineteenth century theorists.  
 
3.5.2 The introspective characteristics of emotion 
Some characteristics have already been touched on in the sections above.  These were 
not simply related to particular theorist’s views but were the regular and pervasive 
features of emotion which appeared in psychology time and again in the work of 
introspective theorists.  Four particular characteristics of emotion that theorists 
described when studying it through introspection will be discussed below.  First, that 
emotion was defined in terms of the way in which it was experienced; second, that it 
was described in terms of its individual and idiosyncratic aspects as much as its 
universal aspects; third, that there was a difficulty in delineating the emotions; and 
finally, that a useful scientific concept of emotion would struggle to account for the 
range of human emotional experience. 
First, as has been described, the experience of emotion was at the centre of the 
descriptions of emotion in the work of introspective theorists.   It was believed that 
through describing emotion as a subjective state, of how it felt, that a clear 
understanding of what emotion was and how it functioned could be developed.   This 
is shown in the work of all of the three theorists above but particularly in the work of 
Bain, where the emotions were to be described in terms of particular 
phenomenological attributes. This was true also for many other theorists of the time, 
whose depictions of emotion show a variety of descriptions of how emotion felt.   
Examples of these are:  in terms of pleasantness and unpleasantness (e.g. Bain, 1855, 
1865; Baldwin25, 1893); in terms of strength or weakness (e.g. James, 1892); in terms 
of how intense it was or how long it lasted (e.g. Ladd, 1894); and in terms of its 
“affective tone” (e.g. Baldwin, 1893; Sully, 1892a).  Further, the division between 
                                                          




emotions as being pleasurable or painful was one of the most prevalent aspects of the 
way in which emotions were described.  It featured in the work of most of the main 
theorists but was particularly highlighted by Henry Rutgers Marshall (1852-1927), the 
US psychologist:  “emotions are states of mind composed of elements which to a great 
extent are usually highly pleasurable or painful” (1894b, p. 65).  Indeed, although Bain 
(1887) attempted to argue for “indifferent feelings”, it was argued by many that 
emotions which could not be classed as either were not emotions at all (Stanley, 1889).    
Secondly, emotion, as observed through the medium of introspection, appeared to be 
to some extent idiosyncratic and individual.  Although there was a scientific 
prerogative that emotion was to be explained in terms of its universal mechanisms and 
experience and that patterns and laws should be discovered, it became clear, as 
described above, that this was not what introspective evidence was necessarily going 
to reveal.   It was found that, not only were there differences between theorists, as 
shown in the section on James, but that emotional experiences were also particular to 
particular people.  Ladd (1894), for example, stated that, “every actual emotion or 
sentiment has its own characteristic complexity, intensity, bodily resonance or 
ideational background, as it was.  These differ greatly in every individual, and in 
dependence upon age, sex, temperament, disposition, and stage of culture” (p. 537).  
Comte had used the differences of understanding produced by introspection as an 
argument against its use in science.  At this time, however, for psychologists the 
differences between the emotional experiences that introspection showed were valued 
and viewed as being a notable characteristic of emotion, even if they could not be 
explained.  For example, James, in describing his own experience of the fear felt during 
a nightmare, states, “It were much to be wished that many persons should make 
observations of this sort, for individual idiosyncrasy may be great” (p. 522). 
Thirdly, what emerged from the introspective psychology of the nineteenth century 
was that separating out the emotions scientifically was no easy matter.  Although 
taxonomies of emotion had always been produced in philosophy, when psychologists 
tried to classify the emotions along the lines of the classifications produced in the 
natural sciences, it was clear that this was going to be a much more complex task.  
Spencer's (1868) criticism of Bain's (1859) classification in The Emotions, was one 
example of a more general awareness in psychology that any systematic scientific 
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analysis was almost impossible.  Citing Bain’s classification explicitly as an example 
of it not being possible to delineate the emotions in such detail, Ladd stated, “for the 
purposes of classification, we are prevented in somewhat the same way as that in which 
we are prevented when attempting the classifications of sensations of smell” (1893, 
p.388).  Sully (1892a), similarly, argued that, 
emotions are an eminently complex and variable phenomena. Thus, what we 
call a feeling of joy or grief will exhibit an infinite number of shades answering 
to particular modes of presentative consciousness and the particular currents of 
feeling to which these give rise.  No precise systematic arrangement can 
therefore be tried. (p. 83)   
 
In contrast to the consistency of the characteristics of plants and animals, the affective 
tone of the emotions, he said, altered over the period in which the emotion was 
experienced so that they were not consistent over time or between experiences.  
Despite the acknowledged difficulties, however, most psychologists at the time 
attempted to produce classifications26.  Both Ladd and Sully were in agreement that 
some broad differences, for example, in relation to the emotions being pleasurable or 
painful could be made and individual descriptions of emotion were made in relation to 
some of the characteristics of emotion mentioned above.  Ladd (1893) divided them 
into sensuous, aesthetic, intellectual and moral feelings.   The emotions are organised 
by, he stated, “…the natural organic variety in the activities of the mind” (p. 389). 
However, it was clear that the delineation of the emotions was not going to be easy 
scientific endeavour.  Indeed James (1890b) asserted that the production of 
classifications was done merely in relation to the scientific purposes of each theorist, 
rather being reflective of emotions as experienced by people.  
Finally, if it was hard to delineate the emotions because these appeared to be too much 
of a whole thing, introspection also showed that it was going to be almost impossible 
to develop a concept of emotion as a whole from the diverse range of emotional events 
described in human experience.  What became clear through the early use of 
                                                          
26  A great number of classifications were produced during the period which were based on various criteria (e.g. 
Bain, 1855, Spencer, 1855; Mercier, 1884a, 1884b, 1885; McCosh, 1880; Ladd, 1893).  These followed those 
taxonomies already produced in the early nineteenth century by Herbart, Reid, Hamilton and Brown, for example, as 




introspection is that emotions as human experiences covered an array of different 
phenomena and did not fall neatly into a category from which a prototypical emotion 
could be formed.  James, for example, applied his theory only to what he called the 
coarser emotions of fear, anger, rage and love and altered it for what he called the 
subtler emotions.  Emotion, therefore, if it was to be developed into a useful scientific 
concept would have to be narrower and more restrictive than its usual conception and 
what might be commonly understood to be emotional was not necessarily what science 
viewed as emotional.  Introspection showed that emotion, as a concept or category, 
could not be both defined for scientific purposes and continue to reflect the range of 
understanding and experience that characterised all the individual emotions.  As the 
English psychologist, William McDougall (1910), stated in his Introduction to Social 
Psychology, 
In adapting to scientific use a word from popular culture, it is inevitable that 
some violence should be done to common usage; and, in adopting this rigid 
definition of emotion, we shall have to do such violence in refusing to admit 
joy, sorrow, and surprise (which are often regarded, even by writers on 
psychology as the very types of emotions) to our list whether of simple or 
primary emotions or of complex emotions.' (p. 48).   
 
This quote referred to the idea that if the experience of emotion was disregarded, and 
other sources of evidence were appealed to, it was possible to define emotion 
scientifically, albeit by altering the meaning that emotion might hold for people.  This 
would come about through the use of other scientific methods of observation as 
described in the following chapter. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, introspection was the main method by which 
emotion was studied, and it produced particular understandings of emotion.  These 
were based on the psychologist’s own experiences of emotion and, as such, presented 
a picture of emotion as a complex and subjective phenomenological experience.  They 
were based on the idea that emotion was felt and understood within each person, which 
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was where it had to be observed if a scientific understanding was to be produced.   
There was an understanding that emotion was to some extent a personal and individual 
experience which could not be easily captured by those who existed without that 
experience. Bain’s introspective understanding of the mind had produced a view of 
emotion as being the most important aspect of the mind and elevated it as a subject for 
inquiry in psychology and his classification, whatever its shortcomings, had made a 
first attempt at describing the characteristics of the object of emotion in psychology.  
Spencer’s work provided a complex view of emotion and its connection to the other 
elements of the mind and, in contrast to Bain, had shown the difficulties of delineating 
emotions from each other.  James had used introspective evidence, based on his own 
experience, to produce a theory of emotion and, in doing so, constructed the most 
fruitful definition of emotion, in terms of debate and discussion at least, that 
psychology has ever had.  As has been described also, despite the understanding that 
emotion was a universal human experience, the introspective descriptions of emotion 
seemed to show a pattern of idiosyncrasy, rather than regularity.   Emotion, therefore, 
presented a challenge to psychologists who believed that the purpose of science was 
to present knowledge as structured, regular and universal and to discover laws and 
patterns of cause and effect. 
Introspection was, however, not the only method by which theorists attempted to 
understand emotion during this period.  All of these theorists were advocates of the 
examination of the physical signs of emotion as a means to greater understanding of 
the emotional experience.  The following chapter will describe how, during this time, 
psychologists increasingly began to observe the outward signs of emotion: the 
expressions, the actions, the visceral and glandular responses.  It will look at how these 
observations were used to address some of the perceived fallibilities of introspection 








The previous chapter described the way in which emotion was understood by 
psychologists using introspection as a method.  It showed that these accounts tended 
to differ between theorists.  This chapter will describe the way in which other means 
by which to observe emotion began to be embraced by psychologists during this period 
partly in order to find a way of presenting more structured, universal understandings 
of emotion.  Although introspection was being advocated as the means by which to 
describe psychological phenomena, and emotion continued to be predominanlty 
viewed as a subjective experience, the development of other forms of knowledge about 
emotion, presented a challenge to purely experiential accounts of emotion.   
 
4.1  Introduction 
The introspective analyses of emotion conducted by the US and British psychologists 
of the latter half of the nineteenth century were set against a background of increasing 
scientific observation of human beings in other ways.  At this time, the observation of 
emotion in the body focused mainly on two aspects.  First, the observation of the 
outward signs that an emotion was occurring within someone: that is their facial 
expression and physical behaviour.  Second, emotion was viewed through the 
observation of the physiology of the body; what Ladd (1896) described as the “bodily 
reactions’, the ‘organs of circulation, respiration, secretion, digestion, and involuntary 
movements and tensions of the muscles” (p. 504).  Although these were generally 
viewed by psychologists of this period as the indirect observation of emotion, in 
contrast to the direct observation of introspective analyses, as the century progressed 
their importance to the way in which emotion was defined grew.  What follows in this 
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chapter will be an analysis of this growth, why these aspects became increasingly 
significant and the effect of their inclusion in psychological understandings of emotion 
on the value placed on introspection as a means to study emotion and of its subjective 
experience.  This section will provide the background to the chapter by describing the 
academic context in which these issues arose.  
The scientific study of the body and brain had been developed through the work of 
physiologists and anatomists some time before psychology came into being as a 
distinct discipline. For example, Charles Bell had published details of the differences 
between the sensory and motor nerves in 1811 and had described the facial expressions 
connected to emotion in the 1820s, as mentioned in Chapter One.  For the 
associationists, as Flügel (1933/1964) points out, the discovery of the elemental nature 
of the body in terms of cells and connections between these, via the nerves, seemed to 
mirror their philosophy of simple ideas as being combined to form increasingly 
complex mental structures.  This connection, Flügel argues, probably accounted for 
the advancement of that system of psychology during the latter half of the century.  
The connection is to some extent reflected in Bain's work, although the relationship 
between associationism and physiology was never fully developed as it became 
quickly clear that the link between mind and body was far more complex than at first 
thought.  In nineteenth century Britain, physiologists such as William Carpenter (1813-
1885) and Henry Maudsley (1835-1918) were studying the bodies of both animals and 
humans.  Progress in the understanding of how the body worked gave psychologists 
hope that physiology could also provide a platform for an understanding of how the 
mind worked.  Although, as will be described in this chapter, this was resisted by some 
theorists, both physiologists and psychologists embraced the idea that physiology was 
a means by which the mind could be understood. Books on physiological psychology 
were published both in Germany and in Britain and the US by both those, such as 
Carpenter, who viewed themselves as physiologists and those, such as Ladd, who 
viewed themselves as psychologists.  As, Smith (2001) argues, “The course of modern 
psychology as a scientific area of activity has been bound up with its relation to 
physiology” (p. 225).  So great, claims Smith, was the connection between the two that 
psychologists were forced to make an argument for psychology's existence as a 
discipline distinct from physiology.   The following quote from Baldwin (1893), 
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illustrates this, although he himself fundamentally disagreed with the sentiment 
expressed,  
The question of psychology is “Is there an order of mental facts apart from the 
phenomenon of the physical sciences and especially physiology?”..Psychology 
we are told by the materialists, is properly a branch of physiology since 
physiology...includes the function of the brain which is thought.  Psychology 
thus becomes a special chapter in physiology. (p. 1) 
 
In this context the promotion of the study of the mental states and experience through 
introspection, as the subject matter and  method of  psychology, became vital as the 
means by which psychology could distinguish itself from the physical sciences. The 
maintenance of psychology as a distinct discipline, at this time, therefore, relied on the 
argument that, while physiological data was useful, the mind and mental states existed 
apart from their neural correlates and could be studied only through introspection.  
Spencer (1855), for example, argued that physiology, as the objective study of the 
human mind, needed the understanding of the subjective states in order to produce 
meaningful work.  
The elevation of evolutionary theory as a result of the publishing of Charles Darwin's 
Origin of Species in 1859, also, radically altered the direction which psychology was 
to take; of its methods of observation and the kinds of evidence it admitted.  As Flügel 
(1933/1964) states, “From now onwards psychology was related not only to 
philosophy (as it had always been) and to physiology (as it had more recently become), 
but to the general study of life in all its varied manifestations, both animal and human” 
(p. 99).  The application of evolution to the study of the mind, meant that psychology, 
in the work of some theorists, became as much about the development and function of 
the elements of the mind in relation to the environment as it was about understanding 
the experience of these elements.  As will be discussed in the section on evolution 
below, the focus of evolutionary psychology on outward behaviour as a means to study 
the development of the mind meant that new methods were developed for the indirect 
observation of emotion.  As much as psychologists often viewed these as being minor 
routes by which to observe emotion, the acceptance of the observation of behaviour as 
a means to understand the mind meant that psychology never really adhered to the 
argument put forward by psychologists that it was purely a discipline that had the 
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purpose of studying only the mind, the mental states or consciousness.  US psychology 
in particular was influenced by evolutionary ideas and comparative methods. “By 
1900”, claims Boring (1929), “the characteristics of American psychology had become 
well defined.  It had inherited its physical body from German experimentalism, but it 
had got its mind from Darwin” (p. 506). Functional psychologists, such as John 
Dewey, James Rowland Angell and William James, still argued that the principal 
method of psychology was introspection.  They also, however, advocated comparative 
methods as additional sources of knowledge. The functional and comparative 
psychologists of the US were not content with describing the elements of the mind, 
but of understanding their purpose.   
In Germany a group of scientists, later to be described as the psychophysicists, were 
attempting to understand the sensations by looking at the effect of physical stimuli on 
their production.  Although these theorists will not be discussed in this thesis because 
they had little to say about emotion, it is important to note their effect on the 
development of psychology as a science.   The work of Hermann von Helmholtz, 
Gustav Fechner and Ernst Weber, argues Brennan (1998), in hindsight acted as a 
bridge between the study of physiological and physical aspects of sensation and the 
emergence of an experimental, rather than a metaphysical psychology.  Their interests 
lay, however, not only in the workings of the body but also in the subjective experience 
of sensing and perceiving the world and elements in it.   
Although, as has been described, there was to a large extent an adherence in 
psychology to introspection during this period, as this chapter will show, psychologists 
of the late nineteenth century were open to other means by which to understand 
emotion whilst adhering to the idea of emotion as a mental state or experience.  It will 
argue that as psychologists increasingly relied on other methods to observe the 
accompaniments to emotion, there was an inevitable movement away from the idea of 
emotion as purely a mental state and understandings of emotion became broader and 
more inclusive.  This chapter will, therefore, proceed as follows:  first, it will describe 
the particular reasons why physiological understandings of emotion were appealed to 
by psychologists and how these altered the available definitions of emotion and then 
it will examine the ways in which emotion became increasingly understood in 
psychology in terms of the observation of outward behaviour as a consequence of the 
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acceptance of evolutionary ideas.  It will show that the consequence of this was that, 
rather than clarifying what emotion was, there was a proliferation of the ways in which 
emotion was viewed and interpreted.  
 
4.2 Physiology of emotion 
This section looks at the relationship between physiology and psychology during this 
period.  It will first describe the arguments that were put forward by psychologists for 
physiological accounts of emotion to be used to supplement the scientific deficiencies 
of introspective accounts.  It will then go on to describe three particular ways in which 
these were used to do so – to  demonstrate that emotion was universal, to present it as 
a coherent concept, and in order to measure it.  
 
4.2.1 Physiology required to supplement introspection  
If emotion was to be understood subjectively, through introspection, as has been 
described above, it had always been argued that the physical and outward signs could 
aid the psychologist’s understanding of it as a mental state or, indeed, a private 
experience.  However, these signs were to be used in psychology to supplement 
understanding but were not the emotion itself.  Indeed, as has been described in the 
work of Bain, most theorists could not ignore what was viewed as the obvious 
relationship between the mind and the body and felt that studying one exclusively 
would not enable the scientific understanding of the mental states to progress. 
“Although Subject and Object (Mind and Matter) are the most diametrically opposed 
facts of our experience, yet there is a concomitance or a connexion between mind and 
a material organism”, argued Bain (1855, p. 10).  One of the aims of the work of the 
theorists mentioned in Chapter Three was to understand the relationship between mind 
and matter; at how the ephemeral, intangible mental states, consciousness, thought, 
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feeling, emotion and memory, for example, could be produced by the physical, 
corporeal flesh of the body.  It was not only psychologists who had this purpose, but 
physiologists also as mentioned in the introduction above.  William Carpenter, for 
example, argued that an understanding of the mental was required as a reference point 
for the physical and vice versa: “the Mind”, he said, “has been studied by 
Metaphysicians altogether without reference to its material instrument while  the Brain 
has been dissected by Anatomists and analyzed by Chemists, as if they expected to 
map-out the course of Thought, or to weigh or to measure the intensity of Emotion”  
(Carpenter, 1875, p. 2).  
Those who felt no shame in being tagged materialists, such as Maudsley (1876), 
however, argued for the examination of the brain as the primary means to understand 
the mind.  Arguing against introspection as the predominant method, he said of 
psychology, “Its value as an independent science must plainly rest upon the 
trustworthiness and the sufficiency and competence of consciousness as a witness of 
that which takes place in the mind.  Is the foundation really secure?  It may well be 
doubted” (p. 16).  His main arguments against the method rested, not on the difficulty 
of the observation of contents of the mind, after all profound difficulties inflicted all 
modes of scientific observation.  It was rather that, when contradictions between 
theorists' accounts arose, there was no way of adjudicating as to which was right or 
which was wrong.  Further, he asserted that introspection produced artificial data in 
that it was a derailing of the usual way in which thought flowed.  The workings of the 
brain that produced the mental states, he argued, could never be known through 
introspection because these were unconscious:  “This activity”, Maudsley claimed, “is 
even of more consequence in determining the tone of feeling, or of our disposition, 
and the character of our impulses, than that which follows impressions received from 
the external world” (p. 35).  Metaphysical theories of mind, being vague and false, 
should be ignored. It was only when a theory of mind had been developed, based on 
the systematic observation of the brain and body that the experiences described in 
introspection could be of any use.  Although psychologists did not agree with 
Maudsley’s position, Bain (1899) admitted to some disagreement within their ranks as 
to the extent of the usefulness of objective accounts in relation to the understanding of 
subjective accounts and the ratio of each that should be used in psychology.  
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Whatever the ratio, as psychology attempted to mould itself along the lines of the other 
sciences it was increasingly to observations of the physical that psychologists looked.  
As has been described, Bain’s “systematic exposition of the human mind” was one of 
the first attempts at elucidating the mind in a thorough and methodical manner.  
Systematisation was a route by which psychology could be brought into line with the 
way in which other sciences, such as chemistry and biology were constructed.   The 
descriptions of the elements of the mind, the classification of the senses and the 
emotions, the development of the simple elements to the more complex elements were 
the bases on which the scientific exploration of the mind could be founded.   For some 
psychologists, however, as vital as it was to the description of the psychological states, 
the method of introspection in psychology had done little to advance an understanding 
of the mind in a systematic and coherent way.  A review of the discipline and its output 
throughout the nineteenth century caused Ladd (1896) to make the following 
assessment, 
For a long-time the so-called “old psychology” as pursued by the introspective 
and metaphysical methods, made little or no advance.  In a single generation, 
as pursued by the experimental and physiological methods, the science of 
psychology has been largely reconstructed. (p. 9) 
 
Physiology seemed to promise a more clearly defined basis on which to produce and 
progress a systematic delineation of the mind.  Physiologists could begin by looking 
at the small elements of the body, the cells, and describe how these together made up 
the organs.  They could show how the nerves and organs worked to produce different 
responses in a piecemeal way because of the relative ease of defining which bit was 
which.  They could describe the blood, the viscera, the motor and sense nerves and 
how these were connected to the brain. The body, during the late nineteenth century, 
was gradually being mapped out, its territory discovered and described.  The study of 
the mind through introspection on the other hand was producing, as Comte had argued 
it would, results that seemed, in comparison, inconsistent and indefinite.   
Psychologists thus were increasingly turning to physiology as a means to provide 
evidence for their theories and the driving force behind the use of physiological 
accounts by psychologists was the requirement to be seen to be acting within the 
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bounds of the rules of science.  For this, physiological accounts were required to, in 
John Dewey's words, “supplement the deficiencies of introspection” (1891, p. 10). 
But there were dissenting voices. Some theorists, such as John Alexander Stewart 
(1846-1933), the Scottish philosopher and professor at Oxford, fought the drive to 
include physiological evidence as part of psychological knowledge.  He argued that 
the purpose of psychology was still, as it had always been, to study the mind and that 
introducing physiological accounts, however useful, radically altered the purpose and 
subject-matter of the discipline, 
No student of Locke and Hume can read the psychological works of the present 
day without feeling anxiety for the future of the study of Mind or Experience. 
The modern psychologist is profoundly dissatisfied with his subject; the exact 
and the classificatory sciences, by the brilliance of their methods and results, 
fill him with envy; he is painfully conscious that mental phenomena are not 
definite enough to be the objects of a science; he must therefore connect them 
with other phenomena which are.  Hence the "Physiological Psychology" of 
our day. But surely this is not psychology, or the study of experience, but 
physiology. Let us keep clearly before our minds that psychology is the study 
of experience, and inquire whether it has the marks of a Science or of a Method-
whether it is a speculative, or a practical study.  (Stewart, 1876, p. 445) 
 
Stewart was far from impressed with what he saw as the denigration of introspection 
in favour of objective methods, 
Psychologists more and more impressed by the impossibility of giving an exact 
scientific account of subjective states and their mutual relations, are turning 
their attention from these states to their physiological accompaniments, in the 
hope of thus constructing a scientific psychology.  Because there can be no 
science of subjective experience, they show a tendency to ignore it, and to 
stamp introspection, as compared with physiology, as a waste of time. (1876, 
p. 447) 
 
However, voices such as Stewart's were not listened to.  Even if it was not clear what 
the relationship of mind to matter was, many psychologists viewed physiology as the 
science on which the understanding of the mind in psychology could progress, as 
Ladd's quote above describes.  The argument as to the connection between the mental 
and the physical had been won in psychology, and physiological evidence was viewed 
as necessary, even if introspective evidence was still recognized as the means by which 
psychological phenomena could be directly accessed.  The following section will 
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describe three ways in which psychology drew increasingly on physiology to 
supplement the perceived scientific defects of introspective descriptions of emotion: it 
could more easily provide a conceptualisation of emotion as a whole; it could be used 
to measure emotion, and it could present clearer evidence of the universality of 
emotion.  It will describe, however, that this hope of a more structured physiological 
account of emotion was not fulfilled. 
  
4.2.2  The use of physiological descriptions of emotion 
4.2.2.1The conceptualisation of emotion 
Some psychologists viewed the observations of the physiologists as being capable of 
producing some concrete detail on which to develop the understanding of emotion in 
a way in which introspection could not.  That there were observable changes in the 
body when an emotion was understood to be occurring, allowed data to be collected 
which might indicate something about the experience of the emotion itself.  As has 
been described, the conceptualisation of emotion through introspection was proving 
difficult, given that the experience of emotion and the different emotions seemed to 
have different meanings and variability between people.  Emotions as examined 
introspectively appeared to be so many different things that a coherent understanding 
seemed very far away from being realised.  Physiology promised a presentation of 
emotion, not simply as a collection of similar but vague psychological events, but as a 
coherent whole, and that a prototype of emotion could be built which would 
incorporate the observable elements of emotion.   
Eitler (2014) argues that, in the mid nineteenth century, German physiology, 
“became...a key source for the knowledge of feelings...increasingly displacing 
philosophy as the medium of contemporary interpretation.   No other science seemed 
to provide such apparently certain knowledge about the human and animal body as 
this self-claimed rigorously scientific...discipline” (p. 100).  The belief that 
physiologists had in their grasp the ability to provide an explanatory framework for 
emotion was hard for psychologists to resist, stuck as they were with a method that 
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flouted the rules of Comte's positivist science and seemed to provide only vague and 
contradictory descriptions.  Although Bain (1855) argued for emotion as a mental state, 
it was his inclusion of physiology that allowed him to present emotion as a coherent 
concept.  He described the physiological action associated with emotion as, 'a diffusive 
action over the system, through the medium of the cerebral hemispheres.' (p. 5).  He 
went on, “observation shows that all parts of the moving system are liable to be 
affected by an emotional wave: while a very important series of effects is produced 
upon the secreting and excreting apparatus of the body” (p.5).  In the second edition, 
Bain describes the involved parts of the body individually, “the stomach, lungs, heart, 
kidneys, skin” (p. 4) and in the third, to supply detail about the parts of the body, effects 
on the blood vessels and heart and descriptions of the effect of the motor nerves on the 
movements of the face and body.  Thus, the concept of emotion, as described in 
physiology, became more concrete and detailed.  In contrast, the accompanying 
introspective analyses seemed to produce fewer definite descriptions.   At the end of 
the nineteenth century, Ladd (1894) had felt confident enough to provide, “a 
description of the physiological conditions of any developed state of decided 
emotional character” (p. 544),   
This large amount of centrally initiated nerve-commotion itself overflows and 
passes down the nerve-tracts which connect the brain, centrifugally, with the 
internal and external organs of the body.  These organs are thus put into a 
changed condition of tension or relation (as in the case of the muscles), of 
quickened or slower activity (as in the case of the heart, the lungs, the vessels 
of venous and arterial circulation, the secretary vessels etc.), of temperature, 
and of various obscure and ill-localizable form of sensuous irritation.  (p. 544) 
 
These physical descriptions of emotion also provided a basis on which to develop 
psychological theories of emotion.  James's theory, for example, was a description of 
his introspective experience of emotion but drew on understandings of these 
physiological ‘organic reverberations’ as he called them as a means to understand that 
experience.  James theory was, of course, twinned with that of Lange, a physiological 
psychologist, who had produced a theory similar to James’s one in relation to his 




It is the vasomotor system that we have to thank for the whole emotional aspect 
of our mental life, for our joys and sorrows, our hours of happiness and misery.  
If the objects that affect our senses had not the power to throw this system into 
action, we should travel through life indifferent and dispassionate; the 
impressions from the outside world would enrich our experience, would 
increase our knowledge, but that is all; they would neither rouse us to joy nor 
goad us to anger, neither bow us in care nor overwhelm us with terror. (Lange 
as cited in Titchener, 1910, p. 475) 
 
Given that psychologists were coming to depend for their conceptualisation of emotion 
on physiological, rather than only psychological, understandings of emotion, it is no 
wonder that the psychological theories of the time, such as James’s, reflected these.   
However, there were, of course, arguments against physiological conceptualisations 
of emotion, particularly by psychologists who were afraid that explanations of the 
mind were being reduced to the workings of the body.  It was argued, by those against 
a materialist agenda, that the emotions were far more complex than the physiological 
accompaniments could show (Dixon, 2003).  Defending a more rounded view of 
emotion, James McCosh (1811-1894), for example, was prompted to write The 
Emotions, presenting a theory of emotion27 which gave the experience of emotion a 
prominent place.  McCosh, a philosopher from the Scottish School of Common Sense 
and President of Princeton University, argued for a theory of emotion with four 
different aspects: the appetence, or motive; the idea; the conscious feeling; and the 
organic, or bodily, affection.  McCosh (1880) argued that because emotion was 
difficult to pin down introspectively psychologists were ignoring three of the elements 
and moving towards treating emotions purely according to the last.  He stated, 'The 
vagueness of the idea entertained favors the tendency on the part of the prevailing 
physiological psychology of the day to resolve all feeling, and our very emotions, into 
nervous action and thus gain an important province of our nature to materialism.’ (p. 
iv).  He felt that physiological accompaniments to emotion were too often presented 
                                                          
27 Ruckmick (1934) argues that aspects of McCosh’s theory were similar to James’s but seemed to have been 
ignored by James, who, Ruckmick claims must have known about his theory.  He argues, 
A man in this position, writing a rather lengthy and significant book on the emotions in the year 1880, 
could hardly have been overlooked by a fellow psychologist at Harvard. That he was known to James 
goes without saying in as much as his name occurs in the Principles of Psychology. It is surprising, too, 
that Titchener's historical review fails to mention this contribution to the James-Lange doctrine. (p. 508) 
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as being automatic, reflex reactions.  McCosh (1877) stated, “Emotion is not as it has 
often been represented by physiologists a mere nervous reaction from an external 
stimulus, like the kick which the frog gives when it is kicked.  It begins with a mental 
act and is essentially an operation of the mind” (p. 415). 
Although an assumed connection between the physical and the mental continued to 
inform psychological understandings of the mental states, physiological descriptions 
did not serve the purpose that Bain and others had hoped they would: that of showing 
how the mental states and experience of emotion arose. Further, while physiology 
promised the greater elucidation of emotion, some theorists found that physiological 
aspects of emotion were not necessarily more readily observed or provided more 
clarity than subjective ones.  Indeed, they seemed to support the notion of emotion as 
being as vague and variable as described through introspection.  In his Elements of 
Physiological Psychology, Ladd (1897) stated that, 
The psychology of the feelings, as studied from the introspective point of view, 
has therefore always been peculiarly unproductive of assured results.  The fact 
that their physiological conditions are laid so largely in obscure, rapid, and 
infinitely varied changes within the central organs, such as cannot be either 
directly observed or indirectly subjected to experimentation, increases the 
difficulties of the subject. (p. 498) 
 
Despite this lack of clearness, it was the physiological accompaniments to emotion 
that were often used in the work of psychologists as a means to provide an ever more 
detailed conceptualisation of emotion.  Although the subject matter of psychology was 
often argued to be about the examination of the mind and the mental states, the 
perceived close connection with the bodily states meant that finding the line of 
demarcation between the two both in introspection and in physiology proved difficult.  
Thus, even though the study of physiological descriptions of emotion was used as a 
means to support its understanding as an experience or mental state, in reality 
descriptions of the physical states started to invade and in some cases, replace, its 
conceptualisation as a subjective experience or mental state.  Although physiological 
accounts were often described as indirect measures of both the changes taking place 
in the body and even more so of emotion as a mental state or subjective experience, 
they seemed to promise a more scientific account of emotion.  This led psychologists 
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to increasingly draw on them as the nineteenth century progressed.  They continued to 
be used as a means to discover the regularities of emotion, despite the findings that 
emotion appeared as variable and idiosyncratic when studied physiologically as it did 
when studied introspectively.  
 
4.2.2.2 The measurement of emotion 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century psychologists were increasingly striving not 
simply to observe and describe but to measure and also quantify. The push for this in 
psychology came from two sources.  First, from the example set by the natural sciences 
and second, from the increase in sociological accounts of human behaviour as 
developed in the work of Darwin's cousin Francis Galton (1822-1911).  The production 
of quantitative data and the development of statistical techniques, in particular, in these 
fields, seemed to provide a template by which psychology could progress as a science.   
In the third edition of The Emotions, Bain (1875) argued that, “The inability to estimate 
quantity with precision is a serious defect in any department of knowledge; it is the 
absence of the feature constituting an exact science. (p. 23).  Further, Baldwin (1891), 
bemoaning the difficulty of measurement in psychology, stated that, “mental facts, 
unlike physical facts, cannot be directly measured. For the measurement of external 
magnitudes extension affords us at once definite and constant standards; but for states 
of consciousness we have no such exact means of procedure” (p.3).  The mental states 
were unfortunately, “liable to all the uncertainties of subjective estimation” (Baldwin, 
1893, p. 3).  Bain lamented the inaccuracy of language used in introspective 
psychological descriptions and argued for quantification of emotion as a means by 
which to produce some statistics about it.  According to Bain, there was no reason why 
introspection should not be useful for this purpose.  For example, it could be used to 
measure the strength of emotions, “From the zero of indifference, up to the highest 
known pitch...no one would venture to interpolate twenty graduations, perhaps, eight 
or ten” (1899, p. 27).  Likewise, time could be used as a measure of emotional 
intensity; the more intense the emotion, the longer it would be seen to last and, further, 
the occurrence of particular emotions could be counted and might be observed to occur 
more frequently.   Bain also argued that, outwardly, emotions could be viewed in terms 
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of their facial expression, the regularity of which could be measured and also by how 
much physical energy and intensity they appeared to produce.  It could also be detailed 
as to how often people engaged in a particular activity so as to gauge what kinds of 
feelings, unpleasant or pleasant, these actions of might be producing.  For example, if 
someone often went on holiday to Switzerland it was a sign that for that person this 
was something that produced within him pleasant emotions. The counting of the 
occurrences of these actions could act as an indirect guide to what people were feeling.    
British and US introspective psychologists struggled to find definite sources for the 
measurement of emotion.  The measurement of emotion in the physiological 
laboratories of Leipzig in contrast appeared very impressive.  By the end of the 
nineteenth century, William Wundt and his German contemporaries were producing 
all kinds of physiological measures of feeling.  Ladd and Woodworth (1911) discuss 
the different ways in which the bodily accompaniments to feeling were measured: the 
use of pneumographs to measure breathing and movements in the chest; the rate and 
depth of respiration; the use of sphygmographs to measure the pulse and 
plethysmographs to measure the pumping of the blood.  Add to these, the kymograph, 
developed by Carl Ludwig in the 1840s, to measure blood pressure and the 
galvanometer to study electrical impulses from the body, and it was clear that 
physiology had at its disposal an array of impressive sounding instruments which could 
potentially produce a range of measurements of physical emotional response.  Ladd 
reported, for example, the work of Otto Veraguth (1870-1944), the Swiss neurologist, 
where the needle of the galvanometer reacted most strongly when a particularly 
emotional passage was read out to a participant.  He reported Wundt's experiments, 
too, where pulse and breathing were measured while a subject was shown particular 
pictures.  If measurement in psychology was to be the key to understanding the 
emotions scientifically it seemed that physiologists had made a great deal of progress.  
When contrasted with the vagueness of introspection, these measurements promised a 
more concrete basis on which to define emotion. 
The development of experimental psychology around the use of these instruments in 
German labs impressed US and British psychologists because they enabled the 
experimenter to control and isolate particular psychological and physical states.  The 
production of these kinds of data seemed to equal scientific progress.  The increasing 
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argument that psychology must construct rigid structures of measurement and 
experimentation in order that a systematic psychology be advanced meant that the 
ideas of introspective analyses conducted by a solitary psychologist seemed 
increasingly anachronistic and merely the metaphysical musings of individual and 
unrepresentative minds rather than as a scientific method as such.  Further, as will be 
described below, another requirement of science was also devaluing the British and 
US focus on emotion as experience.  The requirement that scientific psychological 
knowledge be universally applicable meant that the focus was on looking for the 
commonalities in emotion rather than its idiosyncrasies. 
 
4.2.2.3 Emotion as a universal phenomenon 
The issue of the scientific assumption of universality also caused the study of emotion 
in psychology through introspection to be problematic.  In this context, introspection 
appeared again to be somewhat inadequate at getting to the heart of what really seemed 
to matter to science.   In the final edition of The Emotions, Bain (1899) stated, “We 
must use our single and solitary mind as a key to the whole human race...this must be 
pronounced a narrow basis for interpretation for such a vast range on individuation” 
(p. 26).  He also argued, however, that it was certainly easier for psychologists to 
observe emotion through introspection because the inner world of other people was 
not available to them.  The only access to other people's emotions that psychologists 
had was indirect, through self-report and through observation of the outward 
accompaniments.  For Bain, emotion was narrowly defined as simply a mental state, 
but there were inherent problems of how to study it.  He stated, “while the signs of 
feeling [in other people] may be sufficiently distinct, we never have access to the thing 
signified” (p. 25). He was pragmatic about the difficulties of 'getting at' the mental 
states or the feelings through the observation of the physical states: “Our own 
experience tells us that the same outward expression does not always mean the same 
inward state even in ourselves” (p. 26).   
Physiology, on the other hand, could potentially provide a level of universality on 
which an understanding of emotion could be built even if the experience of emotion 
was perhaps somewhat idiosyncratic and individual.   Bodies and brains tended to look 
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and act much the same even if there were differences in size of the organs or brains or 
idiosyncrasies of function e.g. blood pressure and heart rate.  Physiology could also 
provide clues as to why people were the same and why they were different.  It seemed 
to present a picture of a general uniformity between bodies, whereas, the workings of 
the mind seemed much more susceptible to change over time and between people.  
Indeed, physiology had already shown that it could produce universal laws or patterns 
with regard to the way in which the body acted.  For example, as early as 1811 Bell 
had described the location of the motor nerves in the spinal cord and eleven years later 
François Magendie, the location of the sensory nerves, in what was to become the Bell-
Magendie Law.  Further, Carpenter (1875) stated with regard to the “habits of Nervo-
muscular action”, that it was a “matter of universal experience, that such habits are far 
more readily acquired during the period of Infancy” (p. 75).  Physiologists were 
describing consistent patterns of form and function of the body.  Mental and 
experiential laws and patterns of emotion in psychology had so far been notoriously 
difficult to pin down and therefore the production of universal laws with regard to the 
workings of the body promised that from these physical laws, mental ones could be 
more easily developed. 
 
4.2.3 Conclusion 
This section has described the ways in which physiology was used to supplement 
introspection and satisfy the assumptions of a scientific discipline, namely that the 
knowledge that it produces is measurable, verifiable and replicable.  While physiology 
could not study the subjective experience of emotion directly and certainly when used 
seemed often to continue to present emotion as idosyncratic and individual, it offered 
the possibility that emotion could be measured, conceptualised and presented as a 
universal phenomenon.  In accepting physiological understandings of emotion, 
however, psychologists began to embrace other definitions of emotion rather than 
purely that of emotion as a mental state or subjective experience and this was 
beginning to alter how emotion in psychology was conceptualised.  Further, during 
this period, there was another framework of knowledge through which emotion was 
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beginning to be described and defined, also: that of evolution.  It too was having a 
profound effect on the ways in which conceptualisations of emotion were to develop.  
 
4.3 The evolution of emotion 
The theory of evolution has had a significant and long-lasting influence on the way in 
which emotion has been understood in psychology.  As will be described in this 
section, it meant a movement away from the definitions of emotions as purely 
subjective experiences to those which embraced a range of understandings – 
biological, instinctual, and behavioural, for example.  This section will describe the 
development of these understandings of emotion and of the way in which the means 
by which emotion was observed altered as a result of their development.  It will show 
that while introspection continued to be advocated by theorists who embraced these, 
it, and the understanding of emotion that it was used to produce, was challenged by 
broader observations of the phenomenon.  
 
4.3.1 Evolution and psychology 
The emotions could hardly come to their own before a very considerable 
convergence of modern interests had prepared the way for the 
consummation...(a) the evolutionary doctrine in general and the signal service 
of Darwin's study of emotional expression as a link between man and beast. 
(Jastrow, 1928, p. 27) 
 
If  the effect of the use of physiology in psychology was to tie the subjective states to 
their physical cause or accompaniments, the impact of evolution was to almost entirely 
remove the need for the explicit understanding of human experience in psychology 
altogether.  The enormous influence of evolution on the development of psychology 
has been well-documented (e.g. Boring, 1929; Dixon, 2003; Flügel, 1969; Richards, 
2010).  According to  Brennan (1998), “For psychology, Darwin's theory of evolution 
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represented the third movement of the nineteenth century...which not only allowed the 
formal study of psychology to emerge as a discipline, but indeed, made it unavoidable 
and compelling” (p. 156).  The emergence of psychology as a scientific discipline, 
however, was happening regardless of evolution.  What the introduction of the theory 
of evolution did, rather, was to alter significantly the subject matter and purpose with 
which some of the early psychologists had set out.  Although Spencer was advocating 
an evolutionary approach even before Darwin had brought out The Origin of Species, 
other theorists were much more cautious in their acceptance.   Bain (1865), found it 
difficult to see its relevance to the study of the mind and emotion.  In the second edition 
of The Emotions, he stated, 
On the subject of Fear, I mentioned a suggestion of Mr. Spencer’s derived from 
the doctrine of evolution; far greater in my opinion, is the light flowing from 
the physical workings of that passion. Those great physical generalities 
stated...are full of suggestions as to the mental laws. (p. 603) 
 
Criticisms by Spencer (1868) of Bain's classification of the emotions as being 
“transitional” had caused the latter to rethink the use of the Natural History Method 
but not, at first, his views on the introduction of  evolutionary ideas into psychological 
understandings of emotion.  However, in the third edition of The Emotions, he 
considered the question of whether the emotions “gain in clearness” when “viewed in 
the light of this [evolutionary] hypothesis” (Bain, 1875, p. vii) and conceded that for 
love and anger in particular they did.  As Dixon (2003) describes, despite some 
objections, there was a gradual and general acceptance by psychologists of an 
understanding of emotion in terms of adaptation, inheritance and instinct as much as 
experience, ideas and elements.  Spencer and Darwin and later, functional 
psychologists, James, Dewey, Angell and McDougall and comparative psychologists, 
Romanes, Hall and Thorndike seamlessly incorporated the theory into psychological 
knowledge in a way which meant that by the end of the nineteenth century it had 
become the ideological basis for much of the psychological knowledge that was being 
produced.  Indeed, as the US functionalist psychologist, James Rowland Angell (1909) 
stated, so accepted were Darwin's ideas in psychology, that an understanding of the 
extent to which he had influenced psychological knowledge in the US seemed to have 
been forgotten,   
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Darwinism has never been a really vital issue in psychology. Occasionally a 
theologian or a naturalist has inveighed against the Darwinian theory of mental 
evolution, but the psychologists as such have rarely uttered a protest. In view 
of the storm of vituperative scientific criticism precipitated by the publication 
of the Origin of Species, this fact is distinctly significant. Indeed, so much a 
matter of course have the essential Darwinian conceptions become, that one is 
in danger of assuming fallaciously that Darwinism has no important bearing on 
psychology.  (p. 152) 
 
Therefore, from the mid nineteenth century onwards, the study of psychological 
phenomena in psychology was connected also with an understanding of their 
evolutionary development.  For the emotions there was a particular incentive to take 
an evolutionary approach to their study, as Jastrow was to reflect later, “The 
evolutionary renaissance was a general one.  Yet the demonstration was easier that 
animals behave like human beings because they feel as human beings feel then that 
they behave so because they think as human beings think” (1928, p. 280, my italics). 
Because of the physical accompaniments of emotion in the form of expressions and 
actions which were observable, it was easier to make connections between human and 
animal minds through the study of emotion than through other elements of the mind 
that could not be outwardly observed.  Conversely, given that introspection did not 
seem to be producing a great deal of scientific progress in their understanding, 
connecting animal and human emotions gave psychologists another route into their 
study even if, as Bain had argued time and again, there were inherent difficulties 
associated with making assumptions about the emotions of another person, never mind 
an animal.  The making of this connection also gave encouragement to physiological 
psychologists that the study of animal physiology would be useful in developing an 
understanding of the human body and mind. 
Although introspective accounts were still seen to be important by many psychologists 
including those who were taking a functionalist approach, in a theoretical culture 
which prized evolutionary understandings there was less room for experiential 
interpretations  to flourish, as will be illustrated in this chapter.  Indeed by the early 
twentieth century, there was a tendency for the former to be viewed as being more 
valuable.  As Angell (1909) stated,  
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The analytical methods will no doubt always retain a certain field of usefulness, 
and an indispensable one at that, but our larger and more significant 
generalizations, our more practically important forms of control over mental 
life are going to issue from the pursuit of methods in which growth, 
development and the influence of environment  both social and physical, will 
be the cardinal factors, methods which will in other words apply Darwinian 
principles with, let us hope, Darwin's tireless patience.  (p. 153) 
 
Ernst Haekel (1834-1919) the German zoologist, in discussing the effect of evolution 
on the subject matter and method in psychology, was even more explicit. “The future 
task of scientific psychology, therefore, is not as it once was, the exclusively subjective 
and introspective analysis of the highly developed mind of a philosopher, but the 
objective, comparative study of the long gradation by which man has slowly arisen 
through a vast series of lower animal conditions” (1905, p. 108).   
The following section will describe the ways in which emotion was observed and 
understood as a result of the embracing of the theory of evolution by psychologists and 
the methods developed in response.  It will be divided into three parts, each illustrating 
how the theory of evolution impacted on the understanding of emotion in psychology 
and its effect on the view of emotion as a subjective experience.  The first part will 
describe Spencer's arguments for comparative methods to study emotion and the 
assumptions on which these rested; the second, the use of these methods by Darwin in 
the observation of emotion in his Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals.   
The third part will examine the understanding of emotion as related to instinct in US 
functionalist accounts.   
 
4.3.2  Evolution and emotion 
4.3.2.1 Spencer's comparative method for the study of emotion 
Although Spencer (1868) was an advocate of introspection he also argued that it was 
not enough for psychologists simply to study their own minds but that the study of 
mental evolution must take place through examining other, less well developed minds 
in order to produce a truly scientific and systematic account. He was, therefore, one of 
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the first theorists to argue for a comparative psychology as a means to study emotion.  
In his essay on Bain's The Emotions, he argued that it was not enough to use only 
introspection and physiology but that the emotions must also be understood in terms 
of their evolutionary development, particularly if they were to be successfully 
classified according to the Natural History Method.  The understanding of the 
development of both “structures” and the related “functions” of the mind were, he 
argued, necessary to present a complete analysis.  However, Spencer described the 
difficulty of such an analysis of the emotions, 
“But”, it will perhaps be asked, “how are the emotions to be analyzed, and their 
modes of evolution to be ascertained? Different animals and different organs 
of the same animal, may readily be compared in their internal and microscopic 
structures, as also in their developments; but functions, and especially such 
functions as the emotions, do not admit of like comparisons.”  (1868, p. 309) 
 
Emotion was viewed as being a purely a mental state or subjective experience.  
However, the problem of studying it in other people was still a barrier to its 
understanding.   Although Spencer understood that it may be difficult, and, therefore, 
any classification be “provisional”, there was much, he argued, that could be done to 
develop a greater understanding of the emotions with regard to evolution.  The only 
way really to get at the emotions of other people was to study their behaviour, 
expressions or actions during various states of emotion.  To develop an evolutionary 
account, however, the study of the behaviour associated with the emotions could not 
be confined only to psychologists themselves.  They must, also, be observed as taking 
place within various other classes of what he termed “organisms” in order for 
comparisons to be made.  First, this could be done through comparisons between 
animals: “Thus we may, in the first place, study the evolution of the emotions up 
through the various grades of the animal kingdom: observing which of them are 
earliest and exist with the lowest organisation and intelligence” (p. 310);  second, by 
studying 'savages' and comparing their behaviour with 'civilised' people: “we may note 
the emotional differences between the lower and higher human races – may regard as 
earlier and simpler those feelings which are common to both, and later and more 
compound those which are characteristic of the most civilized” (p. 310); and third, 
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through the study of children: “we may observe the order in which the emotions unfold 
during the progress from infancy to maturity” (p. 310).  
Although Spencer did not carry out any of these investigations into emotion himself, 
his theoretical and methodological stance, a stance which was taken up by 
psychologists throughout the late nineteenth century, reflected particular expectations 
about what a comparative psychology of emotion would find in contrast to the 
muddled view of emotion produced by introspection.  As discussed in Chapter One, 
Spencer had found that he could not delineate the emotions introspectively in a way 
which would produce a complete and comprehensive analysis. Emotions seemed to 
him to be often, “homogenous to consciousness” (Spencer, 1868, p. 250).  Thus for 
the understanding of emotion in an evolutionary sense, the study of the subjective 
states would, without the comparative methods, result in the production of an 
understanding of emotion which was not scientifically 'true'.  “And here, indeed”, 
Spencer went on to argue, “in the inability of existing science to answer these questions 
which underlie a true psychological classification, we see how purely provisional any 
system of classification is likely to be” (p. 250).  Therefore, although Spencer placed 
a great deal of value on introspection as the means to understand emotion, he argued 
for the use of comparative methods to study emotion alongside that of the study of 
subjective experience.  This was to have an effect, even if not intended, on the value 
of introspective evidence in psychology.  
First, the study of emotion through two of these methods - the study of animals and 
young children - meant that subjective experiences of emotion could never be a part 
of that study because these groups did not have the linguistic ability to describe their 
own experiences.  Thus, subjective experience as an aspect of emotion was lost to the 
understandings of emotion produced by the comparative method.  However, if 
experience of emotion was to be explicitly attributed to these categories, psychologists 
would be open to accusations of speculation and with regard to animals, 
anthropomorphism.   Secondly, as is evident in Spencer's argument for these methods, 
there was an assumption that minds and the emotions were hierarchical. The 
hierarchies lay between physically simpler and more complex animals, babies and 
adults; and between civilized and uncivilized societies.   Evolution fitted well with the 
associationist assumption of collections of simple ideas going together to make up 
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more complex ones.  It fitted well, also, with the prevalent cultural assumption that 
British and US societies were more psychologically advanced (Richards, 2012).  
Hierarchies of emotion could not be revealed introspectively by psychologists who 
were all 'civilized adult men' but as observed through the outward manifestations in 
the range of classes mentioned.  Spencer felt that 'primitive emotions' such as fear, 
anger and disgust may be viewed in animals and in the 'lower races', but presumed that 
some emotions, the 'aesthetic' and 'moral' emotions, were only experienced in the so-
called 'civilized' echelons of society and, therefore, would not be viewed in ‘lower’ 
groups.   He, for example, stated that “There are emotions common among ourselves, 
that are scarcely in any degree experienced by some inferior races; as, for instance, 
those produced by music” (1868, p. 312).  This assumption of hierarchy allowed for a 
systematic study of emotion in the way in which the complex, undifferentiated, 
idiosyncratic understandings of emotion as observed through introspection could not.   
As Angell, argued, the acceptance of the hierarchical understanding of minds had 
particular advantages for psychology,  
Indeed, at the present time it is undoubtedly the case that most psychologists 
share Darwin's main convictions as to the continuity of mental evolution from 
animal to man, less perhaps as a result of careful scrutiny of the facts than as a 
consequence of a powerful drift from every direction toward the belief in a 
common origin for human and animal characteristics. We feel more 
comfortable nowadays in a world where simple and uniform rules obtain. 
(1909, p. 159) 
 
A third, connected, consequence of evolution was the placement of people in the 
category of 'organism' alongside plants and animals (Danziger, 1997a).  Spencer 
(1868), for example, in attempting to define emotion stated, “the word Emotion has 
come generally to mean that kind of feeling which is not a direct result of any action 
on the organism” (p. 319).  The effect of the use of this term was to present a view of 
people not predominantly as experiencing, agentic human beings, but rather as passive, 
biological, objects of scientific observation.  In turn, the experience of the human as 
an organism seemed of less value, indeed was increasingly seen as not to be trusted, 
partly because the experience of some of the other organisms in the category could 
never be ascertained.  It presented human emotions, therefore, as adaptive, physical, 
mechanistic processes which had little to do with reflection or experience.  This 
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analysis concurs with that of Dixon (2003, p.179) who also highlights the defining of 
emotions in the evolutionary context as ‘non-cognitive feelings’.  
In this section the way in which Spencer’s understanding of how emotion should be 
studied in psychology had particular inevitable effects on the value placed on the 
subjective experience of emotion has been described.  Although Spencer was an active 
advocate of evolutionary theory and the use of comparative methods, Darwin's more 
accessible descriptions of evolution in the Origin of Species (1859) and The Descent 
of Man (1871) caused these to become incorporated more widely into psychology in 
Britain and the US.  The following section will examine the use of comparative 
methods to study expressions of emotion by Darwin in his other highly influential 
work, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals 28.   
 
4.3.2.2 Darwin and the detachment of experience from expression  
Darwin reduced emotions to precise and measurable quantities: heart rate, 
blood pressure, movements of the facial muscles, angles of the brow, 
developmental stages in the individual or the species. As emotions became 
mechanical and reproducible through new technologies, their “quality” faded, 
their felt experience disappeared. (White, 2009, p. 826) 
 
Darwin's The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals is a book which has had 
a profound effect on the study of emotion in psychology29.   This section will describe 
the subject matter of the book and the methods of observation that it advocates.  It will 
explain how the methods strip away the explicit relevance of experience to the 
understanding of emotion and will also demonstrate that the experience of emotion, as 
something which is not often explicitly discussed in the book, was, however, implicit 
in Darwin's research.  Further, it will argue that Darwin presented a template for the 
study of emotions for psychologists to follow without the need to have recourse to the 
subjective experience.  
                                                          
28 To be referred to as The Expression for the rest of the chapter. 
29 See, for example, Darwin and facial expression: a century of research in review (Ekman, 2006). 
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Although he acknowledged in the introduction to the book that expressions in humans 
had already been widely studied, Darwin makes it evident that his own account has 
been put together for a particular purpose; to show that human and animal emotional 
expressions, and by inference the emotions themselves, were on a continuum.   In 
particular the book was written to address some concerns Darwin had with the work 
on expression of Charles Bell whose theistic stance meant that, according to Darwin, 
he had “evidently wished to draw as broad a distinction as possible between man and 
the lower animals” (1872, p. 10).  Although Darwin was greatly impressed by the work 
of anatomists and physiologists of expression, such as Bell and the anatomist, 
Duchenne (1862), whose Mécanisme de la Physionomie Humaine was a rigorous study 
of the movement of the facial muscles in the production of expressions, he almost 
viewed their works as Spencer viewed Bain's, as ‘transitional', because they did not 
provide an evolutionary account.  Darwin is explicit in the introduction to The 
Expression that it would not be like previous accounts of emotional expression because 
it had been written expressly to show that the emotional lives of people and animals 
are on a continuum as demonstrated by the way in which animals expressed their 
emotions in a similar way to humans.  Unlike some of his contemporaries Darwin did 
not set out to study emotion as a mental state, nor as a subjective experience.  Neither 
was he concerned with producing a definition or theory of emotion or of classifying 
the emotions, although the way in which the chapters were set out meant that 
seemingly connected emotions are dealt with together.  Darwin, of course, was not a 
psychologist, but rather a biologist, so whatever his own experience of emotion, it was 
not to be an explicit part of this work.  Indeed, of course, in explicitly studying the 
expression, rather than the emotion itself, it would have been impossible to study his 
own physical movements in the way that it was possible to reflect on the inner 
experience.    
Darwin was not a physiologist or anatomist either.  Although he included some 
explicitly physiological descriptions, he did not set out to provide a detailed anatomical 
account of each expression, but rather to study the behaviour associated with the 
emotions in a systematic manner, using comparative methods. Although Spencer 
(1868) had argued theoretically for a comparative psychology, he had not gone on to 
develop his ideas in a practical sense or conduct any comparative research himself.   
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Darwin, however, had been carrying out observations on people and animals and 
taking notes for decades prior to the publishing of his book, and had developed several 
other methods for the observation of emotional expressions.  First, he advocated the 
observation of emotion in infants because, he argued, their expressions were 
particularly pronounced; second, he included reports of emotional expressions of those 
classed as insane for the same reason.  Third, Darwin studied the expressions of 
animals, particularly dogs, cats and the “commoner animals” (1872, p. 11).   Further, 
he used the new technology of photography to capture fleeting emotional expressions 
to be analysed at leisure, following the work by Duchenne.  Using Duchenne's plates, 
Darwin also examined how well people recognised emotional expressions in others.  
He did attempt, also, to observe something about the expression of emotion from some 
of the artworks of the great masters but concluded that the requirement of the depiction 
of beauty in these meant that something about true emotional expression was lost.  
Finally, he set out to discover if emotional expressions were universal through cross-
cultural studies30.  In an attempt to capture information about the expressions of the 
“lower races”, he produced questionnaires which he sent out to missionaries and 
officials throughout the British Empire in order to “ascertain whether the same 
expressions and gestures prevail, as has often been asserted without much evidence, 
with all races of mankind, especially with those who have associated little with 
Europeans” (p. 15).   Like Spencer, Darwin believed in the hierarchy of emotion – that 
some emotions could be observed in both people and animals, that some could only be 
observed in humans and that some could only be observed in the ‘civilized’ races. 31 .   
Darwin's subject matter and methods, therefore, were designed to present a particular 
understanding of emotion.  Darwin was attempting to connect the emotions of people 
and animals and to place them in an evolutionary context.  Therefore, the account of 
                                                          
30 In 1968 Ekman, Sorensen and Friesen (1969), following Darwin, set out to similarly examine the extent to which 
emotional expressions are cross-cultural.   The study compared participants from US, Brazil, Japan, New Guinea 
and Borneo, looking at their interpretations of photographs of emotional expressions.  This generated the notion in 
psychology that there are six basic emotions – fear, anger, surprise, happiness, disgust and sadness - and has 
spawned a huge amount of psychological research in the area - see e.g. Ekman (1977); Ekman (1992); Ekman 
(2003). 
31 This view of emotion was later influential on of the major strands of theorising on emotion in psychology, the basic 
emotions hypothesis (Gendron & Barrett, 2009) which present accounts of emotions in psychology as being either 
primary or secondary:  the former being equated with emotions which are innate and physiologically hardwired and 
experienced across cultures and those which develop in relation to the culture of the immediate environment. 
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emotional expressions which he presented was, essentially, a functional one, in the 
sense that he was attempting to understand their purpose.   He includes very little in 
terms of descriptions as to how particular emotions might feel or are experienced by 
the people or animals being observed, nor discusses how he arrived at the selection of 
the particular emotions tackled in the book.  In his questionnaire, he does not attempt 
to elicit from those observed how they feel when they display the expressions and 
behaviours that they do.  It is rather that he wished simply to understand what the 
expressions are and why they are displayed. The questionnaires included such 
questions as, “When in good spirits do the eyes sparkle, with the skin a little wrinkled 
round and under them, and with the mouth a little drawn back at the corners?” (p. 16) 
and “Is fear expressed in the same general manner as with Europeans” (p. 16). The 
display of emotional behaviour thus was studied as separate from the subjective 
experience of the person being observed.  The inferences made as to what emotion 
they were experiencing was given through the circumstances in which it arose rather 
than how they felt. 
The result in The Expression is that the subject matter and, therefore, the object of 
study is not the person or animal itself but, rather, the particular behaviours displayed, 
because it is through the observation of these behaviours, and the situations in which 
they arose, that, Darwin hoped, an understanding of the reason for their existence 
would be found.  Further, because Darwin did not view animals as having volition or 
will, he presented an understanding of emotional behaviours as involuntary, habitual 
and instinctive.  Indeed, the three principles of expression he described in the book: 
serviceable associated habits, antithesis and direct action of the nervous system, were 
attempts to theorise as to the reasons for the automatic production and function of 
emotional behaviours.   The first refers to the idea that particular expressions were in 
the past habitual and have become a useless remnant of the past, the second that some 
expressions result because they are the opposite of the serviceable ones, and the third 
reflects Bain's law of diffusion or the nervous discharge of emotion.  Darwin seemed 
to believe that emotional expressions served no communicative purpose but were 
merely inherited responses.   He thus further dissociated them from the actual feeling 
of the person being observed: first, because they are viewed as an automatic and 
habitual response to something that happens in the environment rather than an 
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accompaniment to an experience and second, because they are viewed as not being of 
any use whatsoever.  What occurs subjectively within the subject, therefore, was of 
little relevance other than the idea that they may be feeling something when they act.   
The methods of observation also detached the emotional expression from the emotion 
itself.  The use of photographs, particularly those of Duchenne, who had induced 
artificial emotional expressions in the faces of people through the use of electrical 
stimulation, and indeed, Darwin's attempt to study paintings allowed him only to look 
at the expression but not at the underlying feeling.  The study of animal emotional 
expressions did the same because psychologists could not rely on their own feelings 
of emotion to describe how animals might feel.  Indeed, Darwin was clear in arguing 
that the observation of animals was of “paramount importance” not for “deciding how 
far in man certain expressions are characteristic of certain states of mind” (p. 17) but 
for, “affording the safest basis for generalisation on the causes, or origin, of the 
movements of Expression” (p. 17). It also meant that there was less likelihood of the 
observer having preconceptions of the observed and, therefore, of being objective, “In 
observing animals, we are not so likely to be biased by our imagination; and we may 
feel safe that their expressions are not conventional” (p. 17).  The observation of  
infants and the insane erected a further barrier between the emotional experience of 
the observer and the observed, as was the observation of expressions of 'savages', 
people who were seen as being much further down the evolutionary ladder.   Because 
the experiences of these were regarded as being very different to the theorists own 
emotional experience, these could be viewed with detachment. This is pure description 
of the emotional expressions, viewed disinterestedly by an observer, who, to a large 
extent presented himself as emotionless whilst viewing the object of this study.    
Of course, Darwin set out to study expression only, so it is perhaps no wonder that 
there is little reference to the experience of emotion in his work.  However, White 
(2009) argues, that although Darwin used objective methods in The Expression, his 
own experience of emotion is never far away from the understanding of emotion that 
he puts forward.  He disagrees, however, with Levine’s (2006) stronger assertion that 
Darwin’s objective self is merely a construct.  White believes, rather, that in attempting 
a detailed scientific analysis of the emotions, Darwin's own emotions played a vital 
part in what develops, but that he was able to separate his objective and subjective 
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selves. The following statement, however, expresses the sense that it was not always 
easy for Darwin to remain emotionally detached and at the same time attempting to 
make observations: “When we witness any deep emotion, our sympathy is so strongly 
excited, that close observation is rendered almost impossible” (1872, p. 13).  Some of 
Darwin's findings were produced by studying his son, so perhaps it is no wonder that 
he at times felt this way, and highlights the way in which Darwin's observations of 
emotional expression were not as entirely detached from his own experience as he may 
have wished.   
The sense too  that the animals he studied were experiencing something was prevalent 
in his discussion of emotions in The Descent of Man, where he much more explicitly 
described the feelings which animals might experience as demonstrated by how they 
express themselves. 
This shews that animals not only love, but have desire to be loved. Animals 
manifestly feel emulation. They love approbation or praise; and a dog carrying 
a basket for his master exhibits in a high degree self-complacency or pride. 
There can, think, be no doubt that a dog feels shame, as distinct from fear, and 
something very like modesty when begging too often for food. (1871, p. 40) 
 
There is, therefore, throughout The Expression an underlying sense that behind the 
expression there is a particular kind of feeling, even if the focus of the work is on the 
physical.  It is often clear that it is extremely hard to do away with emotional 
experience entirely.  This is indicated in his analysis of the descriptions he received 
from his questionnaires. Having collected thirty-six of these, Darwin used the 
descriptions from them throughout The Expression to delineate similarities between 
European and 'aboriginal' expressions.  At times, the circumstance in which an 
expression occurs is described and from it an assumption made as to which emotion 
the person or animal is displaying.  For example, “The expression of grief is by no 
means confined to the Europeans, but appears to be common to all races of 
mankind...With respect to the negroes, the lady who told me of Fra Angelico's picture, 
saw a negro towing a boat on the Nile, and as he encountered an obstruction, she 
observed his grief muscles in strong action, with the middle of the forehead well 
wrinkled” (p. 187).  In order to understand what emotions the facial displays are 
demonstrating, Darwin, must have had to refer, however, implicitly to his own 
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emotional life and bring up an internal template of the feeling which was being 
described.  In places, when distinguishing between emotions which are similar in 
expression it is to the state of mind that he referred.  For example, “Scorn and disdain 
can hardly be distinguished from contempt, except that they imply a rather more angry 
frame of mind” (p. 254).  Disgust, sneering and defiance, Darwin insisted were so 
similar that in terms of the expression were almost impossible to distinguish although 
clearly in a phenomenological sense they could be.  The sense of the emotions as being 
individual, nuanced, personal experiences, therefore, comes through in The 
Expression, despite the rigid focus on the outward behaviours. 
This implicit introspection was in contrast to the work of Darwin's peers in psychology 
and their explicit emphasis on the subjective analysis of their own emotions.  Darwin, 
however, illustrated how emotion might be studied without the need for an explicit 
introspective agenda or even a great deal of physiological detail, but rather from the 
observation of human behaviour under particular circumstances.  In the adoption of 
both his theoretical approach and methods of study, later psychologists found a means 
by which to bypass the difficulty of self-observation and the complex depiction of 
emotion it provided.  Indeed, as Angell stated, through an embracing of behavioural 
accounts of emotion and an increasing use of the methods which Darwin developed, 
psychologists gradually became less reliant on their own experiences of emotion but 
rather on the outward displays of others as a means to construct a psychological view 
of what emotion was and how it functioned.  As much as Bain did not readily embrace 
the theory of evolution, his ideas on the study of the emotions certainly developed in 
response to Darwin's work.  Indeed, what he had viewed as being mere physical 
'accompaniments' to the emotions started to become elements of emotion itself.  He 
stated that “The Feelings possess a natural language or Expression.  So constant are 
the appearances characterizing the different classes of emotions, that we regard them 
as part of the emotions themselves” (Bain, 1873, p. 6).  Further, in the final edition of 
The Emotions, Bain (1899) argued that often the best way of observing emotion is to 
do away with thoughts of the subjective state altogether but to describe them from the 
outside: “every mental sequence runs side by side with a physical sequence, we may, 
and often do, remain content with the physical aspect, and image the phenomena to 
ourselves under that aspect exclusively” (p. 681), and, “In really the same exclusively 
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objective forms, we can study and think of, our grown-up fellow-men, we may refrain 
from conceiving their pleasures, pains, emotions, ideas, in the subjective character” (p. 
681). This indicated a movement away from his regarding emotions as predominantly 
mental states to predominantly being behaviours.  
 
4.3.2.3 US functionalist accounts of emotion as instinct 
As described in the introduction, US psychologists embraced evolution and 
incorporated its purpose and methods into functionalist accounts of the mind and 
emotion.  This section will show that, although they argued that introspection was the 
primary method in psychology, the purpose with which they set out to explain the mind 
meant a movement away from the use of introspective accounts of the experience of 
emotion but that other accounts came to dominate the field, in particular, accounts of 
emotion as being tied to instinct. 
Darwin, in his account of the emotional expressions, argued that these were habitual, 
automatic responses and a remnant of the evolution of human beings.  Although 
Charles Bell too had argued for the expressions as instincts, the introduction of 
evolution changed the concept of instinct from meaning something which had been 
placed in an animal by God, to being a behaviour which had been inherited for survival 
(Richards, 2002).  Spencer was the first theorist to use the latter view in relation to the 
motivation behind emotional response.  He argued, that certain emotions, were 
instinctual, habitual, reflex processes which take place in the body in response to 
particular events in the environment, for example, stating that,  
When in the circumstances of any race, some one kind of action or set of 
actions, sensation or set of sensation, is usually followed, or accompanied by, 
various other sets of actions or sensations, and so entails a large mass of 
pleasureable or painful states of consciousness; these, by frequent repetition, 
become so connected together that the initial action or sensation brings the 
ideas of all the rest crowding into consciousness;…constituting what we may 
call the body of the emotion. (p. 315) 
 
The tying of emotion to instinct meant that a particular view of emotion and strand of 
emotions research, that of the ‘basic emotions’ approach, was to develop in the work 
of later psychologists (Gendron & Barrett, 2009).  It introduced the idea that certain 
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emotions were biologically and genetically inherited and universally experienced in 
contrast to others which were culturally acquired.  The effect of this was to separate 
out the emotions and to bestow on certain emotions a particular psychological 
significance.  Spencer gives the example of fear, as being one such ‘basic emotion’, in 
arguing that it was, “nothing else than an impulse, an emotion, a feeling, a desire. To 
have in a slight degree those psychical states accompanying the reception of wounds, 
those which express themselves in cries, those which are experienced during flight, is 
to be in a state of what we call fear” (Spencer, 1855, p. 356).  This view of emotion, 
echoed later in the century in the work of functional psychologists, James, Angell and 
McDougall, will be described below, as will the down grading of the usefulness of 
introspective accounts of emotion as result of this understanding of emotion, 
particularly in the work of the last of these theorists. 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, functionalist descriptions of 
emotion had fully incorporated ideas of emotions.  These were now often being 
equated with instincts.  William James, for example, stated that “Instinctive reactions 
and emotional expressions…shade imperceptibly into each other. Every object that 
excites an instinct excites an emotion as well” (James, 1890b, p. 442).  Like the 
instinctiveness of a baby crying when its needs are not being met, for James some 
emotions were an organic response to a stimulus.  For him the usefulness of 
physiological explanations of both instincts and emotions were that there was a 
possibility that a comprehensive theory to explain the behaviour associated with 
instinct and emotion could be provided; one which describes what happens within the 
body to cause both emotional and instinctual behaviour to occur.  He argued that the 
strength of reaction of the ‘coarser’ emotions - anger, fear, love, grief, joy and hate - 
may be related to an innate, instinctual and physical response. Although James did not 
particularly develop this connection in his work, other theorists were far more definite 
in their arguments that emotions and instincts could not be studied as separate entities. 
James Rowland Angell (1869-1949), whose comments on the acceptance of evolution 
in psychology have already been mentioned, was instrumental in forming, along with 
John Dewey, the functional school of psychology in Chicago.  For Angell (1906), 
psychology could not simply be defined as the “science of mind” because that implied 
that it was the study of only “normal human processes” but he argued, as it included 
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the study of animals and the “insane”, it should be understood to be the study of all 
“consciousness everywhere” (p. 2).  Although he argued that introspection was still 
the principal method in psychology, it was also to be supplemented, although, not 
replaced, by other means of observation, 
Moreover we are able to supplement introspection by immediate observation 
of other individuals.  It is thus possible, for example, to detect much which is 
most characteristic of the emotions, such as anger and fear, by watching the 
actions of persons around us and noting their expressions, gestures, etc.  The 
facts we thus obtain must be interpreted in terms of our own direct knowledge 
of our own experience gained introspectively.  (Angell, 1906, p. 6) 
 
It is no coincidence that Angell uses the example of emotion to illustrate the need for 
other methods.  As has been described above, in the section on physiology, the 
introspection of emotion produced descriptions of emotion which did not fall neatly 
into the expectations of what a rigorous scientific analysis should look like.  For 
functionalists, such as Angell, a scientific psychology should not only describe the 
mental states but should ascertain their purpose also.  Instincts were viewed in 
evolution as having, both in animals and in humans, a particularly important 
significance for the survival of the organism.  If emotions were connected to instincts, 
the purpose with which each emotion arose could be stated, and a truly scientific 
understanding of emotion could emerge.  In fact, Angell appeared to equate instinct 
with some psychological events which would have previously been viewed as 
emotions.  The instincts he described as, “Fear, anger, shyness, curiosity, affection, 
sexual love, jealousy and envy, rivalry, sociability, sympathy, modesty(?) [sic], play, 
imitation, constructiveness, secretiveness and acquisitiveness” (p. 297), before 
concluding that “A perusal of our list brings at once to notice the union of instinct and 
emotion” (p. 297).   
Like Angell, the English psychologist William McDougall (1871-1938) was definite 
in his tying of emotion to instinct.  Having moved from Oxford to Harvard University 
in 1920, he was professor of Psychology there until 1927 and as will be described was 
a stout defender of introspection against behaviourism.  As Boring describes, and as 
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six, McDougall, tried to find a third way 
between introspection and behaviourism in stressing that the minds of individual 
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organisms express themselves in both experience and behaviour.  However, 
McDougall was scathing about the narrow and restricted view of psychology as the 
science of consciousness that he saw as persisting in the discipline, the method of 
introspection itself and its disadvantageous effect on the study of emotion, in 
particular.  Unlike James and Angell he did not argue for introspection as the primary 
method of psychology but, rather, stated that  
The insistence upon introspection as the one method of the science tended to 
prolong the predominance of this narrow and paralysing view of the scope of 
science; for the life of emotion and the play of motives is the part of our mental 
life which offers the least advantageous field for introspective observation and 
description.  (1915, p. 6)    
 
Although, as will be described in Chapter Six, he was to be a great defender of 
introspection against behaviourist attacks, he argued that introspection could only be 
useful to carry out a preliminary understanding of the mind.  Psychology must, he 
argued, “Above all…aim at providing a full and accurate account of our constitution, 
the innate tendencies to thought and action that constitute the native basis of mind” (p. 
15).  Therefore, in McDougall’s work the correlation between instinct and particular 
emotions becomes even more robust, and his ideas about emotion developed, not 
simply through introspection, but through the development of comparative 
psychology.  He referred somewhat to experience as he discussed emotion and instinct, 
for example, stating that, 
We may then define an instinct as an inherited or innate psycho-physical 
disposition which determines its possessor to perceive and to pay attention to, 
objects of a certain class to experience an emotional excitement of a particular 
quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular 
manner, or at least to experience an impulse to such action. (1915, p. 29) 
 
However, the emphasis in his descriptions of the emotions was not on how these are 
experienced but rather on the instinctual expression.  He argued that the primary 
emotions are those related to the instincts in “higher animals” (p. 49), there being seven 
distinct emotions related to instincts; those of fear, disgust, wonder, anger, subjection, 
elation and tender emotion.  In producing this taxonomy, McDougall is scathing of 
arguments, based on introspection, that emotion cannot be classified because the 
emotions are not easily delineated from each other,  
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It has often been remarked that the emotions are fluid and indefinable, that they 
are in perpetual flux and are experienced in an infinite number of subtle 
varieties.  This truth may be used as an argument against the propriety of 
attempting to exhibit all the many varieties of our emotional experience as 
reducible by analysis to a small number of primary emotions. (1915, p. 45) 
 
Thus McDougall rejected the accounts of emotion reached through introspection alone 
and exhibited a mistrust of the findings of introspective analysis, in favour of an 
account of emotion which allows for the emotions to be clearly delineated and to be 
described individually.  In tying particular emotions to particular instincts - the instinct 
of flight with fear and the instinct of curiosity with the emotion of wonder, for example 
- he demonstrated how it may be possible to classify the emotions scientifically, even 
if it meant, as described at the end of Chapter Three, that some emotions, such as joy, 
which could be studied through introspection, are rejected as being emotions in his 
account.    
In the work of the functionalist psychologists, there were, therefore, three main effects 
of the conceptualisation of emotion as instinct which meant that subjective experience 
was rendered less relevant to the study of emotion.  First, the description of emotion 
as an instinctive, unconscious and automatic process, meant that the introspective 
analysis of the conscious experience of emotion could not be solely trusted as a method 
by which to understand emotion.  Second, because consciousness did not discriminate 
between emotions that occurred as a result of instinct and those that were culturally 
inherited, the divisions between these could not be examined by introspection.  Third, 
looking at the experience of emotion could say nothing of the purpose with which it 
arose or the instinct to which it was connected and so could not present a fully scientific 
account of emotion.  Thus, the changing conceptualisations of emotion, as developed 
through evolution, were beginning to alter the status of experiential accounts of 
emotion.  The need to understand how emotion was experienced, although implicit in 
the work of functionalists such as McDougall, was secondary to the purpose with 
which these psychologists observed emotion; that of understanding the purpose and 





4.3.3  Conclusion  
This section has described the impact of evolutionary accounts of emotion on the 
understandings of emotion that were produced during this period.  It has shown in the 
work of Spencer, Darwin and the US functionalist psychologists a movement away 
from emotion as a subjective experience and a movement towards a concept which 
was concerned with understanding its function, rather than its feeling.  The embracing 
of evolution by psychologists in the US began to drive the study of emotion in a 
different direction from that with which psychologists had started out but promised the 




This chapter has described the growth of other methods of observation of emotion in 
the late nineteenth century and has described how these became increasingly 
important, first as a means by which to supplement the perceived deficiencies of the 
introspective analysis of emotion and second, as a means to study particular aspects 
and views of emotion that were not available through inner reflection.  It has shown 
how the incorporation of physiological and evolutionary understandings of the mind 
and body into psychology radically altered the subject matter and methods of the 
discipline.  As a consequence, particular understandings of emotion began to be 
produced which were less about how emotion was experienced and more about how it 
looked as it was observed in other people, or in animals.  This had an effect on British 
and US psychology of a down grading of the perceived usefulness of the examination 
of experience in the study of emotion.  Physiology, in particular, was a source of 
scientific certainty for an ephemeral and elusive phenomenon and seemed to promise 
data from which the universalities of emotion could be discerned and measured and 
from which a consensual understanding of emotion could emerge.  The use of these 
other sources of knowledge to describe emotion were, to some extent, attempts at 
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pinning down what emotion was.  It did, however, have the effect of muddying the 
waters as it moved the understanding of emotion away from being defined as a 
subjective experience to the production of multiple ways of defining it.  
However, there was one late nineteenth century US psychologist who continued to 
argue that the purpose of psychology was to describe the mental states and subjective 
experiences only.  Introspection began to be downplayed in functional and behavioural 
accounts of emotion, but as, will be outlined in the following chapter, Edward Bradford 
Titchener was the strongest advocate of introspection in psychology at this time, albeit 
he had particular views as to how it should be conducted.  The following chapter will 
describe the sort of introspection he advocated and its impact on the observation and 




EXPERIMENTAL INTROSPECTION 1890-1930 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the work of E.B. Titchener and that of the 
structuralist psychologists.  It will look at the effects of the controlled form of 
introspection which they advocated on the understandings of emotion that they 
produced.  It is mainly concerned with the question of whether these controls brought 
about consensual rather than idiosyncratic introspective accounts of emotion as 
intended, in contrast to those produced by psychologists as described in Chapter Three.  
It will first describe the form of introspection advocated by these theorists, discuss 
some of the difficulties of studying emotion using this method and then go on to 
examine the question of consensus. 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Those who remember the psychological laboratories of twenty years ago can 
hardly escape an occasional shock of contrast which, for the moment, throws 
into vivid relief the difference between the old order and the new.  The 
experimenter of the early nineties trusted, first of all, in his instruments; 
chronoscope and kymograph and tachistoscope were - it is hardly an 
exaggeration to say - of more importance than the observer;...There were still 
vast reaches of mental life which experiment had not touched;...The movement 
towards qualitative analysis has culminated in what is called, with a certain 
redundancy of expression, the method of “systematic experimental 
introspection”...A great change has taken place, intensively and extensively, in 
the conduct of the introspective method. (Titchener, 1912a, p. 427) 
 
As was described in the previous chapter, US functionalist psychologists embraced 
various methods in their work.  In contrast, there was one US theorist who stood out 
for the method of introspection as the only method that could be used to study the 
human mind: the English psychologist, Edward Titchener.  Titchener's introspection 
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was a method designed to produce data in the same sense that the 'inspection' of objects 
produced data in physics.  As will be described throughout this chapter, he attempted 
to control the way in which introspection was conducted, in order to standardize it as 
a means by which the idiosyncratic understandings of the mental states could be ironed 
out and replicable data produced.  Edward Bradford Titchener (1867-1927) had arrived 
in the US via Germany and Wundt's laboratories in Leipzig.  On completing his 
apprenticeship in Germany, he accepted a position with Cornell University and became 
Professor of Psychology there at the tender age of twenty-eight.  Although he was very 
much an advocate of Wundt's methods, he placed much more emphasis on 
introspection as a methodological tool than the limited use his mentor advocated 
(Danziger, 1980).  As a result, Titchener's name became synonymous with the defence 
of introspection.  First, because he believed in it so strongly, and, second, because of 
the profile that he had as a result of arguing for his own 'experimental psychology' 
(Titchener, 1898).  As both Boring (1929) and Heidbreder (1933) describe, Titchener 
fought vehemently for what he argued was the only real purpose of psychology: “The 
historical conditions of psychology”, he claimed, “rendered it inevitable that, when the 
time came for the transformation from philosophy to science, problems should be 
formulated, explicitly or implicitly as static rather than dynamic, structural, rather than 
functional” (1898, p. 453).  
Although, initially, Titchener's branch of psychology did not have a name, as he set 
himself up against the functionalists the term “structuralism” was applied to his work, 
as a description of what he believed the primary aim of psychology should be: that of 
determining the structure, elements and processes of the mind (Heidbreder, 1933).  He 
argued that structuralism was the real scientific psychology and that functionalists had 
not shaken off the metaphysical roots of their philosophical ancestors (Titchener, 
1898).  He was not against the discovery of the evolutionary origins of the mental 
processes but believed that introspection was sufficient to find the simple elements out 
of which more complex ones were built.  He believed, further, that the experimental 
introspective method was essential, not only, to show that psychology could rank 
alongside the other sciences but that it was superior to other sciences because it could 
describe the mental processes through which the observations of scientists were 
conducted.   
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Titchener's introspective method was quite different from that used by previous British 
and US psychologists.  The latter’s, he argued, had been inherited from the 
metaphysical speculations of philosophy32 and therefore had no place in psychological 
science, even if, as Danziger (1980) points out, Titchener himself had acquired his 
enthusiasm for introspection from his reading of JS Mill as a student.  However, those 
psychologists who, like Titchener, followed Wundt in advocating the experimental 
method disparaged the kind of introspective method on which the discipline of 
psychology had been built: E.W. Scripture (1864-1945) naming it, as mentioned, as 
mere “armchair psychology” (Klein, 1942, p. 226).  On reflecting on the progress that 
had taken place from the previous formulations of introspection, Titchener stated, 
“What we knew about introspection, twenty years ago, is very fairly summed up in 
such a book as Sully's Human Mind. To-day, if we are still far from agreement and 
from perfect comprehension, we have at least progressed beyond the stage of 
generalities to that of monographic detail” (1912a, p. 428).  Described by Boring 
(1929) as “pure” introspection, Titchener’s experimental introspection was a new 
method for what was termed the 'New Psychology' in the US.  Indeed, as Heidbreder 
(1933) argued, it was, “one of the means by which American psychology made the 
transition from mental philosophy to science, learning to rely less on speculation and 
more on observation, to be less preoccupied with values, ethical and otherwise, and to 
pay more attention to facts, as facts” (p. 148).   
Although Wundt had used introspective experimentalism in a limited way alongside 
the recording of physiological measurements, he viewed it as having a somewhat 
limited role (Green, 2010).  Titchener was to give it a more prominent role in 
experimentation and, in fact, understood it as being of more value than physiological 
measures.  Further, in comparison to Wundt, Titchener, in theory at least, suggested 
that a far wider range of psychological elements could be open to analysis through the 
use of introspection.  As well as the study of the perception and the senses of sight, 
hearing, taste, smell and touch, he argued for its use for the more complex mental 
elements of emotion, memory and language.  He was not alone in this.  Oswald Külpe 
                                                          
32 As Boring (1929) states, one of the purposes of Titchener's work was to distance himself from the Cornell 
philosophers and, according to Boring, he succeeded in doing so. 
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(1862-1915) and Karl Bühler (1879-1963) of the German Würzberg School, were 
concurrently carrying out a program of 'systematic experimental introspection' and 
although Titchener to some extent was really quite isolated in terms of the US 
psychological landscape, his own perceived authority as the upholder of a proper 
experimental program was supported via the work done on the continent. 
Although, the ‘experimental method'33  as it was called, was quickly discarded in the 
rush to embrace behaviourism in the US both prior to and after Titchener's death,  the 
work that it produced during the thirty five years or so in which it was part of the 
landscape of psychological research cannot easily be ignored.  As Danziger (1990) 
describes, this period was significant because it, ‘revealed many of the problems 
inherent in the Wundtian synthesis of rigorous experimentation and mentalistic 
objects’ (p. 42).  For a different reason, Flügel (1933/1964) also argues that this period 
of psychology was a significant one.  He states, “That the method is...not sterile, is 
shown by the volume of useful work that has been done at the Cornell laboratory 
during the 35 years when Titchener was in charge there” (p. 195).  Although this period 
of structuralism in the US has often been dismissed as not being particularly important 
in terms of the advancement of psychological knowledge, it did leave a legacy.  
Titchener was not the only structural psychologist in the US.  Psychologists such as 
Margaret Washburn, Walter Pillsbury and  Madison Bentley, all prominent names in 
early twentieth century US psychology,  produced work influenced by Titchener's 
ethos.  This was a critical time in the history of psychology because, as Daston and 
Gallison (2007) describe, it was a scientific era in which the promotion of objectivity 
and the elimination of its opposite, subjectivity, became a leading initiative in science 
generally, as Green (2010) discusses in relation to Titchener’s work.  Titchener and 
his fellow experimentalists had to make a strong case as to the ability of 
introspectionists to be detached enough from the object of their introspection in order 
for their data to be obtained objectively (Green, 2010).  Nevertheless, Titchener 
continued to use the term ‘subjective’ to refer to his method, in the sense that it used 
the internal thoughts and experiences of individuals as data.  He attempted, however, 
                                                          
33 In 1904 Titchener, who was not a member of the APA, set up an informal group of 'experimental psychologists' – 




to make sure that the results were as standardised as possible and to eliminate the 
idiosyncratic results which had previously been obtained through the introspective 
method of  ‘armchair psychology’.  Therefore, although Green struggles to find much 
evidence of Titchener directly referring to his method as 'objective', it is clear that 
objectivity was a goal which the structuralists were aiming for.  Washburn (1922), for 
example, in defending the method against attacks from behaviourism, presented a 
paper at the 1921 meeting of the APA called Introspection as an Objective Method.  
She argued that, “Introspection appears thus to give results as trustworthy as those 
accepted in other descriptive sciences, which themselves, indeed, often rely on 
introspective evidence” (p. 14).  If introspection was to survive in psychology, an 
argument had to be made for it, paradoxically, as an objective, rather than subjective, 
examination of subjective experience. 
In showing how Titchener attempted to make introspective data objective the 
following section will describe the way in which Titchener standardised introspection 
so that it was not subject to the idiosyncrasies of the thought of the individual 
experimenter.  The rest of the chapter will go on to describe experiments on emotion 
and the particular difficulties associated with its study and examine the extent to which 
systematic experimental introspection achieved a consensus of understanding of 
emotion in psychology. 
 
5.2 Introspection as an experimental method  
'Conduct of an Experiment – A psychological experiment consists of an 
introspection or series of introspections made under standard conditions.' 
(Titchener, 1901, p. xiii) 
 
This section presents Titchener’s view of introspection as a scientific method, designed 
to study the mental elements and to produce ever more precise data on what these 
might consist of.  Its purpose is to show how he attempted to regulate the method in 
order to control the kinds of data that were produced by it and to create a process which 
would provide verifiable, replicable and objective accounts of subjective experiences.  
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Titchener's books, in particular, Experimental Psychology: A Manual of Laboratory 
Practice34 35, set out in a great amount of detail the scientific methods by which 
psychology was to be conducted.  He felt that if it could be shown how psychological 
work could be carried out scientifically then psychology itself may be accepted as a 
science alongside physics and biology.  It is perhaps surprising, therefore, that at the 
heart of Titchener's psychology was the method of introspection, given the arguments 
put forward by Comte and continued by others regarding the efficacy of that approach.  
However for Titchener, like the advocates of introspection discussed in Chapter Three, 
the subject matter of psychology: consciousness, experience and the elements of the 
mind, meant that introspection was an inevitable part of any psychological 
investigation.  “Psychology”, he stated, “may be defined as the science of mental 
processes...a mental process is any process, falling within the range of our experience, 
in the origination and continuance of  which we ourselves are necessarily concerned” 
(Titchener, 1896, p. 5).  Indeed, Titchener, went further.  He believed, like Spencer, 
that introspection was indispensable to science, given that all scientific observation 
was conducted using the mind of the scientist as a tool of investigation.  Psychology, 
he argued, was simply an extension of the other sciences in that, “the subject matter of 
all the sciences is the world of human experience” (1910, p. 24).  Physics, he said, 
takes the point of view of experience as “independent of the experiencing individual”, 
psychology, on the other hand, from the point of view of the experiencing individual.  
Psychology, therefore, did not stop at studying the effect of the environment but 
studied the human mental processes, of sight and language, for example, through 
which the environment was mediated and explained.   
The aim of psychology was to ascertain of what elements, simple and complex, the 
mind was constructed and of how these were connected to the nervous system36.  As 
Titchener argued, “The first object of the psychologist, therefore, is to ascertain the 
                                                          
34 This was published in four parts,  Qualitative Experiments (student's manual); Qualitative Experiments 
(instructor’s manual); Quantitative Experiments (student's manual) and Quantitative Experiments (instructor's 
manual) 
35 Boring (1950, p. 413) states with regard to these “Even now, half a century later it is hard to name a more erudite 
set of volumes or single book in English, in psychology, by a single author” 
36 Titchener argued for psycho-physical parallelism – that is that the body and mind functioned separately, rather 
than the mind being dependent on the body, and that processes in one accompanied processes in the other 
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nature and number of the mental elements.  He takes up mental experience, bit by bit, 
dividing and subdividing, until the division can go no further.  When that point is 
reached he has found a conscious element” (1896, p. 13) and that, 
The primary aim of the experimental psychologist has been to analyse the 
structure of mind; to ravel out the elemental processes from the tangle of 
consciousness, or (if we may change the metaphor) to isolate the constituents 
in the given conscious formation. His task is a vivisection, but a vivisection 
which will yield structural, not functional, results. (1898, p. 451) 
 
While other methods were useful in producing particular kinds of data about human 
behaviour, introspection was given the place as the principal method of this structural 
school of psychology as no other method enabled psychologists to get at experience 
and, therefore, the elements of mind in such a direct manner.  This direct observation 
needed to be strictly controlled and taught, however if it was to produce the kinds of 
information that the structuralists saw as valuable.  Introspection, therefore, as a 
method, was to be as subject to strict controls as the methods of observation in physics 
and biology were.  The following points, gleaned from Titchener's textbooks, while  
not covering entirely the detailed specification of the method, gives a sense of the 
rigorousness of the structuralists’ introspective method. 
Titchener (1910) was clear that there were two parts to experimental introspection, 
both of which had to be conducted correctly if the introspection was to be reliable.  
First, the particular psychological phenomena under investigation must be attended to 
and secondly, a verbal record of the phenomena was to be made and recorded.  The 
first part was to focus on the immediate experience; at what was happening in that 
moment in which the experiment was taking place, without reference to past 
experiences or feelings.  The descriptions were to entail only the psychological 
processes without reference to the object being observed.  There was always the 
temptation to fall into the bad habit of, what Titchener termed, “stimulus error”; the 
mistake of describing the object or stimulus present rather than the internal perception 
of the object.  In everyday life, reference was often made to objects when discussing 
experiences.  For example, someone might say, “The path is rough”, rather than 
describing his or her own experience of walking on the path such as “I feel a sensation 
of roughness”.  For scientific psychology, however, this way of describing the 
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experience was not correct.  Titchener (1910, p. 218) stated that “for one very 
dangerous source of error, in experiments upon the comparison of supraliminal sense-
distances, is that the observer tends to judge, not in terms of sensation, but in terms of 
stimulus”.  English (1921), in presenting the rules for introspection, specified the 
means by which to deal with the temptation to describe the stimulus: “Rule 4: 
'Avoiding the "stimulus error," make no attempt to estimate the stimulus; confine your 
report to your consciousness, to your experiences.  Nothing else is introspection; it is 
merely physical observation under difficulties” (p. 409). 
Titchener (1901), further, entered into practical considerations in a great amount of 
detail, specifying how experiments were to be conducted and the best conditions for 
good introspection.  Experiments should be conducted by an observer (O), the person 
doing the introspection, along with an experimenter (E), who will record the results 
and should be in charge of any physiological recordings37 38 that are to be made.  They 
were then to swap roles and repeat the experiment in exactly the same way.  He also 
identified the need for the observer to be in the right frame of mind: not fatigued or in 
a negative mood.  The observer, as the instrument through which experience was to be 
analysed and recorded was, like the instruments which measured physiological 
response, to be as far as was possible in a fit state to make accurate and complete 
statements: “the rule of psychological work”, Titchener (1899a, p. 35) believed, was, 
“Live impartially, attentively, comfortably, freshly, the part of your mental life which 
you wish to understand.  As soon as it is past, call it back and describe it.”  According 
with the purposes of structuralist psychology, the elements of the mind were to be 
expressed in increasing detail.  “Analysis”, he maintained, needed to be tested by 
asking, “Has it gone as far as it can go?  And: Has it taken account of all the elements 
which are contained in the experience?  To answer the first question the analysis must 
be repeated” (1896, p. 14).  Analyses must also be compared and tested against those 
                                                          
37Following Wundt's example, both qualitative and quantitative work was to be done.  The former was introspective 
analysis, the latter, measurement of physiological response.  Titchener, however, stresses that qualitative is in no 
way inferior or less accurate than quantitative but each produced different but equally useful kinds of data. For 
qualitative work he says, 'What the distinction implies is rather this: that the student's attention is directed not to the 
'How much?', or the 'How well?' of mental function, but to the 'How?' of mental structure.' (1901, p.xxi) 
38Introspective analysis was termed the 'method of impression, physiological methods as 'methods of expression'. 
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of other observers to ensure that it had gone as far as it can go.  Again English (1921) 
was also clear on this as a rule, 
Our first rule, therefore, is: As far as possible, describe the constituent features 
of the experience in terms that resist further analysis. Describe in terms of part-
processes which cannot be thought of as being themselves made up of smaller 
or simpler part-processes, or of part-processes found in other contexts.  (p. 406) 
 
This kind of analysis did not necessarily come naturally to those new to the method. 
The key, therefore, to making sure that the method was conducted correctly was to 
have a long period of training for students of psychology, during which they could 
hone their skills.  Titchener placed a great deal of emphasis on training of observers as 
a means to ensure proper introspective experiments in psychology.  The strict 
adherence to particular practices in psychological experimentation was argued for in 
all of his textbooks but these were mainly laid out in his Experimental Psychology, 
which was to be used as a reference for the instruction of students learning the method.  
In the introduction to the instructor’s volume of the qualitative part of this work he 
introduces the section as follows,  
This Course aims at two things: first, and more especially, to teach the student 
to psychologise and secondly to acquaint him with the most reliable methods 
and most securely established results of experimental psychology. Information 
concerning methods and results can be obtained, without much trouble, from 
the text-books. But introspection cannot be learned from books. If one is a born 
psychologist, it may be learned from the experience of ordinary life; and 
learned the more quickly, if this experience is supplemented by reading and by 
listening to lectures. As a general rule, however, and to the average student, an 
understanding of the introspective method either comes by way of the 
laboratory or does not come at all. (1901, p. xix) 
 
Instructors were to assess students as to the possession of psychological qualities 
which predisposed them to introspection and laboratory work.  Some students were 
more likely to be suited to psychological work because they were by nature “objective” 
minded.  Others, those whose disposition was to be “subjective” could be trained to be 
objective,  
Most natures are sufficiently objective to afford a foothold to training; and for 
the student who is willing to see the matter through, training will accomplish 
wonders. Set a man to work for a year: hold him strictly to the work, insist that 
he be thorough: show him his faults unflinchingly, in all their glaringness; at 
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the same time, work with him, sympathetically, as ready to encourage as to 
blame: fit your praise and blame alike to his character and disposition, and, 
though you have not changed his nature, you will have wrought a very 
considerable change in his methods and attitudes. (1901, p. xxvii) 
 
In any case, practice was the key to producing correct introspective accounts.  With 
sufficient practice, students could provide reports which were similar in nature to 
trained introspectionists.  One of the tests of the efficacy of experiments and of 
introspection was the production of structured and replicable accounts of 
psychological phenomena,  
This experiment shows, in a striking way, the effects of practice. The report of 
a wholly unpractised observer is a mere chaos. With attention, the uniformity 
of the phenomena soon becomes apparent; and presently the observers who at 
first gave radically different accounts of the after-image will reach agreement 
upon all essential points. (1901, p. 48) 
 
Indeed, replicability was a condition of valid scientific observation and for Titchener 
was the key to dispelling the criticisms that had been aimed at introspection by its 
opponents that it produced idiosyncratic, rather than consistent results between 
theorists.  One way of doing so, was to tightly control the conditions under which the 
introspection was conducted in order that another psychologist could easily repeat the 
experiment: “Experimental psychology insists that the psychological method of 
introspection shall be employed under 'experimental' conditions; that is, under 
conditions which reduce the possibility of mistakes to a minimum, and which enable 
one enquirer to test or check the work of another by exactly repeating it for himself” 
(1901, p. 19).  Scientific investigation required that the same results be obtained over 
and over again, something which had not happened with the use of introspection up to 
this point.  Titchener, therefore, set out to show that introspection could be an objective 
method which could show something consistent about the process of the normally 
functioning human mind.  
Although impartiality was a key to proper introspection, Titchener's introspective 
analyses of the mind did not begin from first principles but were to be structured 
according to particular attributes, describing the mental elements in the way set out by 
Wundt.  Titchener's analysis began from the point of view that there were three primary 
elements:  sensation, image and affection, 
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Consciousness, instead of being a shapeless tangle and maze of various 
intertwined and interwoven processes – as it appeared to us to be when we 
started out on out enquiry – has proved capable of arrangement and 
simplification.  You may, it is true, raise the objections that our table of 
contents is, perhaps, not inclusive of every known mental state.  Where, you 
may ask, is emotion...? Well, you must take my word for it, that...other states 
of mind or mental experiences can be derived from these three simple states39    
mixed in different proportions. (Titchener, 1895, p. 430)  
 
These elements were viewed as being the smallest parts to which consciousness could 
be reduced, and could not be “split up, by the most persistent introspection under the 
strictest conditions, into any simpler processes” (1899a, p. 37).  Each predominated in 
different mental states:  sensations were characteristic of perceptions and occurred in 
sight and sound, taste and smell; images were the characteristic elements of ideas and 
occurred if an object was not actually present as in a memory; affections were the main 
elements which made up feeling and emotion.  Sensations and images had four 
attributes: quality, intensity, duration and clearness, but affection had the first three 
only.  Observers were to describe the effects of different stimuli in relation to these 
attributes.  Different taste experiences, for example, might be distinguished and 
described, 
In many experiments O will report a pressure, temperature (warm or cold) or 
pain (stabbing, biting, burning) sensation. These concomitant sensations will 
be characterised somewhat as follows, (i) Sour is at first astringent; then, as it 
becomes stronger, burning; finally, purely painful. (2) Salt is attended by a 
weak burning, not rising to positive pain. (3) Sweet brings with it the 
perception of smoothness and softness. (Titchener, 1901, p. 102) 
 
When feeling or emotion was being studied, the qualities of pleasantness of 
unpleasantness were to characterise the accounts, as will be described below.  
Introspective descriptions were directed to focus on these attributes when particular 
stimuli were presented in order that they were analysed in increasing detail.  
This systematic experimental introspection, was designed, not only to present 
psychology as scientific but also to achieve consensus in the understandings of mental 
                                                          
39 In this early article Titchener states that the three basic elements are 'ideas, feelings and efforts' (1895, p.430).  
However, in most of this work he describes these as being sensations, images and affections.  Therefore it is the 
latter view that is discussed in this here.  
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elements and processes between psychologists.  If the method by which these were 
studied could be controlled and systematised, then it would ensure the elimination of 
any confounding variables which might cause results to conflict with each other.  This 
would remove the concern that introspection was not capable of producing consistent 
results.  For emotion, as described in Chapter Three, this was particularly salient, given 
the discrepancies between the accounts of theorists that had been presented and the 
difficulties of reconciling these given the subjective nature of feeling.  The following 
sections will examine the extent to which the standardisation of introspection managed 
to achieve consistency in the descriptions of emotion amongst structuralist 
psychologists. 
 
5.3 The experimental observation of emotion 
The reason, then, that our descriptive psychology of emotion is schematic, 
rather than analytical is, simply, that experimental psychology has so far 
neither found the time, nor the courage to take emotion into the laboratory.  
(Titchener, 1910, p. 473) 
 
The experimental introspective study of emotion at this time in the US and Britain is 
characterised more by discussions as to its dearth than it is about particular 
experiments, methods or results.  Only a few experimental treatments of feeling and 
emotion appeared in The American Journal of Psychology, The British Journal of 
Psychology, The Psychological Review and The Psychological Bulletin between 1895 
and 1930 and most of these attempted mainly to examine the use of the method in 
relation to the study.  Some of these, Hayes (1906), Titchener (1908) and Shepherd 
(1906), for example, relate to a repudiation of Wundt's tri-dimensional theory of 
feeling as will be discussed in the final section of this chapter.  From Cornell, 
Nakashima (1909a; 1909b) published a couple of papers on the affective processes and 
in Oxford, Adolf Wohlgemuth (1919) addressed the lack of consensus in emotion by 
conducting a systematic experimental study of pleasure and unpleasure.  Throughout 
the twenties, P. T. Young (1921; 1927; 1930) and J. P. Nafe (1924) published four 
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papers between them addressing the issues of the study of affective elements using 
experimental introspection.  Verwoerd (1926) and Conklin and Dimmick (1925) were 
the only psychologists to discuss how emotion, as opposed to its elements, could be 
successfully induced in the laboratory and Flügel (1919) had a paper published which 
described an attempt to take emotion out of the lab and to study it introspectively in 
situ.  These papers were among the few that constituted the non-physiological 
experimental literature at that time.  However, textbooks discussed the James-Lange 
and other theories ad nauseum.  As Titchener (1901), himself, stated   
Corresponding to this dearth of settled facts, we have a hypertrophy of theory 
and a large controversial literature.  Partly because the theories are intrinsically 
interesting, and partly because of the sheer bulk of the literature, the 
fundamental issues of affective psychology are apt to be left out of sight. It is 
easier and more exciting to criticise so-and-so's theory of pleasure-pain, than 
to face the problem of the affective qualities for oneself ; and, indeed, theory 
has and, indeed, theory has had so wide a range that one can hardly turn in any 
direction without being confronted by some so-and-so's speculations. (p. 149) 
 
Titchener's own discussion of the experimentation on emotion seems to be more of a 
promise of things to come, rather than actual descriptions of particular experiments or 
results.  The number of experiments on feeling and emotion mentioned in his work 
was greatly limited in comparison to the far greater discussion of experiments on 
sensation.  In fact, most of the chapters on emotion were of a theoretical, rather than 
experimental nature, even in Experimental Psychology, the ultimate guide to the use 
of the experimental method in psychology.  The ease which was found in 
experimenting on the sensations or perception, for example, did not apply to the most 
intangible elements such as language, memory and emotion.  The isolation of the 
former through the use of external stimuli seemed to be relatively straightforward.  For 
example, experiments on sensations included the comparison of response to different 
colours or the experience of tasting a sweet drink and the effects of adding more sugar 
to the drink.  It was far more challenging to elicit emotions such as anger, fear or joy 
in the lab and to then alter the stimuli in order to elicit other versions of these. 
The experimental accounts of emotion by the structuralists tended not to focus directly 
on descriptions of particular emotions themselves anyway, but on the simpler elements 
which made them up – that is, the connected affective qualities which were produced 
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in response to external stimuli.  The rare accounts of experiments on feeling and 
emotion that were created at the time tended to centre around the two aspects of 
affection which Titchener would admit, those of pleasure and unpleasure:  “Feeling is 
a mixture of perception and affection, in which the affection preponderates...Now there 
are only two qualities of affection: pleasantness and unpleasantness” (Titchener, 1896, 
p. 218).  Each emotion fell somewhere on a continuum with these at either end.  
Experiments were designed to test which of these was invoked by particular stimuli, 
for example, 
Method – suppose that the subject is in position, as described in § 33 (2).  After 
a short time has elapsed, he is informed, say, that he may smoke.  The pleasure 
of the unexpected news shows itself in the records of pulse, breathing and 
volume; and if the dynamometer be squeezed while the cigar is being cut and 
lighted, it also gives evidence of the affective processes.  After another brief 
interval, the cigar is flicked out of the subject's mouth by the assistant, 
apparently as a practical joke.  The resultant unpleasantness is clearly marked 
upon  the instruments - The manifestations of the emotions of pleased surprise 
and resentment are here identical with those of simple pleasantness and 
unpleasantness. (Titchener, 1896, p. 224) 
 
Although, in theory, Titchener argued that the study of emotion in the lab was palpable, 
he did not, however, publish any data on emotion in his books or in papers.  Beebe-
Center (1951), argues that the reason that Titchener did not develop a program of the 
study of emotion was because he was unable to, since the truly emotional aspect of 
emotion was meaning, and Titchener (1912b) consistently argued that science does not 
deal with meanings.  In allowing the observer to describe their subjective experiences 
fully, Conklin and Dimmick (1925) had found in their study of fear that the unpleasant 
feeling of the emotion, was produced through the meaning that the stimulus had for 
the observer.  They stated,  “It appears...that the presence of fear depends not upon any 
particular group of processes such as organic sensations, but rather upon some 
perceptual meaning of the object for O, a meaning which is carried by the particular 
sensations, images, or both, that are called out by the stimulus” (p.100) 
Given that Titchener argued that a focus on the stimuli during introspection was 
committing the ‘stimulus-error’, he would have dismissed the introspective reports that 
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Conklin and Dimmick had gathered.  For example, in response to touching wet 
macaroni while blindfolded, one observer’s report was as follows:  
That is a violent reaction. It feels awful. It makes me shiver and shake inside 
and my stomach feels 'all mixed up.' It is so ugly and awful. It is the most 
unpleasant feeling I have ever had. I can't control myself. I want to wipe it off 
my hand. I think it is a bunch of worms and I have always had a horror of 
worms. (1925, p. 98) 
 
Given that emotions were elicited by objects and events in the environment, it was 
often meaningless to merely report the subjective feelings without reference to why 
the particular stimulus had that effect.  However, this was not the only reason why 
Titchener's system prevented the study of emotion from flourishing.  There were, also, 
a number of practical difficulties to deal with and, as had been an issue in earlier 
introspective accounts, there was the difficulty of achieving consensus between the 
introspective reports of observers.  These will both be discussed below. 
 
5.3.1   Difficulties of studying emotion in the lab 
The acknowledged dearth of experimental work on emotion was viewed, in part, as 
being related to the complexity of emotion and the much greater difficulty of isolating 
particular elements of it.  Titchener, himself, had described the emotion of anger, for 
example, as follows,  
The emotion of anger seems, at first sight, to be a single experience; it has a 
single name.  Really, it is highly complex.  It contains e.g., the idea of the 
person with whom one is angry; the idea of the act of his, at which one is 
displeased; the idea of a retaliatory action on one's own part; a mass of bodily 
sensations, attending the flushing of one's face, the tendency to clench the fist, 
the bracing of the whole muscular system – one 'feels stronger' when angry.  It 
begins with a feeling of displeasure, of pained surprise or wounded pride; but 
this soon gives way to the pleasantness of anger itself...These processes...all 
take part, crossing or recrossing, shifting and recombining, in the emotion. 
(1896, p. 13) 
 
So as much as he believed that introspective analysis could, and had, shown the mind 
to be capable of being broken down into increasingly smaller constituent elements and 
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processes, the practicality of separating these was another matter altogether.  The 
elements of ideas, sensations and affections all appeared to conflate in this one mental 
and physical state to produce an experience from which these seemed almost 
impossible to disentangle.  It also took a great deal of time and training for 
experimenters to be proficient enough in the method to study emotion and even then 
it necessarily involved more of an exploration, than an experiment.  Titchener did not 
include descriptions of methods to investigate emotion in Experimental Psychology 
because the subject was viewed as being one of the most complex processes of the 
mind.  It was only when students had become proficient in introspection of the simpler 
processes they would be ready to move on to the study of these,   
Thus, experiments upon the more complex processes or consciousnesses 
(memory, imagination, reasoning, emotion and the like) are, for the most part, 
ruled out of a Manual by the time limit; they require systematic work, preceded 
by a term of practice, and so take on the form of investigations rather than of 
single experiments. (Titchener, 1901, p. xxxiii) 
 
Further, for many theorists who opposed Titchener's work, there was a belief that it 
was not simply the complexity of emotion that caused the dearth in accounts of 
emotion to be produced in a laboratory setting but that it was the method itself.  
Titchener did not shy away from the criticisms but tackled them head on.  He stated, 
“Two reasons are usually given for the deficiency: first, that it is impossible to bring 
emotion into the laboratory; the emotions there set up are artificial, washed-out, insipid 
affairs; and secondly that we have no method for the study of emotion, since attention 
to affection defeats its own object” (Titchener, 1910, p. 472).  There were certainly 
difficulties of invoking genuine emotional feeling in the laboratory: the element of 
surprise shown in the cigar experiment describes the sort of methods that would be 
required.  If the observer was to study the emotion introspectively, they would need to 
be prepared for what was about to come in order to be in the correct state of mind to 
analyse the effects.  Furthermore, the detachment that was required to study emotions 
introspectively, particularly in the controlled manner demanded by the standardised 
form of introspection could interfere with the actual feeling.  To rationally consider 
one’s own emotion during a fit of anger, seemed somewhat incongruous.  However, 
for Titchener these objections held no water, “Neither reason”, he argued, “is 
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valid....the laboratory offers the very great advantage of isolation; we can get the 
emotion pure, and without interruption from extraneous processes” (Titchener, 1910, 
p. 472).  His firm belief in the method led to the rejection of these very valid reasons 
why the place to study emotion might not be the laboratory. 
However, although Titchener did not believe objections aimed at the study of emotion 
invalidated the use of experimental introspection, he did recognise that difficulties 
needed to be addressed.  He acknowledged the paradox of experiencing emotion and 
providing a rational and detached account while being caught up in the feeling.  For 
emotion, Titchener argued, it was especially important to allow the feeling to run its 
course before it was reflected on because of the interference from thoughts that could 
interrupt the flow,    
Suppose, again, that you are observing a feeling or an emotion: a feeling of 
disappointment or annoyance, an emotion of anger or chagrin.  Experimental 
control is still possible; situations may be arranged, in the psychological 
laboratory, such that these feelings may be repeated, isolated and varied.  But 
your observation of them interferes, even more seriously than before, with the 
course of consciousness.  Cool consideration of an emotion is fatal to its very 
existence; your anger disappears, your disappointment evaporates, as you 
examine it.  To overcome this difficulty of the introspective method, students 
of psychology are usually recommended to delay observation until the process 
to be described has run its course, and then to call back and describe it from 
memory. Introspection thus becomes retrospection; introspective examination 
becomes post mortem examination. (1910, p. 22)  
 
This concurred with what had been argued by several philosophers and psychologists 
throughout the nineteenth century, including Mill (1891) and James (1890a): that 
introspection was always really 'retrospection' because descriptions came from a 
memory of the events, even if that memory was seconds old.  Observers had only to 
allow the emotion to subside before attempting to describe it.  That is, the period 
between the psychological event and the description had to be a bit longer. 
Secondly, he also accepted that the communication of feeling was an issue.  The 
descriptions of emotion could never allow another theorist to experience the feeling of 




The difficulty of describing affection lies in the fact that spoken language 
...communicates ideas and ideas only.  If I say, 'I am very angry', you know 
that I am angry, but you do not feel my anger. A verbal description of affection 
is therefore always a description at second-hand. (Titchener, 1896, p. 101)  
 
This had always been a problem for introspectionists, as was described in the section 
on James.  It was not only an issue for the study of emotion but also in all areas of 
psychology, because introspective accounts presented individual phenomenological 
descriptions, and it was important that these descriptions could be replicated.  The 
reliance on the words of different individuals to express what they felt meant that it 
was difficult to know if people had different experiences or if they were using different 
words to describe the same experience.  The best way it seemed to some 
introspectionists to achieve consensus between observers was to find a common 
language.  This practice was described by Washburn (1922), “The precaution adopted 
by those who use the introspective method consists in giving the observers a careful 
preliminary drill in the use of terms” (p. 103).  This, of course, left introspective 
accounts open to the accusation of being carefully constructed.  Washburn, however, 
defends this practice as not being any different from that used in the physical sciences, 
Take, for example, the terminology used in reporting the very difficult 
observations on the structure of protoplasm; or such astronomical observations 
as those on double stars, needing years of practice; take the observations of 
planetary markings, or, in chemistry, the use of the Wheatstone bridge, which 
requires liminal discriminations of noise. These observations are wholly 
analogous to certain types of introspective work, where an actual external 
stimulus is given, but where the reactions to that stimulus are complicated and 
may vary greatly according to the degree in which the stimulus is reacted to in 
its details. (p. 103) 
 
Although Washburn makes an interesting point, as will be described below in the work 
of Nafe (1924) below, the cost of using common terms was that understandings of 
emotion were accused of being mere artefacts of the laboratory and of moving away 
from the ways in which they might be described in ordinary life.   
Titchener, also, conceded that because the observer was the conduit through which the 
emotion was to be known, his or her mood could affect the outcome of the experiment, 
“The way in which we receive impressions must naturally vary as our 'mood' varies” 
he stated.  If we are unusually cheerful, all the stimuli of the series will tend to be 
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pleasant...The subject's mood must be carefully observed and noted by the assistant 
before the experimental series is begun.” (1896, p. 104).  In relation to one experiment, 
he stressed the importance of the correct mood of the observer as they undertake some 
experiments,  
In later affective work, we shall see reason to be very careful that O's mood, at 
the beginning of the experiment, is indifferent.  Here indifference is not 
required. For even if O be in a mood to dislike everything, he will still dislike 
some things less than others; and if he does that, his judgments are valid for 
our purpose. Of course, a mood of steady indifference is favourable to the 
mechanising of the whole procedure. (1901, p. 154) 
 
As the 'machine' which was employed to observe the emotion, the observer, like the 
galvanometer and the kymograph, had often to be calibrated to a neutral or indifferent, 
position so that he or she did not influence the account.  This endeavour to observe 
emotion from the ‘objective’ position of an indifferent mood is an interesting position 
to take.  It shows just how important that requirement of science was that it was 
necessary for introspectors to assume a detached and neutral position even on 
something as physically and mentally involved as experiencing an emotion. 
It is no wonder, perhaps, that given the difficulties which had to be addressed in order 
that feeling and emotion be studied in a manner which was convincingly scientific, a 
program of investigation into emotion at Cornell never really got underway.  So, if the 
behaviourist era was later to be described as the “Dark Ages” of emotions theorising 
in psychology (Gendron & Barrett, 2009, p. 317), the period prior to it could be 
described as the “Dark Ages” of experimentation in that field.  Although theories were 
advanced during this time, it seems that this standardised form of introspection 
inhibited the exploration of emotion in a way in which the less straightened version 
did not.  In admitting that there was indeed a problem with the scientific study of 
emotion in psychology, Titchener (1901, p. 150) was still hopeful of solving the 
problem.  He argued that this could be achieved, first, by more of a reliance on physical 
correlates of emotion: “we must look (i) to physiological advance...and to increased 
knowledge of the physiological basis of our curve variations”.  In doing so, he 
contradicted his own view, often expressed, that physiological measurements had only 
a secondary role in the understanding of emotion.  Secondly, he argued that the way 
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forward was through the, “gradual emergence of an introspective consensus. This last 
is not entirely hopeless, seeing that introspection is constantly sharpening and refining, 
under the influence of the experimental method at large” (p. 150).  Introspective 
consensus, however, as will be described in the following section, did not materialise 
as shown by the few papers that were published at the time which addressed the issue 
using a structuralist approach 
 
5.3.2 Lack of consensus between accounts of emotion 
Although there was more control over the way in which introspection was conducted 
during this period of psychology, it appeared that this did not solve the problem of 
individual theorists arriving at different conclusions as regards emotion and feeling.  
There was a great deal of discussion still in the literature as to the continued problem 
of the differences which were apparent when different people introspectively observed 
what was expected to be the same experience.  This section will describe the continued 
inability to achieve consensus and the attempts that were made to do so.  It will show 
that if consensus of introspective accounts was to be achieved it was only through 
placing tight controls on the experience and descriptions of the observer.  This resulted, 
however, in descriptions of emotion becoming an artefact of the laboratory. 
This time in the psychological study of emotion was characterised by statements on 
the lack of consensus.  Even the two most prominent experimentalists, Wundt and 
Titchener, could not agree on the qualities associated with the affective elements, 
causing not only one of the biggest controversies of the time in psychology but also in 
the history of the psychology of feeling and emotion.  Having early on argued, like 
Titchener, that there was only one affective dimension: that of pleasure-unpleasure, 
Wundt (1896) changed his mind, and, in Grundriss der Psychologie, described a tri-
dimensional theory of feeling.  He argued that the pleasure-unpleasure dimension was 
not adequate to capture the variety inherent in the experience of feeling but that the 
affections were also be characterised by two other dimensions, those of tension-
relaxation and excitement-inhibition.  This constituted a fundamental shift from the 
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views of other experimentalists, including Titchener and resulted in a flurry of papers 
following Wundt's publishing of his theory 40 .  Opponents, with Titchener at the 
forefront, not only published theoretical accounts of why this could not be the case but 
also presented both introspective and physiological evidence as a means to back up 
their conclusions.  Titchener replicated Wundt's experiments during which, Wundt 
claimed, the other dimensions became especially evident.  He found that, for him, they 
did not; “I have, for myself, repeated the test often and again, and have varied it in half 
a dozen ways:...I get the same meagre affective results” (Titchener, 1908, p. 227).  That 
Wundt’s findings were not replicable meant that they could, therefore, be dismissed as 
incorrect by the US structuralists. 
Similar to the disagreement described in Chapter Three between James and Worcester 
as to whose introspective account was correct, it took a personal turn.  The argument 
that Titchener made for the difference in findings was that Wundt’s subjective 
experience coloured his view of what he was observing, and so he came to an 
idiosyncratic, rather than a general conclusion about emotion, 
First of all, then, how does Wundt arrive at his three affective dimensions? 
How does he prove that there are three, and that these three are pleasantness-
unpleasantness, excitement-inhibition, and tension-relaxation? Well! His main 
reliance is on his own introspection. Wundt is a man of keen sensibility. He 
writes of feeling con amore: he is fond of quoting Goethe's Farbenlehre; 
feeling has played a larger and larger part in his psychological system as time 
went on. (1908, p. 216) 
 
Underlying this statement was the accusation of a lack of sufficient objectivity in 
Wundt’s observations of feeling.  Further, Wundt had suggested that Titchener did not 
produce the same introspective accounts because his senses were dulled and Titchener 
returned this accusation:  “If, now, Wundt retorts, that in this and like instances we are 
feeling-deaf and feeling-blind, may we not suggest, on our side, that he is organically 
anaesthetic?  The lack of interest that Wundt shows in the organic sensations has 
always been a source of wonderment to me” (p. 227).  Titchener also argued that 
Wundt had not carried out the introspective method adequately and derived false 
                                                          
40 For example, Stevens (1903); Hayes (1906); Titchener (1899b; 1908) and Foster & Roese (1916). 
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conclusions, as a result: “Wundt can, of course, do no more than take language as he 
finds it.  But I think that his actual choice of words bears witness to a conflict, in his 
thought, between two purposes: the purpose of transcribing his introspections and the 
purpose of maintaining the typical affective movement between opposites” (p. 221) 
The disagreements over these different conclusions which had been reached via 
introspection, therefore, tended to focus on arguments about the dispositions or 
introspective abilities of the proponents.  However, at the heart of the disagreement 
was something which was fundamental to the difficulties associated with the study of 
emotion.  Wundt's theory represented the idea that feelings were far more complex 
than the pleasant-unpleasant dimension allowed for.  It indicated that the experiences 
of feeling and emotion were far more nuanced and that emotions, even different 
instances of emotion, were singular and idiosyncratic,  
The theoretical basis...seems to be the thought that, because every emotive 
attitude is ‘unique’, therefore the simplest characteristic processes of all 
emotions must be unique. Now the major premise in this argument is, in a 
certain sense, true: the feeling of moral obligation, the pride in the birth of your 
first baby, the satisfaction in a new dining-room carpet, your emotive 
experience under the Ninth Symphony, these are all 'unique' consciousnesses, 
each specifically different from all the rest, none reducible to any one of the 
others. (Titchener, 1901, p. 150) 
 
Titchener agreed with this to some extent.  He did not agree that more dimensions were 
required in order to explain the experiential differences between these feelings but 
rather argued that different sensations mixed with affections were enough to describe 
each experience.  What this disagreement showed, however, as disagreements around 
the introspective analysis of emotion had always done, was that the experience of 
emotion was as individual as it was universal, as personal as it was collective. 
While Wundt and Titchener were at loggerheads over introspective accounts of 
emotion, other papers that were produced during this time were also directly 
attempting to address this introspective lack of consensus.  Adolf Wohlgemuth41 
                                                          
41 Wohlgemuth's main contribution to psychology was in relation to the motion aftereffect (MAE), using introspection 
as the method through which to produce this work (Wade, Thomson & Morgan, 2014). 
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(1868-1942), a German/British psychologist tried to do so by using introspection to 
produce a systematic experimental analysis of pleasure and unpleasure, stating that, 
A great many theories as to the nature of the Feeling-elements have been 
advanced, yet the greatest possible divergence of opinion still obtains 
concerning this class of conscious processes.  To elucidate, then, by carefully 
conducted experiments, and, if possible to settle some of the hotly controverted 
questions in the psychology of Feeling were the ends for which this 
investigation was undertaken.  I also kept in view the possibility of ascertaining 
why it has happened that some of the most careful experimenters and observers 
have arrived at absolutely contradictory results.  (1919, p. 4) 
 
Wohlgemuth made the most comprehensive and systematic study of the affective 
elements associated with feeling and emotion in Britain and the US during the early 
nineteenth century during the years 1915-17.  Therefore, the only systematic account 
of introspective experimentation on feeling and emotion in Britain and the US during 
this period was produced, surprisingly, not at Cornell but at Oxford University and 
although his work on emotion is now little mentioned, his published monograph in 
The British Journal of Psychology in 1919 on the subject is a rare example of 
systematic experimental introspection on feeling and emotion in action.  Wohlgemuth 
had complete trust in the method of introspection: “If I experience a pleasure or a 
striving or a memory-image or anything else', he argued, 'I simply experience it: one 
cannot go beyond this.  To question the apodicticity of this is simply questioning my 
very esse” (p. 10).  He did, however, add the caveat that he had used only very well 
trained and experienced observers.  Indeed, he used some of the most prominent 
psychologists and philosophers of the time in Britain, including Carveth Read and J.C. 
Flügel.  
In this extensive study of the results of the presentation of a wide variety of stimuli, 
Wohlgemuth gave a limited amount of instruction to the observers, leaving it open for 
them to describe their experiences in their own words.  For example, one group was 
told “You will be presented with a number of stimuli, tactile, auditory, visual, 
gustatory, olfactory etc., and you are required to introspect closely, concentrating on 
the affective side, the feeling-tone of your experience.  Describe your experience as 
well as you can in words” (1919, p. 15).  The descriptions are quite loose and personal, 
with some focus on the quality of the experience but also on the feelings of the 
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observers.  The result is a descriptive and broad introspective analysis.  The research 
was ostensibly about induction of the dimensions of pleasure and unpleasure of the 
“feeling-elements”.  Many of the descriptions, however, discuss, also, the emotions 
aroused by the situation.  It is clear that when descriptions are produced in the lab they 
are surrounded by a gamut of different emotions which the structuralists often argued 
should be pushed to one side in order that the 'pure' introspection could take place.   
The following descriptions, indicating the difficulties of concentrating on the task at 
hand, was given in relation to the pinching of the hand with a set of forceps for three 
seconds.  The first, from observer X, is a somewhat detached account of the 
experience, 
First a light scraping touch, then a second contact, then a Sn42 of P. which was 
perceived as the effect of a pinch.  It was pretty distinctly localized at the lower 
outer margin of the left hand, around 2 ½ inches below the wrist.  It differed 
from a point st or prick by the apparent existence of an interval of skin between 
the points of contact.  Decidedly unpl, yet there was no impulse to withdraw 
the hand, all other cnns being masked by attn.  (p. 102) 
 
The second, from observer W, is a far more emotional account of the same procedure, 
Repeated instructions in the foreperiod but this did not prevent there being an 
emotion of fear in the background of C.  The Sn was at first indifferent and at 
the moment of first perceiving it.  I once more repeated the instructions with 
the thought corresponding to the words:  “Here it is, be careful and adopt the 
right attitude.”  The background of fear still persisted and there was besides 
considerable excitement and tension.  The Sn then changed its character and 
became definitely painful and unpl. The Unpls increased rapidly.  I had the 
thought that I must examine and try to analyse the Sn and I suddenly recognised 
a heat Sn...fear gradually became complicated with an element of anger, which 
seemed to seek a vague outlet in an atactic violent movement of the 
body...There was also a tendency to cry out.  This tendency seemed to be both 
an expression of the anger and the fear.  This period was followed by an attempt 
to control myself and to bring the attn once more to bear upon the quality of 
the Sn.  (p. 65) 
 
The experiments induce emotions, not only of anger and fear but also of disgust, 
irritation, surprise, wonder and excitement.  This introspective analysis appears to 
                                                          
42 Key to the shorthand used here -  Sn: sensation; P: pleasure; St: stimulus; Unpl: unpleasant; Attn: attention; C: 
consciousness; cnn: conation. 
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produce more complex and broad descriptions than Titchener would have allowed for 
in his striving to reduce feeling into its constituent elements and indicated that the 
observers experienced both the stimulus and the situation differently.  Again, if left to 
individuals, introspective accounts, did exhibit similarities but also described a great 
deal of difference in terms of the experience of feeling and emotion.  The descriptions 
of feelings and emotions did not fall into neat, identical descriptions from which 
psychologists could present universal laws. 
These differences could perhaps be ironed out, it was argued, if the experimental 
situation was even more tightly controlled.  John Paul Nafe (1888-1970), working 
under Titchener at Cornell University, attempted to address the lack of consensus in 
introspective accounts by addressing what he saw as the reason for it - the over 
stimulation of the observer.  The feelings induced during experiments were so 
overwhelming, he argued, that observation could not concurrently take place.  He 
stated, “We thought we found that most experimenters upon affection had made their 
observers feelers rather than observers of feeling.  They had tried, very naturally, to 
arouse strong feelings; and by this natural endeavour had, nevertheless, defeated their 
own object” (p. 508).  The issue with introspection of feeling or of emotion was that 
paradoxically the emotion was too often getting in the way of the observation and 
detached accounts that described the same kinds of qualities or elements were not 
possible.  To address this Nafe and his colleagues toned down the emotional tenor of 
the experimental situation,  
We decided to employ simple stimuli of moderate intensity, such as might be 
expected to set up affective qualities of moderate intensity, which the observer 
should then observe and describe as equably as he had been accustomed to 
observe and describe sensory qualities. Feeling must be aroused,- but feeling 
as existential process, not as referred emotion. (Nafe, 1924, p. 508) 
 
This is perhaps, what Titchener had described as ‘pure’ emotion.  An emotion which 
is untainted by emotionality.  Essentially the mental experience without the physical.  
What Nafe found, was a consensual describing of the experience of stimuli in quite 
similar ways.  He found observers, consistently, described the unpleasant stimuli as a 
“dull pressure”, the pleasant as a “bright pressure”.  However, when Young (1927) 
decided to test these findings by replicating the experiments using other observers, the 
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results were very different.  He argued that Nafe's consensual results were merely as a 
consequence of the training and indoctrination of the observers.  Observers had been 
exposed to Titchener’s (1920) touch pyramid in which the terms they used had been 
initially exhibited.  Young concluded, “It is my belief that...through the control of 
training one can demonstrate, with apparently equal validity, results which are 
logically incompatible” (p. 188).  The result of such a controlled approach was to 
achieve consensus but at the expense of destroying the real experience of emotion.   
This section has described three particular issues for structuralists’ understandings of 
emotion.  It has described how there continued to be a lack of consensus between 
introspective accounts despite the increased controls on the way in which these were 
conducted.  It has also shown that if a common language was used consensus could be 
found, however, this was meant that descriptions of emotion moved away from the 
ways in which they were commonly understood to being an artefact of the laboratory. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
As was shown in Chapter Three, accounts of emotion via introspection had always 
been highly idiosyncratic and individual.  The structuralists, however, had tried to 
manufacture consensual accounts by making their descriptions concrete, bounded and 
definable.  The strict training and controls that were put in place to produce results 
which could be compared would, Titchener had hoped, provide the kind of 
introspection in which consensus was possible.  Indeed, if these were directed enough, 
as has been shown in Nafe's (1924) experiment, they could result in the concurrence 
of observers’ accounts.  In comparison to the often diverse accounts produced 
previously, in some instances at least, this way of conducting introspection appeared 
to offer psychology with a scientific version which could systematically highlight the 
similarities, rather than the differences.   
Underlying this project was the idea that objectivity was possible.  Introspection could, 
if controlled enough, produce consistent and sufficiently detached accounts of 
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subjective experience on which scientific understanding could be built.  Perhaps for 
the study of the unemotional elements of the mind it could.  However, it was found, 
rather, that there was something peculiar to feeling and emotion which was always 
going to be difficult to capture scientifically.  Bentley (1924) described this elusive 
characteristic of the emotions in The Field of Psychology,  
They are never ‘blocked in’; they never are localized or ‘placed’ with respect 
to the qualities already described.  They have been likened to the haze upon the 
mountains, the mist spread throughout the valleys and the varnish or sizing 
upon the painting.  They ‘tone’ but they do not ‘inhabit’ experience. (p. 90) 
  
Psychologists, in attempting to make concrete and describable and consensual that 
which was ephemeral, intangible and idiosyncratic found that their descriptions simply 
became an artefact of the experimental process.  
Therefore, although the structuralists had attempted to control the subjective 
experiences produced during introspection about emotion, it was clear that it was still 
going to be extremely difficult to get these to tie in with each other without actually 
putting words in observers’ mouths.  The inability of systematic experimental 
introspection to produce consensual descriptions on which the understanding of 
emotion could be founded and progress, meant that as a scientific method its days were 
numbered.  Margaret Washburn argued, however, that these differences were not really 
an issue, merely that they reflected different experiences of theorists.  Reflecting in 
1917 on the Last quarter century of psychology she stated.   
Why should we not recognise that conflicting descriptions of the same 
experience, on the part of trained introspectors are each of equal value and 
authority; and simply mean that the experience in question really differs in 
different minds? Why not, instead of arguing that 'imageless thoughts'43, for 
instance, mean that their possessor does not know how to introspect, and that 
if he did he would be able to identify their sensation components, admit that 
real individual differences between minds may be the basis of these differences 
of opinion?  The differences of opinion would then, instead of delaying the 
progress of science serve as valuable scientific material.  (Washburn, 1917, p. 
55) 
 
                                                          




What Washburn argued was that differences of opinion reflected the sense that 
psychologists did not always experience emotions in exactly the same way, rather than 
these differences being an indicator that the method was not being carried out 
correctly.  This should not be viewed as a problem in psychology, rather as a truism 
and something which could be used to establish a more thorough account of emotion.   
The chapter which follows will discuss the criticisms aimed at the method of 
introspection in the early twentieth century and will present the defence of the method 
by those such as Washburn who argued that it was a necessary tool in the investigation 
of the human mind.  It will describe how, despite the criticisms aimed at it, it continued 
to be used to investigate the subjective experience of emotion towards the end of this 





CHAPTER 6   




The purpose of this chapter is to look at the reasons why the method of introspection 
came under particular scrutiny at the beginning of the twentieth century, and, despite 
the criticisms aimed at it, continued to be used by some psychologists to understand 
and to develop the idea of emotion as a subjective experience.  It describes how the 
debate over the retention of introspection centered around differences as to what the 
subject-matter of a scientific psychology should be – whether experience or behaviour. 
It seeks to reveal the scientific assumptions that were at the heart of the criticisms and 
to describe the defences that were put up for the need for introspection to be used to 
study the mind in a psychological science.  It shows that, despite the arguments against 
its scientific efficacy, introspection continued to be used in psychology to describe 
emotion as an experience, both implicity and explicitly.  
 
6.1 Introduction 
Titchener's efforts to drive forward a program of “systematic experimental 
introspection” at Cornell was set against a backdrop of debate as to the efficacy of the 
method.  Although the use of introspection had survived the criticism of Comte in the 
nineteenth century and had come to be widely accepted as a necessary part of 
psychological theorising (e.g. Bain, 1873; James, 1890a; Ward, 1883) there had been 
an underlying concern in psychology as to its effectiveness as a scientific method (e.g. 
Caldwell, 1899; Hall, 1897; Mellone, 1896).  Titchener’s determination to regulate it 
as a means to produce consistent results had not been convincing and its association 
with philosophy meant that, during the first decade of the twentieth century, an 
increasing number of psychologists, tried to distance themselves from it and to claim 
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that objective methods were of far greater use in understanding human nature  This 
chapter will evaluate this period of debate in psychology's history in order to determine 
what happened to introspection, and with it the subjective experience of emotion, as a 
result of these epistemological and methodological challenges.  It will show that there 
were attempts to remove it entirely as a tool of psychological research.  However, it 
will also demonstrate,  as Brock (2013) has described, that it was retained in an altered 
fashion by many psychologists, rather than disappearing altogether as some historians 
have claimed and will argue, that it became, rather, a peripheral and implicit, rather 
than then the central and explicit, method of psychological research that it had been 
previously.  As Brock describes, there is a narrative in the history of psychology that 
introspection disappeared entirely from psychological theorising with the advent of 
behaviourism at this time.  This chapter will describe, rather, how the psychologist’s 
subjective experience of emotion through introspection continued to inform 
psychological theories and to direct research.  
In Britain and the US, from 1912 onwards, there was a distinct rise in the number of 
articles published about introspection that debated its flaws and its merits. Ruckmich 
(1916)44 , writing in relation to the academic wrangling of the time, described the 
reason for the turmoil as due to psychology not being regarded in the same light as 
other sciences because of its adherence to the method. He reported that it had been 
stated in the American Journal of Psychology that “psychology, after twenty-five years 
of growth, does not stand very high on the honor roll among other academic subjects” 
(p. 110).  The fear that psychology might never be accepted as a science was, therefore, 
driving many psychologists to rethink the methods that were employed in the 
discipline.  The result was that the psychology of the early twentieth century, 
particularly in the US, was characterised by argument and debate as to the future of 
introspection (Dunlap, 1912; Jones, 1915).  Although this period was one of upheaval 
for the discipline, it was argued by some that it was necessary that psychology go 
through this refining process in order that it was brought in line with the natural 
sciences (Dodge, 1912; Jones, 1915).  Jones, for example, argued for the necessity of 
                                                          
44 Christian Ruckmich was to later publish under the name of Ruckmick and will be referred to by this 
latter name in other parts of the thesis 
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this time of reflection for psychology, 
The period of detailed research is...temporarily succeeded by one of more 
general criticism, when foundations are examined and, to a greater or less 
extent, relaid. Physics, chemistry, and biology have been tested in this manner, 
and have emerged stronger for the trial. The time is apparently at hand when 
psychology must undergo the same process; and it seems the opinion alike of 
proponents of the classic method, and of its critics, that, whatever the issue, 
such a proving can hardly fail to be beneficial to the subject. (1915, p. 463) 
 
For this reason, while J. B. Watson is often highlighted in historical analyses as the 
main critic of introspection, and Titchener the defender, the debate, as the following 
sections will describe, was not as narrow as simply Watson versus Titchener.  The 
contributions to the debate came from many different quarters and from both 
psychology and philosophy.  In reviewing the issues in psychology that characterised 
the year 1912, Buchener (1913) stated, “The particular interests of the year have been 
in the nature of critical reactions towards some of the work of former years.  These 
have been most marked in the attacks on introspection, as a psychological method” (p. 
3).  The contents of psychology journals of the early twentieth century were littered 
with papers entitled, for example, The case against introspection, Theory and 
limitations of introspection and What is introspection?.  The arguments on both sides 
of the debate were wide-ranging, addressing, for example, the nature of the act of 
introspection; the usefulness of the data it produced; and the nature of its subject matter 
of consciousness or experience.  As Lyons (1986) explains, this was a period in which 
psychologists and philosophers came to a more precise understanding of what 
introspection was.  For the first time in psychology’s history, they were forced to 
defend what it was they were doing when they introspected.   
One reason for the criticisms stemmed from the changing focus of much psychological 
research and the different branches of psychology that had grown in response to the 
acceptance of evolution and physiology as forms of psychological knowledge, 
particularly in the United States.  Therefore, it was felt that the assumptions of 
scientific psychology must alter in response.  By the 1930s, as described by Heidbreder 
(1933), there was a breadth of psychological theorising that did not necessarily fall 
into strict structuralist and functionalist divisions.  Experimental programs which used 
subjects rather than trained observers were beginning to be set up, because of the work 
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of those who were interested in, for example, individual differences, reaction times or 
memory span (Danziger, 1990).  Further, the development of the various branches of 
psychology, such as developmental, comparative and dynamic psychologies, meant 
that many researchers working in psychological laboratories were not interested in 
studying the contents of consciousness or of producing lists of descriptions of ever 
smaller elements of the mind and they were no longer using introspection in their work.  
Cattell (1904), for example, was to state, 
It seems to me that most of the research work that has been done by me or in 
my laboratory is nearly as independent of introspection as work in physics or 
in zoology. The time of mental processes, the accuracy of perception and 
movement, the range of consciousness, fatigue and practise, the motor 
accompaniments of thought, memory, the association of ideas, the perception 
of space, color-vision, preferences, judgments, individual differences, the 
behavior of animals and of children, these and other topics I have investigated 
without requiring the slightest introspection on the part of the subject or 
undertaking such on my own part during the course of the experiments. It is 
usually no more necessary for the subject to be a psychologist than it is for the 
vivisected frog to be a physiologist. (p. 181) 
 
A great deal of comparative work, also, was being carried out on the physiology and 
behaviour of animals.  Begun in the late nineteenth century by theorists  such as George 
Romanes in an attempt to connect animal and human consciousness, this was seen as 
being increasingly important for the understanding of behaviour of human beings, 
given that evolution had established a physiological, if not necessarily psychological, 
continuum.  However, because animal minds were not accessible to psychologists, 
those who studied the behaviour of animals began to be increasingly frustrated that 
this kind of research was not viewed as being useful to psychology because psychology 
was understood to be only the study of the mind (Watson, 1913).  Those involved in 
this work in particular began to call for a change to the accepted remit and methods of 
academic psychology.   
As has been well documented, the most prominent advocate of methodological change 
in psychology was the behaviourist, J.B. Watson (1878-1958).  Lyons (1986) explains 
that behaviourists felt that their success in observing and measuring behavioural 
performance contrasted with what they perceived as the lack of achievement of 
introspective psychology.  Watson, therefore, was not afraid of tackling head on both 
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the traditional understandings of psychology.  Indeed he directly criticised both 
structuralism and functionalism and, famously, debated directly with William 
McDougall in 1924 in what became known as The Battle for Behaviorism.  Watson's 
work in comparative psychology had given him an understanding of what 
psychological knowledge could look like without consciousness and, as will be 
described, his arguments against the use of introspection were determined by his denial 
of the need for psychologists to study the phenomenon at all.  Watson, in contrast to 
Titchener, believed that psychology was to be practical and useful, and he argued that 
an applied behavioural psychology would be beneficial in tackling some of society's 
problems.  This was probably the primary driver behind the rejection of the study of 
mind according to Brock (2013).  Brock argues that the emergence in the US of the 
applied fields of psychology, such as clinical, educational and consumer psychology 
were the result of little public funding being allocated to research so that the there was 
a need to produce data that could be utilised in these areas in order to make money.  
Focusing on behaviour change and learning, rather than descriptions of mental 
elements, could make psychological knowledge more saleable. 
It was not only behaviourists, however, who argued against the use of introspection as 
the structuralists used it.  Another significant and influential movement, Gestalt 
psychology was on the rise in Germany, its premise being that the mind should not be 
atomised in the way in which Titchener and his colleagues advocated and as their 
predecessors the associationists, had done.  It was rather that the mind should be 
viewed as a whole and studied as such (Koffka, 1924).  This was an important critique.  
The Gestaltists did not reject introspection as such or, more correctly, did not dismiss 
the study of subjective experience.  Indeed, their work was focused on understanding 
phenomenology and the development of the method of phenomenological observation 
formed part of their work.  Their work in the study of wholes, rather than parts of a 
whole, was a backlash against the elemental nature of structural psychology.  As Flügel 
(1933/1964, p. 213) states, “Configurationism was a revolt against the excessive 
appeal to the classical principle of association and the elementarism to which this had 
given rise”.  Further, although not centre stage in the discussions of introspection but 
in the background, was the development of the idea of the unconscious mind in Freud's 
psychoanalytic theories.  Although its use as a counter-argument was not particularly 
159 
 
well developed in the work of the experimentalists, it was a thesis which objectors to 
introspection were at times happy to draw on to develop their arguments (e.g. Dodge, 
1912). 
Meanwhile, the psychological study of emotion, continued to be viewed during this 
time as being in something of a state of disarray.  Chapter Five has described the 
difficulties faced by the structuralists in studying emotion.  Debates about particular 
theories and some experimentation continued in other branches of psychology, but 
there seemed to be little scientific progress.  James’s theory dominated the debate on 
emotion even up to the late 1920s, but it was viewed by many as having pushed the 
direction of discussion somewhat off course (Bentley, 1928).  The work by Cannon 
(1914) demonstrating the lack of physiological difference between fear and anger had 
enflamed more scepticism towards James's theory than it had already elicited.  Further, 
the different branches of psychology were using  the term emotion  but with seemingly 
different meanings, prompting the following comment from Bentley, at the first 
Symposium of Feelings and Emotions, held at Wittenberg, Ohio, in 1928,   
But whether emotion is today more than the heading of a chapter, I am still 
doubtful.  Whether the term stands – in the regard of most of us – for a 
psychological entity upon which we are all researching, I do not know. 
Whether it is the common subject of our varied investigations, I am not sure 
enough to be dogmatic. (p. 23) 
 
The uncertainty expressed by Bentley reflected the particular difficulties that the study 
of emotion had always evoked in psychology.  That there was, despite what seemed to 
be a universal understanding of the term in an everyday sense, a great deal of subjective 
difference between psychologists, both in terms of what that word meant and as to how 
it could or should be defined scientifically.  As has been shown in the work of 
introspectionist psychologists, consensus even amongst those purporting to use the 
same method was hard to come by.  The changes to introspection which took place at 
this time, as will be described, had a profound effect on the explicit use of the 
psychologists own subjective experience as a part of psychological theorising about 
emotion and there was a continued denigration of that view of emotion, even if some 
psychologists argued that it was still what emotion was and emotional behaviour could 
not be understood without it.  This chapter will first describe the arguments aimed 
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against introspection during this time and then how it was defended.  This will show 
that, although there was a strong case for its rejection, it was difficult even for 
behaviourists to reject its use entirely.  The chapter will then go on to describe how it 
was retained as a means to conduct pre-experimental exploration and analysis and will 
outline how it continued to be used in the study of emotion.  
 
6.2 Arguments against introspection  
Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely objective experimental 
branch of natural science...Introspection forms no essential part of its methods 
nor is the scientific value of data dependent on the readiness with which they 
lend themselves to interpretation in terms of consciousness. (Watson, 1913, p. 
158) 
 
This section will describe the arguments put forward against introspection in some 
detail.  It will show that these were related to the desire to produce psychological 
knowledge that was consistent, replicable and universally applicable and a drive 
towards the development of a psychological science that was able to produce theories 
which showed consistent patterns of cause and effect.  Although, J. B. Watson’s 
critique will be at the centre of the examination in the chapter, it will also, encompass 
the many critiques of introspection written by other theorists at the time.  Five 
particular points that were put forward as objections to the method will be discussed.  
First, that the study of consciousness was not suitable subject-matter for scientific 
investigation; second, that introspection as a method was unable to produce reliable 
and replicable data; third, that there were some aspects of human psychology that 
introspection was unable to address and fourth, that the over-reliance of psychologists 
on introspection placed a barrier between the flow of ideas between psychology and 
the natural sciences.  Finally, the arguments of some behaviourists that both 
consciousness and introspection could be reduced to physiological and behavioural 
data will be described.  
One of the most contentious points was over the question of the suitability of 
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consciousness or experience as scientific subject-matter.  Titchener's position was, of 
course, that psychologists should be studying consciousness and its contents and 
attempting to delineate it into different elements, and that introspection was the means 
by which they achieved this.  In the work of both structuralists and functionalists, even 
when other kinds of data, such as physiological measurements and behavioural 
observations were accepted as appropriate for a scientific psychology to use as data, 
there was a tendency for these to be used solely for what they could say about 
consciousness rather than what they could contribute to broader knowledge about 
human behaviour (Flügel, 1933/1964).  However, as the US philosopher A.H. Jones 
(1915) described, there was a growing academic debate at the time as to whether 
psychologists should or could study consciousness or if consciousness existed at all.  
In an article analysing psychological methods, he stated, that this period was one in 
which a ‘flood of articles’ presented a debate that, 
centers…on the rôle that consciousness should play in the science.  Is 
consciousness the subject-matter of the discipline – must its interpretations be 
cast in terms of awareness? Or should psychology turn from the subject's 
experience altogether and concern itself only with stimulus and reaction, with 
“behavior”? (p. 463) 
 
There had long been a question as to the existence of consciousness as a psychological 
object or at least an uncertainty as to whether there was anything that could be 
introspectively observed that should be given that term.  Even some psychologists who 
were advocates of introspective psychology had argued against the use of the concept 
of consciousness and deemed it unnecessary for psychological theorising.  Indeed Bain 
(1859; 1865) had at first included a section on consciousness in the first edition of The 
Emotions but had erased it from later editions.  James (1904) was very much against 
the use of the concept, stating, 
”consciousness”...is the name of a non-entity, and has no right to a place among 
first principles.  Those who still cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the faint 
rumor left behind by the disappearing “soul”, upon the air of philosophy...for 
thirty years past I have mistrusted “consciousness” as an entity, for seven, or 
eight years past I have suggested its non-existence to my students, and tried to 
give them its pragmatic equivalent in realities of experience.  It seems to me 




James, however, as can be seen from the quote above, argued for the retention of 
introspection as the study of experience.  This argument was also put forward by 
McDougall (1929), also, as will be described below. 
Some behaviourists were, in contrast, intent on doing away with any kind of 
phenomena in psychology which could not be physically observed, measured or from 
which it was hard to find a relation of cause and effect.  There were two main 
arguments made against the study of consciousness in psychology.  First, that, although 
it might exist, it could not be studied scientifically, therefore, it should be ignored by 
psychologists and, secondly, that it was simply an epiphenomenon which arose as a 
result of physiological processes and responses and therefore did not exist as an entity 
in its own right and had therefore no place as an object of study (Lashley, 1923a).  
Watson (1913) argued initially for the first and then later for the second.  Watson, like 
James, contended, that consciousness was merely a term that denoted the, now 
discarded, concept of the soul.  “All that Wundt and his students really accomplished”, 
he argued, “was to substitute for the word "soul" the word "consciousness"” (Watson, 
1929, p. 14).  Comparative psychologists, he stated, had initially looked for 
consciousness in their studies, because it was such an intrinsic aspect of psychology.  
They had even found alternative concepts for it, such as “associative memory” 
(Watson, 1913, p. 160).  However, Watson had come to the conclusion that this had 
been essentially an anthropomorphic approach and that there was no evidence in his 
work for such a concept.  Behaviour, Watson argued, should be studied not because of 
what it could say about consciousness but for its own sake.  Initially, he stated, that the 
terms used by psychologists - consciousness, image, affection and will - were “in good 
repute”.  However, he had found later on that he could “get along without them” 
(Watson, 1919, p. viii).   
The behaviourists had studied the behaviour of animals without having access to their 
consciousness and argued that they had made great strides in the understanding of both 
animals and humans without it.  By 1924, the year in which he debated with 
McDougall over the future of psychology, Watson had become increasingly dismissive 
of its existence, stating that “it has never been seen, touched, smelled, tasted or 
moved...they do not tell us what consciousness is, but merely begin to put things into 
it by assumption, and then when they come to analyse consciousness, naturally they 
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find in it just what they put into it.” (1929, p. 14).  In studying something that could 
not be viewed, he argued, psychologists had failed to produce coherent and consistent 
data in the way that the observation of the physical world could do,  
In other words, instead of gazing at woods and trees and brooks and things, we 
must gaze at this undefined and undefinable something we call consciousness. 
As a result of this major assumption that there is such a thing as consciousness, 
and that we can analyze it by introspection, we find as many analyses as there 
are individual psychologists. There is no element of control. There is no way 
of experimentally attacking and solving psychological problems and 
standardizing methods. (Watson, 1929, p. 16) 
 
Edward Tolman (1886-1959), one of Watson's fellow behaviourists, also described 
what he saw as an incongruity between a discipline striving to be accepted as a science 
and its study of “elements which by very definition are said to be private and non-
communable” (Tolman, 1922, p. 44).  The results of introspection for many 
behaviourists, therefore, were not scientific discoveries but artefacts of an out-dated 
psychological concept.  As psychology progressed it should, they argued, leave behind 
notions which could now be regarded as the error of a new science.  Psychology could 
develop when consciousness was rejected as a scientific concept. 
The second reason that introspection came under attack, therefore, was that some 
scientific psychologists felt that it had not produced stable and replicable results.  
Many psychologists during this period, even those who supported the method, were 
concerned with what they saw as its unreliability, particularly in relation to the way 
the structuralists used it.  British psychologist and founder of the BPS, Charles Myers 
(1873-1946), was to make the point that the outputs of systematic experimental 
psychology were abstractions of psychological phenomena, rather than real 
experiences (Myers, 1925).  Further, it was argued that these abstractions were not 
sufficient as an aid to understanding the mental states it was claimed they represented.  
Years of psychological theorising using introspection as a method, Watson (1913) said, 
had failed to produce consistent and universal results.  Watson, unlike Comte, was in 
the position of being able to present his argument against introspection from the 
standpoint of a review of the results of fifty years of introspective scientific 
psychology.  He had, therefore, at his disposal, fuel to add to the arguments about the 
perceived scientific unreliability of the method.  It was, as has been described, widely 
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acknowledged in psychology that there had indeed between a struggle to reconcile  
psychologists' introspective reports (Washburn, 1917) and from what he had seen, 
Watson believed that if psychology was to continue to use introspection as its method, 
psychologists would be forever going round in circles, lost in unresolvable disputes 
over whether, for example, “the auditory sensations have the quality of “extension’'' 
or “whether intensity is an attribute which can be applied to color”(Watson, 1913, p. 
164).  Psychology, he argued, was overly reliant on a method that produced 
inconsistent and unverifiable results and from which no determinable and 
demonstrable data could be generated. 
Watson’s was not a lone critical voice in this respect.  Raymond Dodge (1871-1942),  
professor at Wesleyan University and later the editor or the Journal of Experimental 
Psychology,  had written a widely cited paper The theory and limitations of 
introspection which questioned the reliability of the method and argued that it needed 
to be looked at carefully if psychology was to flourish as a science (Dodge, 1912).  
Introspection as the study of the mind of the psychologist was not only subject to 
differences between psychologists, he argued, but it was subject also to change over 
time, “Even the fundamental categories of consciousness change with the years, while 
new and previously totally unsuspected facts may be readily introspected as soon as 
there is theoretical ground for belief that they exist” (p. 227).  Although he did not 
agree that it should be done away with entirely, Dodge argued that the dogmatic 
approach of the structuralists caused the rejection of the inclusion of many other, much 
needed aspects of the study of the human mind, in psychology.  He expressed surprise 
that, a great deal of care was taken over the techniques used in psychophysical 
experiments and the calibration and reliability of the instruments, while, in contrast, 
this unreliable method had been given the place that it had. 
Thirdly, it was argued that there were some aspects of psychology that introspection 
could not address.  The “imageless thought” controversy, in which there was a 
disagreement amongst introspectionists in both Germany and the US as to whether 
people could think without reference to mental imagery, had thrown up a question as 
to whether introspection could capture all mental states (Dodge, 1912).  Dodge 
questioned the belief that introspection was the only method of psychology that could 
be used to tackle all subjects related to the human mind.  In reality, he argued, there 
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were some issues that introspection appeared unable to address; the unconscious being 
one of them.  “The sub-conscious, the elements of consciousness, the processes of their 
integration, and the residua of past experience differ”, he stated, “from consciousness 
in one very significant fact, that they are not describable in terms of introspective 
categories, except negatively” (p. 226).  Karl Lashley, (1890-1958), one of Watson’s 
fellow behaviourists, too emphasised how the modern phenomena of the unconscious 
called  into question both the reliability and usefulness of introspection in 
psychological investigations, “In modern psychology, with its hierarchies of the 
subconscious, the dividing line between the conscious and unconscious has ceased to 
exist” (1923b, p. 341).   
If its critics saw introspection as being unable to provide answers to certain questions 
about the mind, it was certainly, also viewed as being an insufficient method by which 
to answer the particular questions that behaviourists were asking about human nature.  
Its use by psychologists, the behaviourists argued, restricted the scope of psychological 
knowledge and, further, the potential to make discoveries through the observation of 
human behaviour.  Lashley having studied the contents of a typical psychology 
textbook of the time discovered that what he saw as the interests of behaviourism were 
not represented.  
The behaviorist is interested to discover the wells of human action: how does 
the individual meet the complex situations in which he finds himself, how solve 
his problems, how acquire social conventions, whence come his interests, 
prejudices, ambitions, what is the source of his genius or commonplaceness? 
These are not the problems of the introspectionist, yet they are unquestionably 
psychological problems, and their importance is far from measured by the 
grudging five per cent, granted them in the text. Only a vision grown myopic 
by long introversion could behold sensory physiology as twelve times more 
important than all the problems of human personality combined. (1923b, p. 
348) 
 
Fourthly, the perceived limitations of introspective psychology were also connected to 
another argument against the method, that its use was causing a growing distance 
between psychology and the other sciences.  Dodge (1912) described, for example, 
how introspective analyses and accounts did not seem to relate well to physiology and 
medicine but that they seemed, rather, to place psychology in quite an uncomfortable 
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epistemological position in relation to these disciplines.  S.C. Pepper (1918), the US 
philosopher, writing in the American Journal of Psychology, described a situation 
where,  because of its focus on “internality”, psychology, had become adrift from those 
sciences which studied “externality” (p. 208).  He argued that this had happened 
because of structuralism’s assumption of psycho-physical parallelism that described 
the body and mind as separate entities that existed alongside each other but did not 
impact on each other.  Thus, some psychologists felt that the structuralists were so 
caught up in the introspective method and the study of consciousness that 
physiological data, which had previously proved useful as a means to connect 
psychology to the natural sciences, was being seen to be increasingly irrelevant to their 
discipline, 
The only legitimated functions of experiment are either to provide suitable 
conditions for introspection, or objectively to lead to the presumption that 
adequate introspection of the subject would reveal something. Failure to 
introspect condemns an investigation to the outer darkness of physiology. Facts 
of nervous action may be interesting or even suggestive but "psychology better 
take them from the physiologist". In public conference not long ago it was 
seriously questioned whether titles in nervous anatomy and physiology 
couldn't well be omitted from the Psychological Index. (Pepper, 1918, p. 217) 
 
There was a fear, therefore, that psychology was becoming increasingly distant from 
the sciences of physiology and anatomy.  These theorists argued that this distance was 
in danger of impacting detrimentally on psychology, for two main reasons.  First, as 
described in Chapter Three, because the data of these sciences, which psychologists 
had used previously as a supplement to introspection and as a means present 
measurable and universal patterns of cause and effect, were being lost (Pepper, 1918).  
Second, connections with these sciences enabled psychology, in its infancy, to be taken 
seriously as a science.  If that connection was lost, there was a danger that, having 
fought against such criticisms in the past, psychology would succumb to the arguments 
of the positivists that it was a pseudo science interested only in the unfathomable 
consciousness.  Albert Weiss (1879-1931), another behavioural psychologist,  argued 
that the results of psychology needed to be able to be integrated with the results of 
physics, chemistry and biology, if it was to take up its place in the “system of natural 
sciences” and that it could do so “without losing what the introspective method has to 
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contribute” (Weiss, 1928. p. 172). 
Finally, behaviourists argued that introspection was unnecessary to psychology 
because physiological and behavioural methods were sufficient to explain the way in 
which even introspection and consciousness themselves arose.  For many 
behaviourists the study of consciousness could quickly be done away with once the 
behaviourist paradigm was the accepted method of psychology because it would, they 
argued, be shown that all human action could be explained by an eliciting stimulus and 
the resultant physiological and behavioural reaction.  They could even describe 
introspection itself in simple behavioural and physiological terms (e.g. Lashley, 1923b; 
Watson, 1920; Weiss, 1917).  The behaviour of self-reflection, the behaviourists 
contended, was exactly the same as the action of speech.  The former simply lacked 
the employment of the larynx and the mouth.  Weiss, for example, was to argue that, 
'For the behaviorist the introspective reaction is only the habit of being able to react 
by speech, more or less adventitiously, to the weak stimulation of obscure receptors.' 
(p. 316).  This theory was found to be difficult to verify empirically (Flügel, 
1933/1964) and was argued to have little value in explaining the psychological 
processes of introspection (Washburn, 1922).   
Given that it was difficult merely to dismiss concepts such as consciousness which had 
been so much a part of the founding of psychological thought, if such an account was 
verified then psychology could carry on with a behaviourist program safe in the 
knowledge that it was capable of showing how this particular psychological 
phenomenon arose.  Lashley (1923a), a former student of Watson’s, stated, “A 
behaviorism will thus develop which will be an adequate substitute for the older 
psychology.  Its physiological account of behavior will also be a complete and 
adequate account of all the phenomena of consciousness” (p. 244).  Tolman (1922) 
similarly argued that it was entirely possible that behaviourism, rather than avoiding 
the issue, could explain the existence of the epiphenomenon of consciousness and of 
the self-observation that took place in introspection.  He stated “Such a non-
physiological behaviorism seems to be capable of covering not only behaviorism 
proper but introspectionism as well.  For, if there are any such things as private mental 
'feels' they are never revealed to us (even in introspection).  All that is revealed are 
potentialities for behavior” (p. 53).   
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These criticisms of consciousness and introspection were an attempt to alter the 
methodological and epistemological position of psychology.  They were based on a 
drive for prediction, rather than description and if there was one thing that 
introspection had demonstrated it was that if the subjective experience was difficult to 
describe, it was even harder to predict.  However, as much as introspection’s critics 
made attempts at discrediting it there were many defenders, like Washburn and 
McDougall, who argued against the criticisms.  For them human experience, however 
messy and difficult to pin down, was a necessary test of the veracity of scientific 
theories.  For this reason, as much as there were psychologists who could not see a 
future for psychology if introspection continued to be its method, there were as many 
who could not see a future for it without introspection.  The following section will 
describe how introspection’s advocates defended introspection in the face of such 
attacks. 
 
6.3 Defence of introspection  
This section will show how, despite the difficulties described as to its place in a 
discipline purporting to be scientific, introspection was stoutly defended as being a 
necessary part of psychological theorising, without which the human mind or human 
behaviour for that matter could not be fully understood.  This defence was especially 
important to the continued understanding of emotion as a complex and idiosyncratic 
subjective experience and, indeed, as will be described, it was often emotion that was 
called on as an example of why the study of behaviour and physiology alone would 
leave out something fundamental about human nature. 
As the following account of the defence of introspection during this period will 
describe, the arguments as to the rejection of introspection were far from clear cut even 
in the work of the behaviourists.  Watson was to argue that introspection had no place 
in psychology.  However, other psychologists did not follow his lead in doing so, 
despite reservations about Titchener's use of introspection.  They found ways of 
continuing to incorporate it into their own understandings of psychology.  They also 
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specified that psychology was not simply the study of the mind but also of behaviour 
(e.g. Laird, 1919; McDougall, 1929; Pillsbury, 1911;).  Many of these psychologists 
could not reject it in the way that Watson had done because they argued that without it 
their research into human behaviour lacked meaning.  They also felt, however, that the 
objective study of behaviour had been given second place to that of the subjective for 
too long and the balance needed to be addressed.  The defence of introspection can be 
divided into three main themes.  First, was Titchener's assertion that introspection was 
to remain as the only method by which psychological experimentation could be 
conducted and that psychology could not survive without it.  Secondly, was a more 
inclusive note, mostly from functionalists, who believed that observation of behaviour 
was as important as introspection; although that did not mean that the latter should be 
discarded.  W.B. Pillsbury (1872-1960), a former student of Titchener's, for example, 
argued in the Essentials of Psychology, that, “Even if we regard the understanding of 
human behaviour as the ultimate end of psychology, consciousness must still play a 
very important part in our science” (1913, p. 4).  Thirdly, there were some 
psychologists who argued that introspection was sufficient, but that its usefulness 
depended on it altering from the role that it currently played in structural psychology 
to be used more broadly.  This section will examine each of these proposals in turn. 
In presenting his argument in defence of the use of introspection, Titchener (1912a),  
in Prolegomena to a study of introspection, cited the greats of psychology as the 
advocates of the method – James, Munsterberg, Ward, Sully, Binet, Ribot – showing 
the tradition and general acceptance that it had in psychology.  He went on to argue 
that psychology would not exist if it had not been for the use of introspection, 
It is maintained that, were introspection impossible, we might still have a 
science of 'psychology,' a system of observations and inferences which could 
not be subsumed to any existing science. This assertion cannot, so far as I see, 
logically be gainsaid, though one may doubt whether in fact the 'psychology' 
would have arisen. (p. 431) 
 
Introspection could not just be tossed aside lightly – it had, from his point of view, 
been the backbone of the development of psychological thought and without it 
scientific psychology could not exist.  Titchener (1914b), defended his view in 
response to Watson's arguments, but welcomed the behaviourist's methods of study 
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and their usefulness.  He also maintained his position on what psychology was.  He 
argued that Watson's rejection of consciousness must, in fact, be a result of a mistaken 
understanding of what the term referred to,  
Harm begins at once when we forget that scientific meaning, and start out from 
the commonsense or traditional significance of the word; when we equate 
"mind" with "consciousness," which we take as the equivalent of "awareness," 
and when we set off a group of "conscious phenomena" as the peculiar subject-
matter of psychology...But habits of speech are inveterate, and common sense 
is extraordinarily tenacious of life: small wonder, then, that misunderstandings 
should arise. It is, for example, a misunderstanding that has prompted the 
polemical paragraphs of Watson's recent articles on what, I suppose, we must 
be content to call Behaviorism. (p. 2) 
 
Titchener believed that psychology could not be anything other than the study of the 
mind as shown in the individual human experience.  That did not mean that it was any 
less scientific than physics and chemistry, merely that its subject matter was, rightly, 
different.  Although, Titchener did not believe that behaviourism was psychology, he 
did not think that observation of behaviour in humans should not be done, only that, 
“Neither logically nor materially can behaviorism "replace" psychology” (1914b, p. 
6).  
He was not alone in his defence of the method of introspection as being the only means 
by which psychology could progress.  John Laird (1887-1946), the Scottish realist 
philosopher,  for example, suggested that the arguments aimed against introspection 
appeared to be more to do with the personal “taste and aspirations” of particular 
psychologists and where their aspirations lay than on any empirical or evidential basis 
(Laird, 1919, p. 26).  The background that the behaviourists had in comparative 
psychology meant, he argued, that their goals were naturally different and that they 
focused on aspects of human nature that reflected the area in which they were 
interested.  In Laird's opinion, “Comparative psychologists prefer to keep to methods, 
and to study human behaviour in the same way as animal response, in order that their 
measurements and statistics may be strictly comparable” (p. 385).  Thus he argued, 
that the objections of behaviourists to introspection were nothing more than an 
argument made for one way of conducting scientific inquiry over another and did not 
indicate that psychologists should reject introspection as a scientific method.  
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Similarly, Washburn (1917, p. 51) was to argue that the attacks assumed “the personal 
interest” of the psychologists who were making them rather than arguments which held 
any water and that  these assertions by behaviourists about introspection were based 
on what they believed a science should look like.  For Washburn, however, psychology 
was not the same as other sciences.  In defending the method, she went on to describe 
in detail what the development of objective knowledge in psychology owed to 
introspection as a subjective method,  
It was only through introspection that we discovered the fallacy of the 
assumption that when the observor is required to react after discriminating one 
stimulus from another, the time of the act of discrimination can be found by 
subtracting ordinary reaction time from the total time....we have a witness to 
the importance of applying introspection to the process of sensory 
discrimination. (p. 52) 
 
Introspection did not always produce replicable results but it could, nevertheless, 
provide valuable information which could enhance the understanding of psychological 
phenomena.  These theorists argued that there would be a loss to psychology if 
psychologists abandoned introspection altogether.  Reiterating the argument which had 
been made for introspection since the early days of psychology, Laird argued further, 
“But introspection is the only means of direct acquaintance with the mind” (p. 406).  
Psychology for many psychologists should remain the study of the mind for which 
introspection was necessary.  
This argument was made in defence of introspection, also, in relation to the nature of 
scientific investigations.  Science, as Titchener had long argued, was conducted 
through the observations and experiences of scientists and as such the workings of 
their consciousnesses were tools in the process of scientific study.  Scientists in other 
disciplines observed the world outside of themselves, but psychologists were also 
attempting to examine more broadly the outer world with recourse to examining the 
inner world.  Pepper (1918) defended introspection because it was only different from 
the 'objective' methods in terms of what it studied, 
The introspective method will accept any kind of experiences whatsoever as fit 
material for its process, as fit data to be described. The objective method will 
accept only sensations derived from the exteroceptive sense organs, and prefers 
to accept only sensations derived from vision. Introspective method is 
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democratic and recognizes no innate fitness of data. Objective method is 
aristocratic and insists on the natural superiority of  vision. Herein lies the 
whole distinction between the introspective and the objective methods. (p. 213) 
 
It was through the eyes of scientists that scientific observations were made.  
Interpretations of evidence were conducted within the minds of scientists.  For those 
who advocated introspection, its rejection meant that psychologists would no longer 
be in a position to examine the very tool, the mind, through which the world was 
analysed and described in science.   
A second viewpoint was proposed which suggested that some middle ground between 
the structuralists and behaviourists could be found; it argued that both introspection 
and the observation of behaviour were both critical in understanding psychological 
phenomena.  In 1911, for example, Walter Pillsbury, an advocate of the introspective 
method, defined psychology as “the science of human behaviour” (p. 1) and, in 
particular, psychologists who were interested not in the elements but the functions of 
the mind argued for the retention of introspection but not at the expense of ignoring 
behavioural data.  As described in Chapter Three, William McDougall argued for a 
more limited role for introspection in psychology, in part because he saw it as 
inadequate in separating out the emotions from each other.  However,  in disagreeing 
with Watson about the future of psychology, he made two particular points; first that  
it was necessary to retain introspection in psychology but also that behavioural 
observation had been an important source of data for psychology for some time.  In 
arguing the first point, McDougall (1929), like James, claimed that introspection was 
the study of experience rather than consciousness and in rejecting Watson's vision of a 
psychology void of the introspective method, he pointed out an absurdity in Watson's 
reasoning; that so much of human psychology would necessarily be excluded by the 
behaviourist’s rejection of subjective experience as data.  Watson (1929) had stated 
that the behaviourist, in rejecting anything that cannot be physically observed, had 
dropped “from his scientific vocabulary  all subjective terms such as sensation, 
perception, image, desire, purpose, and even thinking and emotion as they were 
originally defined” (p. 17).  McDougall joked about this claim of Watson's, 
Now, though I am sorry for Dr. Watson, I mean to be entirely frank about his 
position. If he were an ordinary human being, I should feel obliged to exercise 
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a certain reserve, for fear of hurting his feelings. We all know that Dr. Watson 
has his feelings, like the rest of us. But I am at liberty to trample on his feelings 
in the most ruthless manner; for Dr. Watson has assured us (and it is the very 
essence of his peculiar doctrine) that he does not care a cent about feelings, 
whether his own or those of any other person.  (p. 44) 
 
The experience of the psychologist was, for those advocating introspection, a vital 
resource by which feelings and emotions could be understood.  It seemed ridiculous, 
therefore, for Watson to reject the idea of emotion when he undoubtedly experienced 
emotions himself.  This position was later echoed by Heidbreder (1933) in the 
statement, “Does a behaviorist mean, then, that a person cannot be aware of his own 
anger except my means of kymograph tracings or blood-analysis...by catching sight of 
his flushed face in the mirror...?” (p. 281).  For R.B. Macdougall (1912), founder of 
the psychology lab at New York University, writing earlier in the century, the existence 
of human experience was not a fact that could ever be in doubt, “whether it concerns 
the psychologist's work or not, the uniqueness and exclusiveness of subjective 
immediacy in each individual experience is a fact to be recognized, not a theory to be 
discussed” (p. 393). 
The second point William McDougall made in debating with Watson was that the study 
of behaviour had been an aspect of psychological theorising for some time, and the 
behaviourists were not alone in using behavioural methods.  He had, he claimed, been 
the “chief begetter” of behaviourism (1929, p. 49).  Human behaviour had been an 
aspect of his own work for many years – through the observation of infants and 
comparative psychology.  McDougall (1910) had always advocated comparative 
psychology particularly in relation to the study of the emotions and their associated 
instincts.  In arguing for the retention of introspection, therefore, he, like other 
functionalist psychologists,  advocated a wider remit for psychology than either 
Titchener or Watson,  calling the amalgamation of behaviourism and introspection a 
“sane Behaviorism”,  
Thirdly, there is sane Behaviorism, or that kind of psychology which, while 
making use of all introspectively observable facts or data, does not neglect the 
observation of behavior, does not fail to make full use of all the facts which are 
the exclusive data of Watsonian Behaviorism. This same Behaviorism is the 
kind of psychology that is referred to approvingly, by many contemporary 
writers in other fields, as "Behavioristic Psychology. (p. 48) 
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For McDougall, the scientific study of human nature was a problematic endeavour and 
psychologists could not afford to reject a whole raft of data which had been gathered 
from the experiences of human beings.  Similarly, there was a number of introspective 
psychologists, who, although not having developed their ideas in comparative 
psychology were, nevertheless, anxious that psychology should embrace the study of 
behaviour as the principal means of developing psychological knowledge.  Many 
theorists believed there to be a middle ground which allowed for the presentation of a 
more rounded picture of human psychology.  Jones (1915) stated that “Structuralism 
and behaviorism are thus hemispheres of the doctrine of mind which, though properly 
separated to meet the demands of an ambitious specialism, must yet be united if we 
are to have a fully rounded account of consciousness” (p. 471).  They were anxious 
that as behavioural accounts were accepted as part of the remit of psychology, the study 
of the mind not be neglected.  For example, H.C. Warren (1867-1934), a founder 
member of Titchener's Society of Experimental Psychologists, in 1919 described 
psychology as “the science which describes the mutual interrelation between an 
organism and its environment” (p. 13).  This science, he suggested, was to develop, 
first through the observation of other people, and secondly, through the psychologist's 
use of introspection of subjective experience.   
Thirdly, other psychologists arguing similarly for the use of behavioural data alongside 
the data of introspection also argued that this would be effective but only if the latter 
method moved away from the structuralists’ understanding of it.  Wheeler (1923), for 
example, stated “One does not discard a promising method because it yielded poor 
results for a time.  On the contrary, he sets about to improve and if possible to perfect 
the method” (p. 105).  Wheeler stated further that the quantitative data obtained from 
behaviourist experiments was inadequate to reveal all forms of human behaviour but 
that there was much that introspection could still contribute to psychology, 
In summary, then, introspection should be used in connection with the 
gathering of behavioristic data for the two following reasons: (i) It provides 
information about the setting in which overt behavior takes place just as the 
physiologist provides his setting by resorting to anatomical information. Until 
behavior as a whole is studied, one can hardly call himself a behaviorist; and 
since man is consciously acting as well as making overt  bodily movements, 
behavior as a whole is not studied until introspection is used as a supplementary 
method. (2) It provides the necessary checks on the reliability of data 
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'objectively' obtained. The radical behaviorist is unscientific in that he ignores 
known conditions and processes which influence and interpret the overt 
reactions to which he has arbitrarily confined himself.  (p. 114) 
 
Wheeler, therefore, advocated a different role for introspection in psychology; to both 
contextualise the study of behaviour and to make sure that behaviouristic data related 
to an internal event.  As explained by Desilva (1930), one of the reasons why a 
behaviourist might be tempted not to reject consciousness entirely was that, when 
behaviour was observed experimentally,  it was often found that differences in 
response to the stimulus between subjects suggested that there was more to the reasons 
behind people's behaviour than mere conditioning.  Behaviorists were attempting to 
demonstrate the predictability of human behaviour, however, in many instances, it was 
noticeable that experimental results did not demonstrate the patterns that they had 
imagined they would.  The theorists who wished to retain introspection argued that the 
information gleaned from introspection could help explain the reasons for this 
variability.  
It was argued, also, that introspection should be retained but altered to describe 
experience but not detail the mental elements.  For Knight Dunlap (1875-1949), a 
colleague of Watson’s at John Hopkins University, the elements of the mind were not 
able to be observed by introspection but experience could be.  Dunlap (1912), while 
arguing for the retention of self-reflection as a method, argued that introspectionists 
had not demonstrated that the mental states could be observed.  As the observation of 
the observation of the outer world, introspection had become, rather, the description 
of the objects in the outer world rather than the inner.  Because of this, psychologists 
were unable to avoid committing the stimulus-error,  
In actual practice, most psychologists who use the term 'introspection' and 
define it as the observation of consciousness not only do not seek to apply it in 
strict accordance with the definition, but they even apply it to the whole range 
of psychological observation. In giving 'introspective reports' on the 
observation of a sound, for example, the sound itself is usually included as one 
of the 'introspected' details. So colors, odors, after-images, and all other objects 
of consciousness, are quite commonly said to be 'introspectively' observed. 
This practice constitutes effectively the reductio ad absurdum of the 
'introspection' theory. Starting as a distinctive kind of observation, the 
observation of an observation of something, it finishes as the only kind of 
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observation. In other words, there would seem to be really nothing to observe 
except the observation of something else! (p. 412) 
 
He did, however, argue for its retention as a tool in the study of feelings and emotions 
and other phenomena which occurred in the body because these were truly inner 
processes and experiences that were accessible to self-examination.  He stated, “These 
facts are 'inner' in that they concern, or are constituents, of the body, or objective self.  
By a rather natural step, accordingly, these inner facts are taken to be the process of 
observing the sound.  Observation of them is, therefore, the process of observing the 
process of observing the sound –introspection” (p. 411) 
 
This section has described three arguments for the retention of introspection in some 
form and has demonstrated that there was still a great deal of support for the method 
as a scientific practice.  It was argued first, that it should be retained in the structuralist 
form by Titchener; secondly, that it be used alongside behavioural observations and 
thirdly, that it be retained but altered from the forms that it currently took.  Some of 
these defensive arguments were based on a belief that the study of subjective 
experience provided a check on behavioural data and, at times, an explanation for it.  
It has also been described that these arguments for introspection had particular salience 
for the study of emotion as a subjective experience.  The following section will 
describe the extent to which introspection was retained in psychology, following this 
period of uncertainty, challenge and debate and at what forms it took, and at how it 
was used to study emotion. 
 
6.4 The use of introspection to study emotion  
6.4.1 The retention of introspective accounts in psychology 
The defences made of introspection by psychologists, above, indicate that there was 
certainly no consensus in psychology as to the rejection of introspection, or of the 
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psychologist’s subjective experience from psychological experimentation and 
theorising.  However, they do show that there was a move to alter introspection from 
the form advocated by Titchener, and this is indeed what took place.  This section will 
describe what happened to introspection.  It will explain the demise of structuralist 
introspection, but the retention of introspective accounts of experience in other forms 
as a means to further psychological research and, in particular, for the understanding 
of emotion.  
Systematic experimental introspection lasted up until Titchener's death in 1927.  With 
its strongest advocate gone, it was unable to survive the changes that were taking place 
in psychology and gradually faded from use (Heidbreder, 1933).  This form of 
introspection foundered on the arguments against its treatment of the mind and of the 
purpose of psychology, rather than against the method per se.  It foundered, also, on 
the drive towards the elimination of the remnants of associationist philosophy on 
which structural experimental psychology had been established.  As early as 1899, 
Caldwell, for example, had described the artificiality of the endeavour, and that what 
the structuralists’ 'discoveries' consisted of were “artefacts, abstractions, usefully 
isolated for scientific ends, but not found in experience” (p. 188).  As Lyons (1986) 
also claims of Titchener’s method, “scientific introspective psychology... brought itself 
into disrepute...even if the concept made sense and the process was feasible, in fact, 
introspection proved to be an unreliable source of psychological data.” (p. 21).  
Further,  Heidbreder (1933), describes how Titchener's lack of willingness to embrace 
and widen his remit of psychology in the face of a great deal of opposition to his 
position, was also a factor in its demise.  Titchener had achieved much in terms of 
legitimising psychology as a science in the US by steering psychology away from its 
philosophical roots towards experimentalism, but the narrowness of his endeavour was 
in the end its undoing.  What this attempt at limiting introspection showed was that the 
method did not benefit from having scientific restrictions placed on it, but rather that 
these restrictions constituted a loss of one of its advantages; that of producing 
phenomenological descriptions of human experiences  unrestricted by the artificiality 
of the  assumptions of science. 
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However, although it is clear that Titchener's view of introspection disappeared45 , 
Watson's strong arguments against consciousness and introspection were undoubtedly 
not taken on board by all psychologists.  After the debate around consciousness and 
introspection of the early twentieth century and the epistemological and 
methodological directions that psychology should take had receded, the landscape of 
psychology, while altered as a result, was not changed in the radical way that Watson 
had hoped for (Flügel, 1933/1964).  Hunter (1925), a behaviourist himself, stated that, 
“Instead of two warring factions we have merely a collection of psychologists who 
vary more or less among themselves in their relative predilection for the methods of 
introspection and external observation” (p. 154).  Heidbreder (1933) too pointed out 
that, “As a matter of fact, few psychologists call themselves behaviourists without 
qualification...As a consequence behavioristic psychology merges gradually into 
psychology in general and strange to say the result is not confusion” (p. 259).  
Heidbreder also describes the product of the rise of behaviourism, not as being the 
disappearance of introspection, but that “the results of introspection are less likely to 
stand alone; they are supplemented and supported by objective data” (p. 263).   
Brock (2013), therefore, describes the interpretation in many histories of psychology 
of the disappearance of introspection in psychology as a “mythical account”.  He 
claims that introspection survived in several areas of psychology including 
psychophysics, Gestalt psychology and psychoanalysis.  Costall (2006), too, states that 
introspection, as the examination of the psychologist’s own subjective experience, 
survived in “a furtive way” (p. 650) in experimental psychology also, even in the form 
advocated by the behaviourists.  This was what Boring called “camouflaged 
introspection”.  When writing a paper on A History of Introspection in 1953, he makes 
it evident that, not only that introspection had not disappeared from psychology but 
neither had the study of subjective experience,  
If conscious experience can be said to exist, then the question arises as to 
whether modern psychology ought not to take into consideration its data, as 
indeed it used always to do. Thus my paper might even be called "What 
                                                          
45 Although it could equally be argued that elements of what Titchener did continue to influence the study of emotion 
today – for example, the description of emotion in terms of a set number of characteristics (Lange et al., 1997), 
attempting to induce emotions in the lab, experiential and introspective accounts from participants and attempts to 
define the structures of emotion (Izard, 2010).  
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Became of Introspection?" One common answer to that question would be that 
introspection was not viable and so gradually became extinct. Another answer, 
however, is that introspection is still with us, doing its business under various 
aliases, of which verbal report is one. The former statement about the failure 
of introspection is approximately true of that introspection which flourished 
under Titchener at Cornell in 1900-1920, whereas the latter statement about 
camouflaged introspection is accepted by the modern positivists who hold that 
the concept of conscious experience has meaning only when it is defined 
operationally. (p. 169) 
 
Given that it is clear that introspection survived in some form, how then was 
introspection used at this time?  The rest of this section will describe two ways in 
which it continued to be an aspect of psychological theorising and experimentation.  
First, it continued to be used explicitly by theorists although its role in psychological 
experimentation had altered somewhat.  Second, it survived implicitly, as Boring’s 
‘camouflaged introspection’ and Costall’s ‘furtive’ introspection, in the methods used 
by psychologists.  
As was described in the previous section, several psychologists argued that it was 
necessary that introspection was retained in psychology but in an altered form and 
alongside behavioural observation.  Woodworth (1918), as a functionalist and as a 
theorist who had worked in comparative, physiological psychology, was sympathetic 
to behaviourist ideals of giving behaviour a larger role in psychological work.  He 
discussed two kinds of introspection – one, the traditional view of the complex process 
of the analysis of the contents of consciousness into increasingly smaller elements;  
and  the other, a simpler introspection which was used to distinguish, for example, 
“difference tones and many other...'subjective' sensations” (p. 33).  The former could 
be dispensed with.  The latter, he argued, could not be discarded because of its 
necessity to the understanding of the relationship of the environment to behaviour.  
Bentley (1924), similarly, presented a softer version as useful to psychological 
research “when taken to mean just the observation of a single aspect of experience it 
loses its sinister and doubtful signification” (p. 44).     
There were, also, calls by some behaviourists for the inclusion of introspection, as a 
means to give direction to the research and to identify what physiological data needed 
to be analysed and which behavioural observations made.  Lashley (1923b) argued that 
merely ignoring psychological phenomena was not enough.  Rather, it was up to 
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behaviourists to account for these using behaviouristic and physiological explanations.  
He stated,  
Behaviorism has a place for introspection but it must be a vastly different form 
of introspection from that which now burdens the literature. Its avowed aim 
must be the discerning of cues to physiological problems and its final appeal 
to the results of objective methods such as introspection may make the 
preliminary survey, but it must be followed by the claim and transit of objective 
measurement. (p. 352) 
   
Although, he argued that psychological phenomena could be explained entirely with 
recourse to physiology alone, these phenomena could only be identified through self-
observation, “The attributes of mind as definable through introspective evidence, are 
precisely the attributes of the complex physiological organization of the human body,” 
(p. 352).  For Lashley, introspection could only ever be vague and imprecise, 
“describing the form and pattern of clouds which are capable of analysis into 
aggregates of water particles by other methods” (p. 338), however, the pragmatic 
assertion from such a prominent behaviourist that introspection should still be a part 
of psychological work, lent a great deal of weight to the argument of its advocates.  
According to Flügel (1933/1964), Lashley's account of introspection heralded a 
“softening” in the attitude of behaviourists towards the use of introspection in 
psychology. 
Lashley (1923b) argued, also, that introspective analysis was required as a starting 
point for any behaviouristic psychological investigation because psychology, as a 
discipline, was so steeped in the language of experience and consciousness. 
To the man trained in the older psychology or philosophy the traditional 
problems must still seem important, even though he has thrown off most of the 
metaphysics of the school in which he was trained. Moreover, unless he has 
first-hand knowledge of a vast range of human activity he must take his facts 
from the subjective literature where they are arranged and selected with the 
subjectivist's bias as to their relative importance. Small wonder then that 
current behaviorism shows the taint of introspection. (Lashley, 1923b, p. 350) 
 
This was also described by Pratt (1922) in his critique of behaviourism, “But not only 
is the behaviourist forced to make repeated use of introspectionist materials in order 
to be intelligible; he also finds it necessary to begin his investigations…with 
introspective facts and to keep them in mind constantly throughout his researches.  The 
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subjective facts both set his problems and guide his methods” (p. 599).  For example, 
the objects of investigation of psychologists continued to be the subjective experiences 
of human beings – emotion, belief, thought – these were the starting point of 
investigations, not the muscular reactions or nerve impulses.  However, as Heidbreder 
(1933) discusses, the behaviourist like any other scientist was dependent, not simply 
on the investigations of the past but also his own immediate experience and as a 
scientist who was studying the actions and behaviour of human beings was as reliant 
on his own self-knowledge of the human experience as a means to understand the 
people he was studying.  Although behaviours could be observed, the only way of 
understanding what that behaviour related to in terms of the particular psychological 
phenomena was through an understanding of his own mind, body and experience of 
that phenomena. 
Further, introspection continued also to be used by psychologists to describe, if not the 
elements of the mind, certainly what was being experienced when particular feelings 
and emotions were elicited.  This is outlined in the work of Ruckmick (1936).  
Although physiological response and behaviour had overtaken subjective analysis in 
relative importance in psychology, the phenomenological side was still viewed as 
being a vital component of understanding the mind and effects on human behaviour of 
the environment.  Part of the reason for this was that the behaviourists had found that 
human behaviour, when studied, was not as predictable as they had assumed.  
Although behaviourists had tried to do away with the mind, what they found was that 
there was a variability in behaviour which could not be accounted for.  As much as it 
had been rejected, consciousness often appeared under different guises in behaviourist 
accounts.  DeSilva (1930) describes this situation, 
The first difficulty that faces the psychological experimenter is the fact of 
everyday observation that his subjects do not all respond to the proffered 
stimulus in the same way, and that individually they do not respond in the same 
way to the same stimulus at different times. This variable phenomenon of 
response in the individual observer has been systematically generalized and 
dealt with in psychology under the term of attention. (p. 71) 
 
In his paper, The commonsense of introspection, DeSilva posited the idea that what 
behaviourists usually call 'attention' is merely a term for what he calls 'conscious 
behaviour' and describes it as a kind of stream of consciousness and its role in 
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producing differences in response, “The common sense reason why individual stimuli 
do not secure uniform responses is that for the observer they blend into a continuous 
yet ever varying flow of conscious behaviour” (p. 71).  This flow of consciousness 
was, as has been seen, idiosyncratic and variable and, because of its complexity, 
difficult to analyse and predict.  It is no wonder, then, the behaviourists would rather 
ignore it in the interests of progressing psychological knowledge, as they saw it.  
However, what they found was a continued need to understand to some extent the 
internal state of the subject.  This often came in the form of ‘verbal report’ as 
mentioned above by Boring.  The use of 'verbal report' by behaviourist psychologists 
as a means of eliciting data from the subject they studied was controversial because 
according to their critics this showed that the behaviourists were interested in the 
minds of their subjects, not merely their behaviour.  The study of memory, for example, 
could not be done without a subject describing what they had remembered.  Although 
the behaviourists protested that these reports were merely verbal behaviour, not reports 
of mental states or experiences, it was a sign for some that despite the firm anti-
introspectionist stance taken by some  it was difficult to reject subjective experience 
entirely and still produce meaningful data. 
The second way in which introspection was retained was that it became implicit in the 
process of research and experimentation.  For example, introspection remained a part 
of psychological theorising related to the continued use of the psychologist’s own mind 
to observe, analyse and interpret the behaviours that they were interested in.  This was 
highlighted by several theorists at the time.  Watson (1913) himself had accepted that 
consciousness was still to be the main tool of understanding of the psychologist,  
If you grant the behaviorist the right to use consciousness in the same way that 
other natural scientists employ it – that is, without making consciousness a 
special object of observation – you have granted all that my thesis 
requires...We might call this the return to a non-reflective and naïve use of 
consciousness.  In this sense consciousness may be said to be the instrument or 
tool with which all scientists work.  Whether or not the tool is properly used at 
present by psychologists is a problem for philosophy and not for psychology. 
(p. 175) 
 
Therefore, Watson agreed that psychologists were accessing their own consciousness 
as a means to develop an understanding of behaviour.  What he was arguing for was a 
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rejection, however, of explicit self-reflection but this also meant that the reflection 
which must inevitably take place for psychologists as human beings to understand the 
behaviour of other human beings was to become implicit in their work,  given that, as 
has been described, the starting point of investigations were particular universal human 
experiences.  Wheeler (1923) argued that introspection was necessary to psychology 
even when it was a behaviouristic psychology, 
All of this information is indeed essential to psychology, but when the 
behaviorist wants to know the significance of these figures what does he do? 
He interprets; and he interprets just as does the mental tester or the statistician, 
namely, from his qualitative knowledge of human nature. Introspection is 
necessary as a method of providing this qualitative knowledge in sufficient 
detail to be scientifically worthwhile. (p. 106) 
 
To observe, for example, that a subject was displaying a particular emotion, the theorist 
could not just put aside his own knowledge of emotional experiences in analysing the 
particular behaviours, neither could they decide what was worthy of study if they did 
not know what emotions were and how they were experienced.  They would need to 
understand what, for example, 'pleasant' or 'unpleasant' meant in verbal reports in order 
to make sense of what they were observing and, although they tried all sorts of ways 
to get round descriptions of conscious experience it was still a part of what they did 
(Dunlap, 1928). 
Therefore, the examination of the psychologist’s own subjective experience continued 
to be an important aspect of psychological theorising, not least in the study of emotion 
and feeling, where despite the behaviourists’ protestations, it survived in various forms 
both explicit and implicit.  The latter was summed up in the critique of behaviourist 
study of emotion by Sartre (1939/2002), 
It is also to experience that the psychologist appeals in order to establish the 
limits of emotive phenomena and to define them.  And, truth to tell, this may 
well awaken him to the fact that he already has an idea of emotion, for after 
examining the facts, he will draw a line of demarcation between the facts of 
emotion and those of a quite different order.  How could experience supply him 
with a principle of demarcation if he did not already have one?  But the 
psychologist prefers to hold fast to the belief that the facts fall into groups of 
themselves under his gaze. (p. 6) 
 
What came out of the disagreements about introspection, therefore, was that not only 
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should a softer form of introspection be retained but that psychologists, as people who 
experienced sensations, feelings and emotions, had first-hand knowledge of these 
which it did not make sense to ignore in the interests of objectivity.  To reject 
introspection entirely as a means to understand human psychological phenomena was 
also to pretend that their scientific understandings came purely from objective 
observation and that their own subjective experiences contributed nothing to the 
research.  As Sartre’s quote describes above, however, this was a fallacy.  A 
psychologist's first knowledge of emotion comes from his own experience.  As Dunlap 
(1912), Woodworth (1918) and Bentley (1924) argued, attempting to use self-
reflection to discover increasingly smaller elements of the mind was a futile task.  
However, psychologists must still appeal to experience to understand particular 
psychological phenomena. 
This section has described how introspection was retained in altered forms from those 
used by the structuralists.  It has shown that even behaviourists understood that there 
was a need to have some kind of understanding of subjective experience in order to 
understand the meanings behind the observation of behaviour.  This was especially 
true of the understanding of emotion.  The following section will describe how 
introspection continued to be used in the study of emotion towards the end of the 
1920s.  In particular, it will focus on the Wittenberg Symposium on Feelings and 
Emotions which took place in 1928.  The importance of this Symposium is that it was 
held towards the end of this period of debate - introspection had gone through the 
period of criticism, structuralism had all but been rejected, and the introspection of 
emotion was emerging again in its exploratory and analytical form.  
 
6.4.2  Emotion studied through introspection 
The International Symposium on Feelings and Emotions held at Wittenberg College, 
Ohio came at a time which had been preceded by a great deal of questioning about 
what psychology was and what it should be.  After the maelstrom of debate had died 
down psychologists continued to attempt to understand emotion, although in a 
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changing epistemological and methodological landscape.  This Symposium, the first 
of four throughout the century, was an opportunity both for reflection on the past and 
as a collective base on which to generate future directions for the study of emotion in 
psychology.  In describing the content of some of the papers given at the Symposium, 
this section will outline the ways in which psychologists’ own experiences of emotion 
continued to be used as a means to produce meaningful understandings of emotion in 
psychology. 
The purpose of this first symposium on the subject was to gather together the most 
prominent theorists working in the field from across the world,with the hope of 
meeting regularly every five or ten years to be able to show how the area had advanced 
(Reymart, 1928).  Titchener, who was to chair the meeting, died suddenly the year 
before it was due to take place and was replaced by Cattell, which we can only presume 
radically altered the theoretical make-up of the conference papers which were 
presented by twenty US and fifteen European theorists.  They included Dunlap, 
Washburn, McDougall and Woodworth, who were defenders of altered forms of 
introspection as has been described.  However, although there was little radical 
behaviourist representation - Watson, for example  was conspicuous by his absence - 
the papers included one by Vladimir Bechterev46, a compatriot of Ivan Pavlov, who 
has been described as one of the early behaviourists (Brennan, 1998) and whose 
Objective Psychology had presented a rejection of introspection.  Albert Weiss, who 
could be described as a Watsonian behaviourist also presented a paper entitled, 
unsurprisingly, Feeling and emotion as forms of behaviour. 
The symposium papers demonstrate the breadth of psychological theorising about 
emotion at the time, including papers related to the physiology, abnormal psychology, 
motor theories, utility theories and psychoanalytic accounts.  Joseph Jastrow (1863-
1944) presented the various current strands of research in emotion, including those of 
motivation, evolution and development.  There were few psychologists present who 
adhered strictly to Titchener's structural paradigm but that did not mean that the use of 
introspection as a method to study emotion was not present in the papers of these, the 
                                                          
46 As Bechterv also died in 1927 his paper was presented by another delegate. 
186 
 
most prominent theorists of the time.  Given the arguments put forward in defence of 
the retention of some kind of introspection, as described above, it was still seen as a 
valuable tool in the repertoire of many psychologists in the understanding of emotion.  
For emotion, in particular, this was because the subjective experience or bodily feeling 
was a part of the phenomenon, in a way in which it was not for memory, perception or 
attention, for example.  Therefore, the examination of the psychologist's own 
experience still held a great deal of salience.  As Dunlap (1912) had argued, the self-
observation of the mental states might be viewed as impossible, but that of feelings 
and emotions involved an inherent appraisal of the bodily experience.  In order to 
understand them, therefore, introspection was required as one of the principal means 
by which they could be studied.  The papers described below reflect two of the 
particular ways, identified in the previous section, in which psychologists’ own self-
examination was retained.  First, that it was used as an initial means, prior to 
experimentation, to explore what emotion was before a more structured analysis was 
conducted with participants in the laboratory; second, to identify what the experience 
of emotion was like and to describe how it might be related to other psychological 
phenomena.  They show that emotion was discussed quite differently between different 
theorists and that introspective accounts continued to demonstrate the idiosyncrasies 
of emotion.  
The first, and perhaps the most obvious, way in which introspection continued to be 
used in the study of emotion was in its identification and description, and to present an 
understanding as a base from which experimental work could develop.  If psychology 
was to admit the study of behaviour to understand emotion in others, there was still 
the question of how that research would be directed.  A paper presented by Frederick 
Aveling of the University of London, entitled Emotion, Conation, and Will, 
demonstrated the use of introspection as a means to identify what emotion was prior 
to experimentation.  Aveling (1928) regarded introspection as a necessary part of 
initiating the study of emotion.  It was only by examining the experience of it that 
psychologists would get an initial impression of what it was they were attempting to 
discover.  He argued, “In attempting to determine what a “feeling” or “emotion” is, we 
must begin with the concrete experience of an affective or an emotional state of 
consciousness” (p. 49).  Aveling, to some extent, unsurprisingly, given the climate of 
187 
 
the time, used the paper in part to defend the continued use of introspection.  Any use 
of introspection in an explicit way would now have to be explained or advocated in 
some way.  From being the method of psychology the acceptance of the practice had 
altered and those who continued to feel it was a necessary aspect of their work would 
have to use their studies also as an argument for its efficacy. 
On the other hand the question for those who had rejected introspection as a method 
was how they could understand what emotion was without in some way referring to 
that bodily feeling, given that emotion was equated with that experience in an everyday 
sense.  In contrast to Aveling (1928), Weiss (1928) presented a paper putting forward 
the behaviourist position; attacking introspective evidence and the mentalistic 
accounts of emotion it produced, and advocating what he called a bio-social approach.  
In doing so, he argued that the study of emotion would be more fruitful if the 
mentalistic understandings were rejected in favour of stimulus-response accounts.  In 
doing so, he was taken to task by Karl Bühler and Morton Prince in the questioning 
after his paper for using mentalistic terms himself.  Both argued that the terms and 
concepts that Weiss used in his work were drawn from human experience, as much as 
Weiss was attempting to argue that human experience had nothing to contribute to the 
understanding of emotion.  Bühler made the point that initial explorations in science 
are done via some kind of informal knowledge of something before the rigorous 
investigations are carried out to determine the nature of that thing,  
for instance…Roentgen found his famous X-rays….He found a certain fact and 
then by scientific reasoning defined it, and we now know what X-rays are.  In 
the same way we define pleasure and displeasure…Ask a child of three years.  
It knows exactly that some things have been pleasant and others unpleasant.  
This is not a good definition, of course; but, we first state the facts and then we 
have to find a good definition. (p. 191) 
 
Aveling’s position, like that of Bühler and Prince, was one of the centrality of the 
psychologist in the process of the understanding of emotion because, as he had argued 
in The Standpoint of Psychology, rather than psychological phenomena being 
understood solely in terms of cause and effect, when it comes to understanding these, 
they must be assumed to exist in relation to the experience and the Self which thinks 
and feels and makes decisions about them.  The mind he argued, could not therefore 
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be expressed by psychologists in “purely objective and impersonal terms” (Aveling, 
1926, p. 170) and that, therefore, “The fact of the occurrence of emotion and its 
descriptive analysis’, he said,’ are open to introspection and introspection alone” 
(1928, p. 50).  For these theorists there was a belief that without introspection it was 
impossible to understand the nature of emotion without first examining it as a 
subjective experience.  It was not, they argued, that behaviourists did not do this - it 
was merely that they claimed not to be using experience as any kind of basis for their 
work.  At the same time, they were presenting accounts which could not be discussed 
if they had no personal understanding of what the experience of the terms they used 
meant.  
Aveling (1928) did not, however, stop at using introspection alone as a means to 
understand emotion – the second part of the research process, once some initial work 
had been done on a working definition of emotion through self-examination, was then 
to test that definition experimentally.  Introspection was useful initially but 
experimentation was where the work of verifying the initial introspective 
understandings lay.  He was not just interested in the emotional experiences 
themselves, or of merely describing these as mental states.  Accepting James’s theory, 
he was interested in testing how the aspects of this theory – the cognition of the event 
and the bodily feeling were connected and how each impacted on the other, “Stated in 
purely psychological terms, the order of events would seem to be; first, cognition of a 
significant stimulus; second, conative “set” towards it; and, last, the “stirred-up” 
characteristic of emotion proper. (p. 52). 
We have now to ask what evidence there is of any causal order between the 
phenomena we have been able to distinguish introspectively, and for what 
functions each may subserve. This is a matter for experimental investigation, 
so planned as to vary the introspectible phenomena in a relatively independent 
way, and to observe the objective results (p. 53) 
 
The reports of introspective experiences were still required during the experiment as 
it was these, rather than merely the responses of the instruments which were the real 
test of whether an emotional reaction was underway – without these the understanding 
of emotion would be impossible.  However, the drive in psychological science was to 
describe emotion in terms of structures and patterns.  Therefore, introspection only 
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took this so far.  It meant placing emotion in the lab under standard conditions in order 
to present it as replicable and predictable. 
As stated at the beginning of this section, a second use of introspection is evidenced in 
the Symposium; that of the grounding of psychological investigation of emotion in the 
lived experience, rather than as an abstraction from what happened in everyday 
occurrences.  Theories which isolated emotion tended to present it in terms of 
predictable patterns.  In contrast, introspective evidence produced multifarious 
understandings of emotion.  The tendency of behaviourists to denigrate the real 
experience of psychological phenomena as, what Weiss called, ‘literary’ rather than 
‘scientific’ descriptions was opposed by arguments which put experience at the 
forefront of psychological work.  Dunlap (1928), for example, who had been 
concerned about the artificiality of the structuralist endeavour was equally concerned 
that behaviourism was producing scientific artefacts of its own.  It was doing so 
because it was ignoring what experience could show.  He argued, “When the plain man 
speaks of fear, rage, or grief, he apparently has reference to some facts – moreover, to 
facts which are, or can be, experienced (and experience is an occurrence, and an 
undisputed fact)” (p. 151).  Without this experience, however, Dunlap contended, there 
would be nothing to investigate.  “If we actually experience an emotion, the emotion 
is something demonstrable; and it is something capable of being a stimulus pattern.  If 
it is not, then we are talking in fables, and we should stop discussing emotion in 
psychology” (p. 152).   
Some theorists attempted to use introspection in order to understand emotion in 
relation to other psychological phenomena as it might occur in the real world.  In her 
paper on emotion and thought, Margaret Washburn (1928) looked at the extent to 
which emotions interfere with or prevent the thought process.  “Emotion”, she 
concluded, “will aid thought when conditions favour the discharge of this energy into 
the maintenance of a steady innervation of the trunk muscles, which is the basis of 
introspectively reported feelings of will, determination, activity, or effort, and which 
secures the steady influence of the idea of a goal” (p. 111).  The reporting of the 
experience of emotion was a vital component of psychological theorising because 
there would be no scientific understanding of what it meant for emotion to interfere 
with thought without it.  “Experience”, Washburn stated, “shows that the flow of ideas 
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is heightened by mild emotion” (p. 110).  For these theorists, any definition of emotion, 
whatever that definition pertained to, should be described as the experience or the 
feeling, not as the peripheral states of the physical accompaniments or causes or the 
eliciting stimuli or the expressions.  For Aveling an emotion had to be felt.  It could be 
defined as he stated as “the massive and generally wholly unclear experience of 
coenaesthesio–kinaesthetic sensation” (p. 57).  Although this definition lacked 
precision or explanation, it is a definition which describes emotion as an experience 
rather than a behaviour.  
Like Aveling (1928), Krueger (1928) presented a paper in which emotion is described 
as an inner experience or feeling.  He argued that the understanding of emotion to some 
extent be based on this, at least in an initial analysis of what that feeling was and what 
it denoted, “Whatever has been conscientiously observed…can finally be brought 
under concepts in so far as they have been clearly determined” (p.85).  For him the 
reductionist approach of the behaviourist to stimulus and response was inadequate 
when it came to understanding the nature of emotion - there was an unpredictability in 
relation to emotion experience.  He argued that, “No constellation of stimuli can ever 
predict that it will positively initiate feelings at all, to say nothing of releasing this or 
that definite feeling” (p. 72).  However, in attempting to describe the quality of 
emotions - for example, to distinguish between “deep joy” and “flat joy” - he was, 
unlike Titchener, content not to analyse it into parts but to understand it as an aspect 
of a whole and continuous, rather than discrete, experience.  Emotion according to 
both Aveling (1928) and Kruger (1928) was varied, unpredictable and vague.  Ignoring 
introspective evidence which demonstrated that this was the way that emotion was, 
simply because it was inconvenient for a science to accept that one of their concepts 
might not be able to be given boundaries and delineations, suggested that what 
behaviourists described were purely artefacts of their method, rather than studies of 
emotion.   
Some used introspection to develop ideas as to why instances of the same emotion 
could be different between people or different for different occurrences.  Claparède 
(1928) for example, attempted to explain why there was such a breadth of 
understandings of emotion by introducing the idea that experience of emotion is not a 
simple relation of cause and effect but that there is the intervening variable of attitude 
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which gives the emotion its uniqueness in particular situations.  “When you are angry, 
turn your attention to the kinaesthetic sensations in your clenched fists, to the trembling 
of your lips, etc. but then you have no longer the consciousness of your anger.  Or 
permit yourself to become absorbed in your anger; but then you no longer experience 
distinctly the trembling of your lips, your pallor, or the isolated sensations arising from 
the different parts of your contracted muscular machinery” (p. 129).  This observation 
could have been a criticism of the efficacy of introspection.  However, it led Claparède 
to argue that how people understand their emotions is not related to a simple cause and 
effect but also related to the attitude of the individual who experiences the emotion.  
He stated, “This peripheral conception which regards the emotion as the consciousness 
of an attitude of the organism is, besides, the only one which can take account of the 
fact that the emotion is immediately, implicitly “understood” by him who experiences 
it” (p. 129).  Claparède’s introspectively produced account of emotion is an interesting 
one because it describes why there might be discrepancies between an individual’s 
introspective accounts.  He went on to explain how this would account for the “infinite 
variety of affective phenomena, feelings, and emotions” (p. 133) and to describe how 
theories of emotion, the James-Lange, in particular, were too simple to account for the 
range of experiences that people would describe as emotional, “We can now 
understand why the range of affective phenomena is indeed richer than a theory would 
foresee which, as that of McDougall, would relate each emotion to a definite 
instinct…as there are more affective nuances than definite instincts, one is obliged to 
admit that feelings may…have…attitudes intermediate to two or more instincts” (p. 
133). Introspection was therefore being used to explain some of the characteristics of 
emotion in a way in which external observation could not.  
Howard (1928), also, in presenting a paper on a functional theory of emotion, 
introspectively described the experience of emotion as being nuanced and messy rather 
than linear and clear as some psychologists attempted to describe in their theories.  He 
argued against the position taken up by some functional and structural theorists that 
separated the emotions from other elements of the mind but instead argued that, 
Introspectively, as well as objectively, emotion is a state of disruption.  All the 
sensational, imaginal, and affective elements of the experience are exploded 
out of their natural patterns, are confused and mixed and 
meaningless…Introspection upon genuine emotional states will, I am 
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assured…show that none of the sensational or affective elements are in the 
focus of experience, but on the contrary, experience is without focus or margin, 
a confused and scattered state of consciousness. (p. 146) 
 
What is interesting from these papers is the way in which each describes emotion in 
some way, not as a clear cut and precise and predictable phenomenon, but rather that 
it is none of those things.  This understanding contrasts with Watson’s behaviourist 
theory of emotion as, “an hereditary ‘pattern-reaction’, going on to explain that, “By 
‘pattern-reaction’ we mean that the separate details of response appear with some 
constancy, with some regularity and in approximately the same sequential order each 
time the eliciting stimulus is presented” (Watson, 1919, p. 195).  These papers 
represented a view of emotion as one which might ultimately defy attempts to be 
defined as predictable and patterned if viewed from an experiential viewpoint.  They 
also highlighted the artificiality of the endeavour to isolate emotion and to develop 
theories about how it functioned away from real experiences of the bodies and minds 
in which it took place.  Another point to note is that those psychologists which referred 
to introspection tended to define emotion primarily in terms of its experiential aspects 
and continue to view anything else, while being informative, as simply 
accompaniments or signs that an emotion was occurring but not the emotion itself, 
thus limiting the meaning of the term to the phenomenological.    
However, the requirement to present emotion as structured and predictable was never 
very far away from these introspective depictions and could be used as a means to 
reject these as unscientific.  Both these and the other papers in the symposium show 
the way in which tide was flowing and the drive towards findings ways to present 
emotion in a more clear cut and structured way, through behavioural experiments, 
physiological experiments and the development of statistical analysis.  While these 
introspective theorists were resisting the attempts to construct a science which left out 
experience, they were all involved in the construction of a science which attempted to 




This chapter has shown how during the early twentieth century introspection was a 
contested method.  It has described the criticisms of it and how it was defended.  The 
criticisms represented the drive in psychological science to produce knowledge which 
presented universal and predictable patterns of response.  The defence of introspection 
was for the retention of the method as a means to understand the experience of 
psychological phenomena without which physiological and behavioural data would be 
meaningless.  The period saw the demise of systematic experimental introspection but 
the retention of a ‘softer’ form of the method, in recognition that emotion was first and 
foremost a subjective experience.  Therefore, the method was retained by some 
psychologists, albeit in an altered form, and continued to be used in both a formal and 
informal sense to direct their experimental study and to understand emotion as a human 
experience.  The understandings of emotion which were presented through the use of 
introspection, as described above, are characterised by being complex, variable and 
nuanced and not following the laws of patterns of prediction.  However, although they 
were advocated by these theorists as being a necessary aspect of the scientific process 





CHAPTER 7   
CONCLUSION 
7.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapters have presented an account of the various ways in which 
introspection and other methods were used by psychologists to study emotion during 
the period 1850-1930.  They have described particular issues for the understanding of 
emotion as a subjective experience that arose in relation to the drive to study emotion 
scientifically.  A range of issues have been explored, including debates over the 
efficacy of introspection, the changing nature of psychological knowledge and, within 
that context, the varying conceptualisations of emotion.  This chapter will conclude 
the thesis by presenting a brief overview of the content of these chapters and in the 
other sections will present answers to the research questions.  It will then examine how 
these answers relate to the current situation before summarising the contribution that 
the thesis makes to the issue of the problem of definition. 
Chapter Three described the use of introspection to study emotion in the mid to late 
nineteenth century by psychologists who were not experimentalists but, nevertheless, 
saw the use of introspection as a method of sorts to examine the mind and its contents 
and to describe what they found there.  Emotion was often understood simply to be a 
subjective experience, but this view proved difficult for psychologists to maintain 
when attempting to find scientific consensus, as a result of the differences in perception 
of emotion that were revealed when introspection was used.  Chapter Four covered the 
same period but looked at the embracing of physiological and evolutionary approaches 
in psychology.  It showed that these were seen as necessary by many psychologists 
who felt that self-observation alone was not able to produce scientifically useful 
understandings of emotion.  These ways of framing emotion seemed, however, to 
undermine the idea that it should be conceptualised as a subjective experience.  
Chapter Five outlined the controlling and constraining of the method of introspection 
by the structuralists and, as the resultant controlling and constraining of descriptions 
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of the psychologists’ experiences of emotion.  It described the difficulties that 
psychologists faced in taking emotion into the lab and that, despite tight controls on 
the method, consensus on a scientific understanding of emotion could not be achieved.  
Chapter Six depicted the arguments for and against the use of introspection in the early 
part of the twentieth century.  It showed that introspection survived to be used to study 
emotion, mainly because it was felt by many psychologists that self-observation was 
vital to the meaningful understanding of emotion.  It demonstrated that its use was 
largely for pre-experimental exploration and as a means to formulate questions and to 
analyse experimental evidence.  It, further, described the differences between 
theorists’ disorganised perceptions of emotion which were produced when using 
introspection and the structured accounts they attempted to formulate in the lab.  
Overall, the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries were characterised by the 
development of the concept of emotion in relation to particular scientific criteria and 
by the uneasy relationship psychologists had with the method of introspection and the 
sorts of understandings about emotion it produced.  These often did not seem to fit 
with a discipline striving to be accepted as a science.  While many believed in 
introspection and the need for psychologists to understand emotion through self-
examination, other assumptions as to how emotion should be conceptualised in science 
were in conflict with the understanding of emotion as a subjective experience.  These 
points will be developed below where I return to the research questions presented in 
Chapter One.   
7.2  Discussion of the research questions 
The research questions to be investigated in this thesis as stated were:  What was the 
effect of the drive to conduct psychological research scientifically on the way in which 
subjective experiences of emotion were viewed?  How did this drive contribute to the 
proliferation of understandings of emotion?  
As described above, Chapters Three to Six have shown that during this period the 
concept of emotion developed in a climate in which scientific psychology was seeking 
to establish its credentials as a science.  Decisions were being made about what were 
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acceptable and not acceptable scientific understandings of emotion.  For the theorists 
of this period, the study of emotions, as described by Dixon (2003), was viewed as 
being “value-neutral” because they were being studied within a scientific, rather than 
a theological framework of knowledge.  However, as Solomon (2002) points out 
scientific research into emotion has never been value free.  Certain kinds of knowledge 
and certain methods are preferred over others, and this has shaped the way in which 
the concept of emotion developed in psychology.  In answering these research 
questions it is, therefore, important to summarise the sorts of underlying assumptions 
on which psychological science was founded during this period, as revealed in the 
previous chapters, in order to understand how the concept of emotion was, and is 
currently, shaped. 
From the early days of psychology there was a pervasive assumption that psychologists 
should present a picture of emotion that was characterized as predictable, structured, 
universal and measureable.  It is these assumptions that lay at the heart of the way in 
which psychological science developed, as evidenced in the thesis by the criticisms 
aimed at introspection and the diversity of ways in which emotion was viewed.  The 
drive for a concept which embodied these characteristics is discussed particularly in 
Chapter Four but really underpins the debates about emotion and the best way to 
observe it throughout the chapters.  Universality, for example, was the assumption 
prevalent in the work of the associationist psychologists as they attempted to isolate 
the elements of the mind and look for the connections between them.  It meant that 
psychologists were striving to present something about the commonalities, rather than 
the idiosyncrasies of emotion.  It underlay Spencer’s criticisms of Bain’s classification 
of the emotions as being only applicable to a “civilized man”. While rarely explicitly 
stated, it supported the debates during this period as to, for example, the lack of 
consensus of introspective findings, the need for physiological understandings, the 
drive for replicability of results, and the arguments of the behaviourists against 
introspection.  What Danziger (2007) calls, “the holy grail of universality”, was the 
founding principle of psychological knowledge.  A scientific psychology required 
theorists to establish what they could find to agree on and in this climate subjective 
experiences presented a challenge.   In answering the research questions, I will focus 
on three particular ways in which the chapters demonstrate that the assumption of 
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psychologists that they search for only universal characteristics, clashed with 
introspective characterisations of emotion: first, through the attempts to isolate 
emotion as a universal element of the human mind; second, in the generation of 
predictive laws and theories; third, in relation to the requirement for measurement and 
replicability of data.  This section will also go on to summarise the effect that the 
search for a concept which embodied these assumptions had on the number of 
understandings of the concept. 
In attempting to define emotion scientifically psychologists first had to isolate it as a 
scientific element and delineate it as one of the common elements of the mind.  Bain’s 
‘systematic exposition of the human mind’, in The Senses and the Intellect and The 
Emotions and the Will was a significant step in the development of scientific 
psychological understandings of emotion.  The presentation of emotion as a main 
element of the mind was based on several assumptions.  First, that it was possible to 
isolate emotion from the whole of experience and, second, that it had distinct 
characteristics by which it could be defined.  Danziger (1993, p. 10) states, referring 
to present day psychology, that in order to distinguish emotion as a scientific object, 
there has to be an “agreed category of events labelled…’emotional’ which can be 
distinguished from other events and about whose basic features there is a large measure 
of pre-understanding”.  Prototypical experiences would need to be drawn on for the 
development of understanding and non-prototypical disregarded in the attempt to 
produce emotion as a scientific object.  In doing so there was an assumption that 
boundaries could be placed on the idea of emotion so that it could become a hard and 
fast scientific concept.  
However, this conceptualisation of emotion was often not what theorists saw when 
they viewed emotion within themselves.  As described in the work of some of the early 
theorists and in the Wittenberg papers, rather than being one kind of psychological 
experience, it appeared fluid and would alter depending on the circumstances under 
which different emotions were elicited.  Indeed even James (1890a) was not convinced 
that elements could be so easily extracted from the “stream of consciousness”. 
Introspective evidence challenged the idea of the simple extraction and examination 
of one element from a complex experience.  James warned of the consequences for 
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psychological knowledge if psychologists started their introspections with the 
assumption that particular elements are basic to the human mind or consciousness,  
Consciousness, from our natal day, is of a teeming multiplicity of objects and 
relations, and what we call simple sensations are results of discriminative 
attention, pushed often to a very high degree. It is astonishing what havoc is 
wrought in psychology by admitting at the outset apparently innocent 
suppositions that nevertheless contain a flaw. The bad consequences develop 
themselves later on and are irremediable, being woven through the whole 
texture of the work. The notion that sensations, being the simplest things, are 
the first things to take up in psychology is one of these suppositions. The only 
thing which psychology has a right to postulate at the outset is the fact of 
thinking itself, and that must first be taken up and analyzed. (p.185) 
 
Psychologists, James argued, should not start off their introspections with elements in 
mind because these assumed particular divisions.  Consciousness and experience were 
much messier and entangled than these delineations allowed for.  This sense of the 
untidiness of the mind and the inability to isolate elements using introspection if no 
prior groupings were provided is highlighted at the end of Chapter Three where 
theorists describe the difficulty of conceptualising and classifying emotion.  Emotion 
as an experience, resisted isolation, but focusing on what were viewed as the 
accompaniments was just as confusing.  Physiological measures did not give clarity.  
This was described by Ladd, as shown in Chapter Four.  Facial expressions and 
behaviours sometimes accompanied certain affective states but often did not.  The use 
of these as indirect measures or indicators, when a particular emotion was occurring, 
was inconclusive.  It was difficult to find evidence for emotion or particular emotions, 
as isolated, coherent scientific concepts no matter how it was studied.  Further, while 
connections were made between emotion and other elements of the mind in 
psychology, it was as if these had been carefully put back together, having been 
artificially delineated in the first place, in order that a scientific relationship between 
them be developed.  This is described both in Spencer’s work and in the Wittenberg 
papers.   
Further, as has been demonstrated, psychologists did not start to isolate and examine 
emotion from a value-free position but, with particular purposes, or frameworks of 
knowledge, in mind.  Thus, the isolation of emotion was done within the various 
scientific contexts defined by particular ontological and epistemological 
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commitments, whether that was associationism, structuralism, evolution or 
behaviourism.  Each of these frameworks imputed emotion with different 
characteristics.  Each extracted a different view of the isolated concept of emotion, 
depending on the approach that they took.  Something as ephemeral, as intangible or 
indistinct as emotion could be easily altered to fit with particular views.  Spencer’s 
development of evolutionary associationism, for example, located the concept into that 
particular framework of systematisation.  It defined emotion as part of the evolutionary 
and gradual development of the mind as a way of imposing some structure on the mind 
and on its elements.  The structuralists’ methods of controlling what took place in the 
laboratory was also a means by which to isolate and encapsulate emotion according to 
a particular view of scientific psychology.  The observers were to focus on one 
particular aspect of their experience as they responded to the stimuli that were 
presented.  They were to focus also on certain features – pleasance or unpleasance, for 
example – but not others.  These specific feelings were to be isolated from the other 
experiences or thoughts they might be having.  As described in Chapter Five, however, 
structuralists experienced profound difficulties in isolating emotion for laboratory 
work. The experience and its accompaniments seemed to lose something of the quality 
of emotionality.  The fuzzy boundaries of human experience could not easily be 
captured as concrete objects necessary for scientific ‘discovery’. 
As much as psychologists tried to isolate emotion it was sometimes recognised that it 
had to be grounded within human experience.  As Alfred Carver (1919, p. 52), the 
English psychologist,  stated, “No person has ever yet satisfactorily defined emotion, 
and any attempt to isolate it from its setting, so to speak, is foredoomed to failure; for 
emotion is only one part or aspect of a more comprehensive internal adjustment”.  
There was something about the wholeness of experience that was lost when theorists 
tried to capture it or remove emotion from its natural setting.  The removal of the 
context in which it was usually played out or understood or experienced caused 
emotion to lose something of its essence – of what makes it emotional.  From a 
phenomenological point of view, Sartre (1939/2002, p. 11) was to state, “For the 
psychologist emotion signifies nothing, because he studies it as a fact; that is, by 
separating it from everything else.  It will then be non-significant from the start; but if 
every human fact is in truth significant, this emotion of the psychologists is of its nature 
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dead, non-psychic, in-human”.  The removal of emotion from its setting as a means to 
show that it could be used to present a universal picture of the human mind, caused its 
significance to be altered and it began to take on different meanings which related 
more to the scientific context in which it was studied, than the everyday context in 
which it is was experienced.   
The second way in which attempts were made to produce scientific accounts of 
emotion was through the development of laws and theories.  The most important 
characteristic of a theory was that it be able to predict.  The chapters of the thesis 
describe various ways in which psychologists attempted to show that emotions could 
be shown to be universally predictable.  Although introspection was the preferred 
method, finding a consistent theory through the description of emotion that came from 
that method, proved problematic, as described in the section on James’s theory.  
Instead of exploring the idea that emotion may be unpredictable, theorists instead 
looked to other frameworks of understanding for their theories.  Bain’s Law of the 
diffusive action of emotion as described in Chapter Three predominantly focused on 
the physiology of the body in describing the emotional response. Darwin’s laws of 
expression of emotions were grounded in assumptions of the adaptive quality of 
emotion; Wundt’s Tridimensional Theory, while focused on the experience of 
emotion, attempted to shape that experience in terms of particular predictable 
characteristics.  Watson’s theory, of course, rejected the experience of emotion 
altogether in favour of a physiological stimulus-response model.  Underlying the 
development of each of these theories of emotion was the assumption that a universal 
and correct theory of emotion could be discovered.  Such a theory could be predictive 
for all instances of emotion in different individuals, for different emotions, across place 
and time.  
As described in the last section of Chapter Four, theorists understood very quickly that 
the study of experience through untrained introspection was not going to achieve the 
evidence they required to present emotion in this way.  As shown by the debate over 
James’s theory, in the early period of the discipline, they often drew on introspective 
descriptions of the experience of emotion while trying to demonstrate that these 
accounts were universal and their theories universally applicable.  There were, 
therefore, disagreements over the correctness of each theory.  Prior to the period in 
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which psychology began to use experimental methods, much of the debate as to the 
efficacy of theories was grounded in the logic of the particular position taken up by a 
theorist.  After the development of psychology as an experimental discipline, it was 
expected that the theories be backed up by evidence produced by the experimental 
methods.  However, because theories were grounded in specific frameworks of 
understanding about the subject matter of psychology and about what sorts of 
understandings psychology should produce theories of emotion often pertained to 
particular viewpoints as to what the subject matter of psychology should be.  
Therefore, even where experimental evidence was produced, there were as many 
barriers to debate as to the efficacy of a particular theory as there were when theorists 
argued about the findings of introspective evidence.   
The presentation of theories of emotion as produced within different frameworks of 
knowledge meant that there was a movement away from understandings as related to 
the experiences of individual psychologists.  This analysis ties in with Danziger’s 
(1993, p. 16) statement that there was around 1879 a change in the way in which 
psychology operated. Before this period, it was acceptable to present theories 
grounded in everyday language and experience.  After that time, what was valued was 
that theories be grounded within particular “empirical domains”.  Even where the 
subjective experience was still viewed as necessary for the understanding of emotion, 
individual perceptions of emotion became supported by the particular frameworks 
within which they were located.  The development of empirical domains meant that 
there was a range of accepted structures in place to maintain theories.  As has been 
described, physiology was a particular empirical domain within which a scientific 
theory of emotion could be supported.  This was important for the support for James’s 
theory in particular, as it was tied to the work of the physiologist, Lange.   Indeed 
James (1894) refers to Lange’s work in the defence of his theory in The Physical Basis 
of Emotion. Without this connection to an established and respected scientific 
discipline, its arguments on the basis of introspective evidence alone would have 
lacked the necessary scientific credentials and would, perhaps, have been taken less 
seriously.  The subjective experience of emotion could not provide the predictive 
certainty that psychological science required. 
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Finally, in order to present scientific accounts, emotion had to be observed, and data 
about it gathered.  This was to be done in such a way that its assumed universal 
characteristics be revealed.  For observations to demonstrate universality this meant 
that findings must be replicable.  Replicability demonstrated a truthfulness about the 
findings which non-replicability did not.  It was the means by which psychology could 
show that the data that it produced was scientifically valuable.  For those who believed 
that capturing the experience of emotion was necessary but also believed in the need 
for replicability, the means to control self-observation was needed.  Bain, for example, 
did so by applying the structure of the Natural History Method in developing a 
classification and, of course, the associationists’ purpose in describing the 
development of ideas guided their introspections to some extent.   
The assumption that psychology should produce replicable results caused problems 
for the study of emotion introspectively, however.  As described in Chapter Three, it 
was often claimed that introspection, even when guided, did not produce consensual 
understandings of emotion.  These were often different even within the same 
psychologist at different times.  The development of experimental psychology at the 
end of the nineteenth century set out to deal with this difficulty of lack of consensus 
and replicability of psychological evidence.  The main purpose of experimentation was 
to control both the input and the output.  This is shown most clearly in Chapter Five 
which describes how Titchener demonstrated the means by which introspection could 
be subject to scientific controls in order to produce the kind of data that is required for 
replication to take place.  When the method and descriptions were controlled 
sufficiently observers seemed to produce similar results as is described by Nafe (1924).  
However, such controls were easily criticised on the grounds of providing synthetic 
data.   
Even those who continued to advocate introspection as a pre-experimental route to 
exploring the nature of emotion, still believed that reducing emotion to a laboratory 
experiment was the most valuable way of presenting a scientifically acceptable 
understanding.  This is shown in Chapter Six in the section on the papers from the 
Wittenberg Symposium where several theorists describe the untidiness of emotion 
when observed introspectively yet look to translate that untidiness into a simplified 
and controlled version produced in the lab.  While the experience of emotion seemed 
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to show a nuanced, idiosyncratic and messy picture, theorists expected that the 
reductive process of the experiment would be sufficient to capture enough of the 
phenomena from which to progress understanding.  Danziger (1993, p. 9), however, 
maintains the difficulty with this translation.  In relation to quantitative analysis, he 
states “Experiences do not naturally arrange themselves in the form of statistical terms; 
they have to be arranged accordingly”.  In taking emotion into the laboratory, 
psychologists were “arranging” emotion to suit the way in which they assumed 
scientific observations should be conducted.  If the right experiment could be found, 
then data from the emotions could be shown to be replicable.   
Despite the determination of psychologists to find out some universal truths about 
emotion, at the beginning of the twentieth century, as today, a consensual definition of 
emotion, or even anything near to it, had not been produced in psychology and 
accounts were diverging sharply.  Undeniably, the search for an understanding which 
embodied the particular characteristics psychologists were looking for had played a 
part in multiplying scientific conceptualisations.  They had failed to take account of 
the evidence, both from introspective and physiological psychology that emotion could 
be a complicated, messy and often disorganised experience.  They attempted to isolate 
the emotions from their context, both as part of the mind and as part of human existence 
and had believed that the generation of individual accounts if controlled enough, could 
say something about emotions at all points of time and place.  In casting around to find 
the correct theory or classification or experiment, theorists had ignored much of the 
nature of the experience of emotion as described through introspection.  Rather than 
getting closer to emotion as it might exist in people’s experiences, or at least the 
phenomenon people understood to be encapsulated by the term emotion, they were 
adding layers of meaning to the concept even as they studied it and moving it further 
away from the individual experience they sought to describe.  As they did so, the 
concept took on different meanings which, while having meaning in particular 
scientific contexts, were inadequate in encapsulating the experience of emotion.   
These concepts, as abstractions, thus lost the ability to reflect the human experience of 
emotion through the drive to produce scientific psychological knowledge.  This flaw 
in the scientific process did not go unmentioned in the late nineteenth century.  
Hurlbert and Knapp (2006), for example, describe a paper given by the pioneering 
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German-US psychologist Munsterberg (1863-1916) in which he portrays what 
happens to subjective experiences when attempts are made to capture them 
scientifically,   
Reality means to us here the immediate experience which we live through. This 
immediate truth of life may be transformed and remoulded in theories and 
sciences, and these remodelings of reality may be highly valuable for special 
purposes of life; we may even reach finally a point of reconstruction from 
which the subjective experience appears as an illusion and the supplementation 
stands as the only truth. Yet the importance of such constructions must not 
make us forget that we have then left reality behind us. Our doubting and 
remoulding itself belongs to the reality for which its products can never be 
substituted. (Münsterberg, 1899, p. 12) 
 
Rather than simplifying the way in which emotion was conceptualised, the result of 
the ‘doubting and remoulding’ was that it became increasingly complex and it was 
difficult to find common ground between the different understandings of it that were 
advanced.  The different conceptualisations of emotion as an isolated, predictable, 
structured, scientific object left psychologists with a number of definitions but none 
that encapsulated it adequately.  This is captured in the following quote from Sartre 
(1939/2002, p. 5), “what is to be gained from the principles and methods of the 
psychologists?  First of all, our knowledge of emotion will be something additional to 
and outside all our other knowledge about psychic being.”  Theorists lost sight of that 
which they were studying as they tried to extract emotion from its natural environment, 
take it apart, reduce it to physiological process or facial expressions and then put these 
back together with experience in some systematic and structured way, to shape it in 
the way they wanted it to be, rather than the way their self-observation often told them 
it was.  The following contrast presented by Solomon (p. 134), describes nicely just 
how far away scientific and everyday depictions of emotion become from each other 
through the scientific process, 
Whereas psychologists talk rather clumsily about “anger” and “rage,” for 
instance, we readily distinguish between resentment, contempt, pique, 
displeasure, irritation, moral and righteous indignation, wrath, hatred, being in 
a bad mood, sulking, bitterness, rancor, acrimony, hatred, outrage, fury, raving, 
fretting, frustration, plus all those metaphors, fuming, foaming, simmering, 
stewing, boiling over, bristling, bursting, being hot-headed, becoming 




This section has shown that assumptions of science in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century drove the understanding of emotion away from that of a  subjective 
experience.  Psychologists attempted to present a concept of emotion which was 
isolated, structured, predictable and replicable.  The subjective descriptions of 
emotion, in contrast, had shown it to be often characterised as rooted in experiences 
and attitudes, chaotic, fluid and idiosyncratic.  These attributes were often ignored by 
theorists as the drive for scientific progress took precedence.  Thus the understandings 
of emotion they produced lacked something of the meaning, essence or quality of 
emotion as experienced and, perhaps ironically, caused a proliferation of 
understandings of emotion to be produced as psychologists attempted to produce an 
understanding of emotion which was scientifically useful.  The following section will 
discuss what these findings have to tell us about the current problem with the definition 
of emotion in psychology.   
 
7.3  Revisiting the current problem 
This section will return to the problems set out in Chapter One as to the current 
proliferation of definitions of emotion and lack of consensus.  First, it will discuss the 
way in which the assumptions under which scientific psychology were formed 
continue to be a feature of current psychological epistemology; second it will examine 
the extent to which the subjective experiences of psychologists as human beings 
continue to be a part of psychological theorising; and third, it will describe the effect 
on the concept of emotion of the increasing diversity of the frameworks within which 
it is studied.  It will then, briefly, return to the suggestions made in the current literature 
as outlined in Chapter One as to the reasons for and solutions to the problem of 
definition in the light of the findings.   
There is no doubt that modern psychology still embodies the traditions of its nineteenth 
century forebears.  Psychology more than any other science has seemed unable to 
discard its history and move into new ways of conducting scientific work (Smith, Harré 
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& van Langenhove, 1995).  This issue is also described by Bevan (1991), who cites 
Daniel Robinson’s argument that American psychology continues to follow the lead 
of the nineteenth century psychologists in terms of how problems are formulated.  
Current psychology, therefore, still adheres to conventions set out in the early days of 
the discipline – most notably the issue of the need to understand psychological 
phenomena in terms of their universality.  Indeed, this assumption lies at the heart of 
the problem dealt with in this thesis: that it is seen as not only desirable but necessary 
for psychologists to find consensus on a universal definition of emotion.  While, as 
Danziger (2007) describes, there has – since around the 1960s and 1970s - been more 
criticism of this universality hypothesis and arguments for cross cultural and discursive 
understandings which allow qualitative differences to be highlighted, there is still a 
deeply held assumption that the purpose of scientific psychology is to emphasise what 
is similar between people, rather than what is different.  Current psychologists, largely 
continue to adhere to this conviction and criticisms of the methodological and 
ontological foundations on which psychology has been constructed go unheeded and 
as a result the picture today is not dissimilar from that of the early days of 
psychological science. 
While psychologists explicitly used introspection as a method, there was, to some 
extent at least, a focus on each theorist’s individual description rather than abstractions 
from a sample of participants.  There was, and still is, however, a presumption that 
progress in understanding emotion is to be found by looking for general rather than 
particular cases.  However, as has been described, an accepted general understanding 
of emotion from which to present exceptions to the rule has not been forthcoming.  
Nevertheless, there is still in current psychology, as there was in the nineteenth 
century, the belief that with enough time and with the right epistemological 
framework, that a correct universal definition of emotion will be discovered.  
As shown in the previous section scientific conceptualisations of emotion are often 
driven by the need to define it as measurable and replicable.  Scientific procedures and 
statistical techniques have been developed to aggregate and average psychological 
characteristics.  These are relied on in psychology as a means to present universal data: 
for example, in the use of measures of central tendency; in the rejection of ‘outliers’ 
and in the rejection of data that does not produce a significant result.  Studies are 
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selected and designed, not only to study what can be measured but to find what might 
be typical and to leave the untypical unexamined.  The hypotheses which are being 
tested in these and on which the advancement of universally applicable theories relies, 
are accepted or rejected solely on the basis of the discovery of typicality.  It is in the 
context of the psychological laboratory where the defining of emotion now takes place, 
but the legacy of the ideas of the early nineteenth century psychologists is still present.  
While there are no longer systematic expositions of the mind, there are still 
assumptions that in the laboratory, emotion can be isolated, operationalized and 
examined out of the context in which it typically arises.  There is still an assumption 
that it can be described in terms of a set of pre-selected characteristics and that it can 
be formed into a scientific object in relation to the discovery of these characteristics.  
There is also still an assumption that with the right method of observation an accurate 
picture of emotion will be discovered.   
As time goes on, however, the continued proliferation of definitions of emotion and 
lack of consensus in psychology, would seem to suggest that the methods which are 
designed to produce replicable data on which universal definitions and theories may 
be based, rather create abstract understandings of the concept.  There are many 
examples of how this happens – here I describe three in particular.  First, while the 
data they present may be replicable in particular methodological contexts, they do not 
make a secure basis for producing good, coherent and universal theories of emotion 
because their significance is related so deeply with the context in which they are 
created.  Second, the obsession with averages means that data which does not show 
statistical significance is rejected, thus sets of findings which show a picture other than 
universality are not published.  Theorists, therefore, search for the experiments that 
will give them significant findings and to an extent this means that these are self-
fulfilling prophecies.  Third, it must also be remembered that the approaches and 
methods of scientific psychology, as shown by the period covered in this thesis, are 
subject to change over time.  While the underlying assumptions as to the nature of 
valuable psychological knowledge have remained fairly stable over time, the concept 
of emotion has been described in relation to developments in frameworks of 
knowledge, not only those that have been discussed - physiological, evolutionary and 
behavioural - but more recently cognitive and neuroscientific.  These have developed 
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often as a result of changes in the technology which has been employed in the 
observation of emotion: the photograph, the kymograph, the galvanometer, and more 
recently the computer and the fMRI scanner.  The use of these new technologies and 
the domains of knowledge that they operate within, as Gergen (1996) describes, has 
resulted in changes in the metaphors through which emotion is defined.  The terms of 
definition have been heavily influenced in psychology by the methods adopted.   
The concept of emotion in psychology is so bound up with the methods and forms of 
analysis that it is no wonder that it does not reflect the idea of emotion as an individual 
experience.  This position is perhaps understandable given the impossibility of 
studying every person and producing purely idiosyncratic accounts of emotion.  
However, this approach often results in the assumption that the abstractions produced 
by experimentation are representative accounts and fail to account for those instances 
which show anything outwith a ‘normal’ range of behaviour.  It oversimplifies the 
phenomena being studied.  Indeed, the primitiveness of current methods in psychology 
is often surprising.  This was described by Bevan (1991, p. 476), 
Both the model of the science-making process and its affiliated metaphysics 
remains simplistic, if not simple-minded.  Although much has been made of 
the alleged cognitive revolution, we continue to be stubbornly reductionistic 
and mechanistic in the way that physics was mechanistic before the advent of 
relativity theory. 
 
The study of the experiences of participants are therefore often shaped to fit with this 
reduced  and simplified cause and effect understanding of emotion and the differences 
and nuances between people and their experiences are lost. 
The second point to be made in this section is that not only are participants’ 
experiences shaped to fit experiments, but the experiences of psychologists are pushed 
aside by the methodological assumptions that exist to generate scientific accounts, 
above all, by the assumption of objectivity.  Although Chapter Six ends with the 
continued use of introspection there is no doubt that since then explicit reference to 
the experiences of psychologists in relation to their work has fallen out of favour while 
introspection has never gone away (Costall, 2006).  The subjective involvement of 
psychologists in the construction of accounts of emotion is overlooked or seen as 
irrelevant in the process of producing a scientific account.  As Slife and Williams 
209 
 
(1995) describe, however, these are profoundly influential on the kinds of data that are 
generated.  They claim that, “scientists decide what to study, how to understand what 
is being studied, how to measure it, what to control for, and what not to control.  The 
very definitions and framing of a research question are shot through with traditions, 
history, expectations, values, and other subjective factors” (p. 193).  Ignoring the input 
of psychologists’ experiences of emotion to the accounts that are produced means that 
inaccurate accounts of how the findings were arrived at are often presented.  Bevan 
(1991, p. 476) identifies this as being an issue, 
When one examines in a first-hand way how scientists actually think and 
behave, one quickly understands that formal accounts of the process and what 
actually takes place are very poorly matched. Real-life scientific problem 
solving does not really happen according to the canonical script. It involves 
impressive amounts of tacit knowledge that never surface in formal reports and 
is a far richer, more complex, and more intuitive process than any textbook 
account ever suggests. 
 
Gergen (1973, p. 311) has argued similarly that, “as socialized human beings, we 
[psychologists] harbor numerous values about the nature of social relations.  It is the 
rare social psychologist whose values do not influence the subject of his research, his 
methods of observation, or the terms of description”.  The illusion of objectivity that 
exists in psychology means that accounts of emotion are produced which, although 
written from the point of view of an objective observer in the language of the concepts 
and methods of psychology have still been influenced by the subjective choices made 
by individual psychologists.  When psychologists were more explicitly reflective on 
their own experiences of emotion, as well as their own philosophical positions, there 
was a far greater understanding of why they might advocate particular views of 
emotion, the subjectivity of psychologists was accepted as part of the process of 
understanding and the context within which the theory or definition was constructed 
was more apparent.  Further, as Klein (1942) was to argue, in discussing the 
disappearance of the kind of introspective psychology exhibited by the likes of James, 
Ladd and Stout, these theorists, while not producing experimental data, nevertheless 
provided empirical evidence, gleaned from their own experiences.  Their evidence, 
while being neither scientifically verifiable nor replicable, provided psychology with 
some of the most valuable insights into the human mind.  This contrasts with the 
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current production of definitions of emotion as detached scientific objects which 
appear to have nothing whatsoever to do with the experiences of the people that 
produce them.   
Thirdly, not only are scientific accounts of emotion abstractions but, because 
psychology is a diverse discipline, these continue to be constructed in relation to 
particular frameworks of knowledge.  This thesis has described several strands of 
thought that were prevalent by the nineteenth century, and the number has continued 
to increase over the twentieth and twenty first centuries.  As time goes on the number 
of domains within which emotion is studied in psychology have grown as a means to 
find a way to discover the truth about emotion.  Henriques (2004, p. 1207) describes 
what happens when a fragmented discipline attempts to theorise, 
Currently psychology exists as an uneasy compromise between unification and 
fragmentation. On the one hand the existence of numerous societal institutions 
suggests that psychology is a singular entity at some level…a more detail 
inquiry reveals a remarkable degree of confusion, fragmentation, and chaos at 
the theoretical level. 
 
The current problem of the lack of consensus on the definition of emotion in 
psychology, therefore, must be understood not simply as a result of the inability of 
psychologists to ‘discover’ what emotion is, but as a result of the diversification of a 
discipline which, historically, has struggled to decide what its subject matter should 
be.  As time has gone on this issue has only got worse as more and more ontological 
positions have been developed through which to understand the phenomenon.  This 
analysis concurs with Staats (1983 as cited in Henriques, 2011) who describes 
psychology as a discipline which is unable to reconcile the concepts that it produces.  
He argues that psychology has no means by which to integrate theories but seems to 
rather encourage the proliferation of different “scientific products” without looking at 
how these can be consolidated.  This has resulted in a, “a buzzing confusing mass so 
huge and ominous that even if there were organizing ideas, they would not be found 
because everyone is intent on inventing a new concept or term to measure rather than 
building on existing knowledge” (p. 28). 
As was highlighted in the previous section and other chapters of the thesis, the search 
for universality has not, therefore, caused psychologists to narrow down the range of 
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ontological or theoretical options open to them.  It seems, rather, that the pursuance of 
universal knowledge in psychology has resulted in the proliferation of ways of 
understanding emotion.  The production of abstracted theories of emotion within 
‘empirical domains’ may cause, for those working within these areas, an illusion of 
their universality because these are supported by the epistemological and 
methodological constraints of the domain in which they are constructed.  However, 
when taken out of the domain they lose their predictive power.  Further, as described 
in the previous section, the development of these domains, is the cause of difficulties 
in the comparison of theories and it is no wonder, therefore, that consensus is hard to 
achieve.  As Danziger says,  
Most of the time, psychological theories do not travel well.  Take them out of 
their appropriate empirical environment and they seem like fish out of water. 
This is because the rules used in the construction of empirical domains tend to 
be based on the same fundamental assumptions as the theories devised for the 
explanation of these domains.  If one abstracts theories from their proper 
empirical context and tries to apply them in an empirical context constructed 
on fundamentally different, perhaps opposite, principles, one is either engaging 
in a meaningless or self-contradictory exercise. (1993, p. 6) 
 
Interestingly, therefore, the perceptions of emotion as produced within different 
domains display the same characteristics of idiosyncrasy as those described in the 
previous chapters, particularly by the early introspectionists.  They are pertinent only 
to the individual domains in which they exist and while they may be expressed in terms 
theorists of other domains might understand, there is still a peculiarity to them which 
makes sense only within the structures of each domain.  This could be seen to parallel 
the experience of emotion itself which if abstracted and isolated from the human 
domain in which it is usually experienced loses something of its significance.  In both 
instances, emotion is defined and understood within particular contexts, whether in the 
individual mind and body or within specific frameworks of knowledge. As the 
introspectionists found when they tried to debate their understandings of emotion there 
was no adjudicator and no agreed benchmark on which their different perceptions of 
emotion could be judged.  The construction of a plethora of psychological definitions 
of emotion throughout psychology’s history has echoed the nature of the subjective 
experience of emotion in individuals: that while we may understand it to be a universal 
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phenomenon, the ways in which people experience, discuss or appraise their emotions 
may be highly individual and context specific.  
To close this section I return to the suggestions made in Chapter One as to the reasons 
for and solutions to the problem.  The argument was made in Chapter One that there 
is no consensual definition of emotion because it has many aspects.  In the light of a 
diverse psychology it would seem, rather that it is the discipline that has many aspects 
and that it has imposed its features on the concept.  This process has been shown in 
the way in which understandings of emotion in the nineteenth century moved away 
from the conceptualisation of it as a mental state  and experience to embrace its 
accompaniments as part of the emotion through the use of physiological and 
behavioural methods.  Mulligan and Scherer (2012), pick up in their argument that it 
is the adherence of psychologists to their own traditions that perpetuates the problem 
of consensual definition.  However, this analysis does not go far enough because they 
assume that this issue can be overcome by further abstracting a complex definition 
from drawing together aspects from different traditions.  They offer a possible 
‘working definition’ of emotion which they hope will transcend these differences by 
gathering up what they see as the most plausible characteristics of emotion in order to 
present an essentialist or prototypical view.  Nevertheless, they fail to take into account 
that these characteristics have been produced in accordance with particular 
assumptions about psychological knowledge and its production, and that they exist in 
relation to these assumptions.  It often feels as if theorists are attempting to go back to 
the drawing board, whilst failing to recognise that they are unable to do so because the 
various conceptualisations they draw on are built on the historical foundations of 
particular assumptions around the efficacy of a scientific psychological concept of 
emotion.  Scarantino and Griffiths’s (2012) argument about the separation of folk and 
scientific psychology would seem, also, in the light of the findings, to be more about 
some kind of imagined purity of science as untainted by human beings, their history 
and their experiences.  It does not take into account that the production of psychology 
is a human activity and that folk and scientific understandings, if indeed they can be 
separated out in that sense, are bound up in a reflexive process with each other as we 
as human beings endeavour to construct an understanding of our emotions.  Further, if 
scientific theories move too far away from the way in which we may commonly 
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understand ourselves, they start to lose their meaning.  Shealy (2005) has observed, 
for example, that, 
the scientific theories we create, studies we construct, analyses we conduct, 
and findings we report are too often too far removed from whatever human 
phenomena they are designed to explain, predict, or control. . . [W]hen we 
subsequently “feed” such theories and findings to our students and trainees, 
they often leave the table feeling empty and dissatisfied, because the 




7.4  Contributions of the thesis 
In this section I will highlight a couple of particular instances where I believe this 
thesis has added to the literature on the history of emotion before moving on to discuss 
the  main contributions to the literature on the problem of the definition of emotion in 
psychology that this thesis makes.  Each of these latter points are in some way related 
to the issue of contextualisation.  First, the thesis indicates that when emotion is 
defined outside the context of human experience it often lacks human significance.  
The second concerns the acknowledgement that the context in which emotion is 
observed and defined has profound effects on the way in which the concept is 
formulated.  Third, is the assertion that it has been demonstrated in these chapters that 
there is a need to contextualise present definitions of emotion in terms of psychology’s 
past. 
First, the thesis could be said to present an original approach to the issue of the 
definition of emotion because it looks at the conceptualisation of emotion in relation 
to the use of introspection in the work of the early psychologists.  This period of 
introspection appears to have been particularly neglected in historical work in 
comparison to the later method espoused by Titchener and has not been examined as 
a method for the study of emotion.  Perhaps that is why, although much attention has 
been devoted to James’s theory in the historical literature, little has been made about 
it being the product of introspective analysis.  In describing his advocacy of the method 
of introspection and appeals to experience as much as to physiological evidence in the 
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defence of his theory, this thesis attempts to address this neglect, and in so doing 
produces an alternative reading of the origin of this prominent theory.. 
More generally the thesis has, first, set the study of emotion and the methods used to 
study it in the context of psychology as a human activity.  It has described how it is 
within this context that the current issue of lack of consensus as to a definition of 
emotion must be understood, and has shown that while introspection was explicitly 
used as a method in psychology there was an acknowledgement of the involvement of 
the experiences of the psychologist in the understandings of emotion that were 
produced.  It has also demonstrated that psychologists are not simply objective 
observers but, as human beings, bring something of themselves to the work that they 
do.  It is important, therefore, that psychologists are able to acknowledge their own 
experiences as being part of the way in which they understand emotion.  In doing so 
the concepts that are produced could be set in context and, therefore, be presented in a 
more meaningful way.  This is something that has been taken on board by qualitative 
psychologists who understand how psychological research is shaped by the individuals 
who produce it and would benefit quantitative psychology also. 
Secondly, this thesis demonstrates the need for the acknowledgement of the effects on 
the concept of emotion of the context and conventions under which it is studied.  It has 
shown that it cannot be taken for granted that emotion is a complex concept but that 
it, rather, alters in relation to the frameworks through which it is understood.  It shows 
that there is a need to contextualise the definitions of emotion that are constructed in 
psychology and to understand that no one correct definition can be found because the 
concept of emotion is subject to the approaches and methods and these, as history has 
shown, tend to shift over time.  There may have to be an acceptance that the definitions 
of emotion that are produced are irreconcilable.  The findings back up Koch’s 
argument that it is perhaps futile to seek consensus, certainly among the different 
branches of psychology,  
The 19th-century belief that psychology can be an integral discipline, which 
led to its institutionalization as an independent science, has been disconfirmed 
on every day of the 112 years since its presumptive founding. When the details 
of that history are attended to, the patent tendency has been toward theoretical 
and substantial fractionation (and increasing insularity among the 
“specialties”), not toward integration. Moreover, there are many principled 
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considerations that underline the futility of seeking theoretical, conceptual or 
even paradigmatic unification. (Koch, 1993, p. 902) 
 
There is, therefore, the suggestion in the thesis, in contrast to those who believe that a 
consensual definition will be found, that a universal and stable depiction of emotion 
will not be discovered simply through experimentation and academic debate because 
it is rather that the concept of emotion, alters in relation to these.  What has been 
shown, is that within the paradigms of psychological science emotion is not under a 
process of continuous refinement but of a process of continuous diversification and 
alteration.   It differentiates as it is taken up by different theorists at different points in 
history, in relation to different paradigms, as it is discussed in different terms and as it 
is studied through different technologies.  The various meanings that are applied to it 
change between methodological and epistemological landscapes.  It is a moving target 
but not one that will be chased down.  Therefore, the meanings that it is given through 
being observed by psychologists should be contextualised and instead of chasing 
consensus, there should be an acceptance and contextualisation and understanding of 
difference and the process of change.  
This thesis has also reiterated the need for, and usefulness of, historical analysis in 
contextualising not only the conceptualisation of emotion but other issues faced in 
psychology today.  As has been demonstrated one of the problems that psychologists 
face in relation to the definition of emotion is that they work with the legacy that they 
have inherited from the traditions and assumptions rooted in the work of nineteenth 
century psychologists.  Most psychologists spend little time in examining how these 
affect the understandings that they produce and has resulted in the continuation and 
repetition of some simplistic notions as to what sorts of outcomes psychological 
science can achieve, such as a ‘true’ definition of emotion.  The extent to which this 
legacy is an issue revealed by Harré (cited in Smith, Harré and van Langenhove, 1995, 
p. 10):  “That a field of academic specialism should exist so shot through with 
conceptual confusions, unexamined assumptions from antique philosophical positions 
long since demolished and propounding theories of such gross implausibility seemed 
to be quite shocking”.  Again some reflection is required:  reflection on the 
epistemological and methodological legacies and where these have led psychology in 
the various ways in which it has conceptualised emotion.  Psychologists also work 
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with the inheritance of concepts of emotion which have been shaped in particular 
historical contexts.  It is, therefore, by contextualising the current situation through the 
use of historical enquiry that emotion can be understood both as a psychological 
concept and human experience.  Further, the concepts of emotion that have developed 
within scientific psychology are part of the history of human behaviour (Smith, 2007).  
At one level, the production of them demonstrates how we have endeavoured to make 
sense of our lives and our place in the world.  They also reflect historical and cultural 
values that are subject to change over time and must be understood in relation to the 
contexts which produced them.  As this thesis has shown, it is through examining the 
production of the psychological concept of emotion that we will come to understand 
its true significance and meaning. 
7.5 Conclusion 
This thesis started out by looking for a reason for the problem of a lack of consensus 
on a definition of emotion.  It has described how the concept of emotion was altered 
through scientific observation from being understood as a subjective experience to one 
which embraced many different factors and has shown that the drive for a universal 
depiction of emotion has, paradoxically, driven the concept in many different 
directions.  The relentless search for the holy grail of a consensual definition at the 
neglect of the individual experiences of emotion has perhaps sent psychologists off on 
the wrong track, or certainly a fruitless track.  It would seem that this obsession, in 
which the experimental participant’s experience is universalised and abstracted, and 
the psychologist’s own subjective experience in the process viewed as irrelevant, 
produces knowledge which fails to capture an understanding of emotion which makes 
sense when assessed in the cold light of everyday experience.  It is worth repeating 
Arnold’s (1960) statement presented in Chapter One, that, “When the connection 
between any system and common experience snaps, that system (and not common 
sense) is doomed.  At best, it will maintain itself in a forgotten eddy in the stream of 
scientific endeavour without contributing to scientific advance” (p. 6).  It is to 
individuals, both psychologists and the human beings that they study, that theories of 
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emotion must make sense.  If these stray too far from the experience of emotion and 
become too mechanistic or reductive they lose their ability to encapsulate the 
phenomena that they are attempting to capture. 
It is vital, therefore, that psychologists understand the need to contextualise their 
definitions, both in terms of their own experience, in terms of the research context and 
in terms of history in order to understand the significance of the theories and 
definitions of emotion that they produce.  In doing so more meaningful understandings 
of emotion can emerge.  As Solomon (2002) argues, 
Let us remind ourselves what fascinated most of us about the emotions in the 
first place: the convolutions of love, the dialectic of anger, resentment and 
revenge, the agonies of humiliation, embarrassment and shame, the long-term 
passions of Othello or an Iago and not the tenth of a second startle reaction or 
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